Dane "Ali" Haskins v. Christopher R. Casey

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2487-25 DANE "ALI" HASKINS, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. CHRISTOPHER R. CASEY, an individual, PATRICIA A. BARBUTO, an individual, PETER BJERREGAARD, an individual, and EKORNES, INC., an entity, Defendants-Appellants. _________________________ Argued August 26, 2026 – Decided September 21, 2026 Before Judges Gilson, Gummer, and Paganelli. On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Somerset County, Docket No. L-0025-23. Irene Hsieh argued the cause for appellants (Greenbaum Rowe Smith & Davis, LLP, attorneys; Irene Hsieh, of counsel and on the briefs; Cristian Gomez, on the briefs). Marc D. Portlock argued the cause for respondent. PER CURIAM In this employment case, defendants Christopher R. Casey, Patricia A. Barbuto, Peter Bjerregaard, and Ekornes, Inc. (Ekornes) appeal from an order granting plaintiff Dane "Ali" Haskins's partial summary-judgment motion in which he asked the trial court to enforce Section 40 of the Workers' Compensation Act (the WCA), N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 to -147, and a subsequent order denying defendants' reconsideration motion.1 In the summary-judgment order, the court permitted plaintiff at trial "to pursue compensatory damages . . . in connection with a bodily injury claim" based on a workplace accident and "to present evidence of medical benefits, temporary disability benefits and permanent disability benefits paid by . . . [d]efendants' workers' compensation carrier to the jury." We granted defendants' motion for leave to appeal and now reverse the orders. I. Plaintiff worked for defendant Ekornes as a material handler in one of its warehouses. On June 3, 2021, he filed an Employee Claim Petition with the 1 According to defendants, plaintiff incorrectly named defendant Patricia A. Barbuto as Tish Barbuto in his pleadings. We refer to her as Patricia A. Barbuto because she used that name in her submissions to the trial court and this court. A-2487-25 2 Department of Labor's Division of Workers' Compensation, seeking workers' compensation benefits in connection with "orthopedic injuries to [his] left shoulder" he had sustained in December 2020 at work while he was "reaching and [experienced a] subsequent fall[-]down incident involving pallets." (Capitalization modified). Plaintiff subsequently resolved his workers' compensation claim. Under the terms of the settlement agreement as memorialized in a November 17, 2022 "Order Approving Settlement," plaintiff was awarded $85,995 in permanent disability benefits. (Capitalization modified). Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit on January 10, 2023, by filing a complaint against Ekornes in the Law Division. Plaintiff later amended the complaint to add additional claims and to name as defendants Ekornes's president, chief financial officer, and director of human resources. In a May 22, 2025 second amended complaint, plaintiff alleged that after he filed his workers' compensation claim petition, Ekornes unilaterally had placed him on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 - 2654; denied his request for a work accommodation; and ultimately terminated his employment on December 3, 2021. Plaintiff pleaded several causes of action asserting violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), A-2487-25 3 N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50, based on disability, perceived-disability, and racial discrimination. Plaintiff also claimed defendants had engaged in fraudulent concealment in connection with the FMLA designation notice and had wrongfully discharged him "[i]n retaliation for [his] decision to lawfully exercise his rights to file a claim petition for workers' compensation benefits." Plaintiff sought "back pay, front pay, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorney's fees, costs, interest and such other relief as the [c]ourt deems equitable and just." He described his damages as "economic losses in the form of lost wages since his termination of employment with Ekornes" and "emotional distress as the result of his termination of employment with Ekornes." Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment, seeking "an [o]rder enforcing Section 40 of the [WCA]." Plaintiff also moved for summary judgment on his FMLA claims. Defendants opposed the motions and cross- moved for summary judgment on the FMLA claims. After hearing argument, the court entered a December 19, 2025 order, with an accompanying statement of reasons, denying the FMLA motion and cross-motion2 and granting plaintiff's 2 The parties did not seek leave to appeal the denial of the FMLA motion and cross-motion, and those issues are not before us. A-2487-25 4 Section 40 motion. Tracking the language in plaintiff's proposed form of order, the court in its order permitted plaintiff at trial to pursue compensatory damages, including pain, suffering and the loss of life's pleasures, in connection with a bodily injury claim at trial in the event the jury finds that [d]efendants unlawfully retaliated against him for filing a claim for workers' compensation benefits and/or wrongfully terminated him in violation of [the LAD]. The court also allowed plaintiff "to present evidence of medical benefits, temporary disability benefits and permanent disability benefits paid by . . . [d]efendants' workers' compensation carrier to the jury to support his claim for compensatory damages relating to his bodily injury claims." 