J.S.A. v. L.O.R.

RECORD IMPOUNDED NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0692-25 J.S.A.,1 Plaintiff-Respondent, v. L.O.R., Defendant-Appellant. _______________________ Submitted September 15, 2026 – Decided September 