3 The court denied defendants' subsequent reconsideration motion in a February 4, 2026 order. On leave granted, defendants appeal the Section 40 aspects of the December 19, 2025 order, as well as the February 4, 2026 order. II. "We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard that governed the trial court's determination." Padilla v. Young Il An, 3 Plaintiff's counsel represented to this court during oral argument that, despite the broad language of the order permitting plaintiff to submit to the jury evidence of the benefits Ekornes's workers' compensation carrier had paid him, he intended to present to the jury medical bills only and not evidence of the benefits plaintiff had received. A-2487-25 5 257 N.J. 540 , 547 (2024). Summary judgment is proper if, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, the record demonstrates "no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law." Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J. 449 , 471-72 (2020) (quoting R. 4:46-2(c)). "If there is no genuine issue of material fact, we must then 'decide whether the trial court correctly interpreted the law.'" Gill v. Dir., Div. of Tax'n, 481 N.J. Super. 17 , 23 (App. Div.) (quoting DepoLink Ct. Reporting & Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J. Super. 325, 333 (App. Div. 2013)), certif. denied, 261 N.J. 549 (2025). We review a reconsideration-motion order under an abuse-of-discretion standard and reverse it "when the [trial judge's decision] . . . is clearly unfair or unjustly distorted by a misconception of law." Sadeeshkumar v. Venugopal, 478 N.J. Super. 25 , 40 (App. Div. 2024) (alterations and omission in original) (quoting M.G. v. S.M., 457 N.J. Super. 286, 294 (App. Div. 2018)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the meaning of a statute is a question of law, we review a trial court's statutory interpretation de novo. Fuster v. Twp. of Chatham, 259 N.J. 533 , 546 (2025). In performing that de novo review, we are guided by the well- established principles of statutory construction. When interpreting a statute, we "determine and give effect to the Legislature's intent." In re H.D., 241 N.J. 412 , A-2487-25 6 418 (2020) (quoting N.J. Dep't of Child. & Fams., Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. A.L., 213 N.J. 1, 20 (2013)). "[S]tatutory construction begins with an examination of the plain language of the statute, 'ascrib[ing] to the . . . words their ordinary meaning and significance.'" State v. Higginbotham, 257 N.J. 260 , 280 (2024) (omission and second alteration in original) (quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)). "We 'may neither rewrite a plainly-written enactment of the Legislature nor presume that the Legislature intended something other than that expressed by way of the plain language.'" Ibid. (quoting O'Connell v. State, 171 N.J. 484, 488 (2002)). "[W]e 'strive for an interpretation that gives effect to all of the statutory provisions and does not render any language inoperative, superfluous, void or insignificant.'" Fuster, 259 N.J. at 547 (quoting G.S. v. Dep't of Hum. Servs., 157 N.J. 161, 172 (1999)). To determine legislative intent, we "look not only at the particular statutory language but also to the design of the statute as a whole." Est. of DeMartino v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 373 N.J. Super. 210, 219 (App. Div. 2004). The WCA "provide[s] employees injured in the workplace 'medical treatment and limited compensation without regard to the negligence of the employer.'" Vitale v. Schering-Plough Corp., 231 N.J. 234, 250 (2017) (quoting A-2487-25 7 Est. of Kotsovska ex rel. Kotsovska v. Liebman, 221 N.J. 568, 584 (2015)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also N.J.S.A. 34:15-7. "The remedial objective of the [WCA] is 'to make benefits readily and broadly available to injured workers through a non-complicated process.'" Ibid. (quoting Tlumac v. High Bridge Stone, 187 N.J. 567, 573 (2006)). In general, "workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy for injured employees who qualify under the [WCA]." Rodriguez v. Shelbourne Spring, LLC, 259 N.J. 385 , 395-96 (2024). Under N.J.S.A. 34:15-8, which is the exclusive-remedy provision of the WCA, "[i]f an injury . . . is compensable under th[e WCA] . . . a person shall not be liable to anyone at common law or otherwise on account of such injury . . . for any act or omission occurring while such person was in the same employ as the person injured . . . except for intentional wrong." Therefore, "[t]he only exception to th[e] 'exclusivity bar' . . . is for injuries caused by 'intentional wrongs,' for which an employee may still seek redress under common law causes of action." Rodriguez, 259 N.J. at 396 (quoting Millison v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 101 N.J. 161, 177 (1985)). Section 40 of the WCA, N.J.S.A. 34:15-40, "addresses situations in which a third person is liable to the employee for an injury." Greene v. AIG Cas. Co., A-2487-25 8 433 N.J. Super. 59, 64 (App. Div. 2013). In enacting Section 40, the Legislature "sought . . . to regulate 'the rights and responsibilities of the several parties concerned in compensation payments where, in the course of his employment, injury . . . comes to a workman as the result of the fault of a third party.'" Vitale, 231 N.J. at 251 (quoting U.S. Cas. Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 4 N.J. 157, 165 (1950)). "Section 40 permits a workers' compensation insurance carrier to seek reimbursement of benefits it pays when a third[]party, other than the employer, caused the employee's injury." Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting Talmadge v. Burn, 446 N.J. Super. 413, 416 (App. Div. 2016)); see also N.J. Transit Corp. v. Sanchez, 242 N.J. 78 , 78 (2020) (Patterson, J., concurring) (stating Section 40 "authorizes employers and workers' compensation carriers that have paid workers' compensation benefits to injured employees to assert subrogation claims"). In effect, Section 40 "imposes a lien in favor of the workers' compensation carrier '[i]f the sum recovered by the employee . . . from the third person or his insurance carrier is equivalent to or greater than the liability of the employer or [its] insurance carrier' under the [WCA]." Vitale, 231 N.J. at 251 (alteration in original) (quoting N.J.S.A. 34:15-40(b)). As the Court has explained, an earlier statutory scheme permitted an injured employee to recover not only A-2487-25 9 workers' compensation benefits but also any payments received from third-party tortfeasors. In this manner, employees were able at times to obtain double recoveries. Frazier v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 590, 596-97 (1995). Finding such double recoveries inequitable, the Legislature enacted N.J.S.A. 34:15-40, which, with some modifications since its original adoption in 1913, creates a lien in favor of the employer that attaches to the employee's recovery against other tortfeasors. [Pool v. Morristown Mem'l Hosp., 400 N.J. Super. 572, 575 (App. Div. 2008).] In seeking to introduce evidence of his work-related injury, plaintiff essentially reasons that his employer's workers' compensation carrier will have a lien against any recovery he might receive from his LAD claims. So, plaintiff asserts he should be able to pursue his personal-injury claim as part of his LAD claims. We reject that reasoning because plaintiff's work-related injury did not arise out of any claim of discrimination under the LAD. Moreover, before us, plaintiff's employer acknowledged that neither it nor its carrier would assert a worker's compensation lien against any recovery plaintiff may receive in his LAD action. In granting plaintiff's motion in this matter, the trial court relied on Richter v. Oakland Board of Education, 246 N.J. 507 (2021). In that case, the plaintiff, who was "a longtime diabetic and teacher, experienced a hypoglycemic event in A-2487-25 10 a classroom" in which "[s]he fainted, hit her head on a science laboratory table, and sustained serious and permanent life-altering injuries." Id. at 514 . After receiving workers' compensation benefits for those injuries, the plaintiff pursued a LAD claim. Ibid. She alleged her employer had failed to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic disability by denying her repeated requests "to change her schedule . . . so she could manage her blood sugar levels by having her lunch earlier in the day." Ibid. According to the plaintiff, that failure to accommodate caused the hypoglycemic event and her resulting bodily injuries. Ibid. The Court considered "whether [the] plaintiff's claim [wa]s barred by the 'exclusive remedy provision' of the WCA because she recovered workers' compensation benefits." Id. at 515 . The Court "conclude[d] th[e] plaintiff's LAD claim based on [the] defendants' alleged failure to accommodate her pre- existing diabetic condition [wa]s not barred by the WCA," ibid., and any jury award issued on that claim equaling or exceeding the workers' compensation benefits she had received would be subject to a Section 40 lien to prevent a double recovery, id. at 544 . That is not this case. This case does not involve a bodily injury caused by an employer's failure to accommodate a pre-existing disability. Plaintiff contends that under the LAD's broad penumbra, he should be able to present A-2487-25 11 evidence about his shoulder injury to the jury. Courts liberally construe the LAD because its "worthy purpose is no less than eradication of 'the cancer of discrimination in our society.'" Richter, 246 N.J. at 537 (quoting Smith v. Millville Rescue Squad, 225 N.J. 373, 390 (2016)) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, unlike the injury in Richter, the bodily injury at issue in this case – the shoulder injury – was not caused by discrimination, a failure to accommodate, or any other conduct the Legislature intended to eradicate with its enactment of the LAD. Instead, plaintiff's shoulder injury was the result of an "accident arising out of and in the course of employment" for which he appropriately received workers' compensation benefits, as the Legislature intended with its enactment of the WCA. Id. at 535 (quoting Millison, 101 N.J. at 174 ). If successful in proving his LAD claims, plaintiff is entitled to damages caused by defendants' discriminatory conduct, such as the lost wages and emotional-distress damages he alleged in his pleadings. See N.J.S.A. 10:5-3 (Legislature stating its intention that "damages be available to all persons protected by [the LAD]" based on the "personal hardships" they suffered "because of discrimination") (emphasis added); Tarr v. Ciasulli, 181 N.J. 70, 80 (2004) (finding that under the LAD, "we compensate victims for economic and A-2487-25 12 noneconomic injuries attributable to an employer's discriminatory conduct") (emphasis added) (citing N.J.S.A. 10:5-3); Morris v. Rutgers-Newark Univ., 472 N.J. Super. 335 , 355 n.10 (App. Div. 2022) (finding "[t]he LAD permits a jury to award compensatory damages . . . stemming from the unlawful conduct of the defendant") (emphasis added). Moreover, his employer's workers' compensation carrier will not have a lien claim against any potential damage award because no part of the LAD award would involve an exception to the bar under Section 40. Because the shoulder injury was not caused by defendants' alleged LAD-violative acts, plaintiff is not entitled in his LAD claims to damages related to that injury. Thus, the court erred in granting plaintiff's summary-judgment motion and in permitting plaintiff to pursue compensatory damages based on the shoulder injury and to present evidence to the jury regarding that injury and the workers' compensation benefits he had received for it. Plaintiff also argues his workers'-compensation retaliation claim entitles him to present evidence about and seek damages for his shoulder injury at trial. We disagree. N.J.S.A. 34:15-39.1 prohibits employers from "discharg[ing] or in any other manner discriminat[ing] against an employee as to his employment A-2487-25 13 because such employee has claimed or attempted to claim workmen's compensation benefits from such employer." See also Hejda v. Bell Container Corp., 450 N.J. Super. 173 , 192 n.10 (App. Div. 2017) (same). In enacting N.J.S.A. 34:15-39.1, the Legislature expressly determined the remedies for a violation of this statute: For any violation of this act, the employer or agent shall be punished by a fine of not less than $100.00 nor more than $1,000.00 or imprisonment for not more than 60 days or both. Any employee so discriminated against shall be restored to his employment and shall be compensated by his employer for any loss of wages arising out of such discrimination; provided, if such employee shall cease to be qualified to perform the duties of his employment he shall not be entitled to such restoration and compensation. [N.J.S.A. 34:15-39.1.] In N.J.S.A. 34:15-39.2, the Legislature, "[a]s an alternative to any other sanctions herein or otherwise provided by law," also authorized "the Commissioner of Labor and Industry [to] impose a penalty not exceeding $1,000.00 for any violation of this act." In Lally v. Copygraphics, 85 N.J. 668, 670 (1981), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that in addition to those statutory rights, "a plaintiff has a common law right of action for wrongful discharge based upon an alleged retaliatory firing attributable to the filing of a workers' compensation claim." A-2487-25 14 Thus, separate and apart from the statutory remedies, a plaintiff could pursue "a viable common law cause of action for civil redress." Id. at 671 . Plaintiff contends a defendant who retaliates against an employee for filing a workers' compensation claim should not benefit from the exclusivity provision of the WCA and, consequently, the employee should be able to obtain damages from a jury for the workplace injury that was the subject of the workers' compensation claim. The Legislature, however, did not include the setting aside of the WCA's exclusivity provision as a remedy among those it expressly identified in N.J.S.A. 34:15-39.1 and N.J.S.A. 34:15-39.2. Nor did the Court in Lally recognize that type of claim as a remedy in a common-law cause of action. In sum, we reverse the aspects of the December 19, 2025 order granting plaintiff's Section 40 summary-judgment motion and permitting plaintiff at trial to pursue damages based on his shoulder injury and to present evidence regarding the benefits paid by defendants' workers' compensation carrier relating to that injury. We also reverse the February 4, 2026 reconsideration- motion order. In so doing, we do not intend to otherwise limit plaintiff's pursuit of legally-viable claims for damages under his LAD, FMLA, and workers' compensation retaliation causes of action, such as his claims for lost wages and emotional distress. A-2487-25 15 Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. A-2487-25 16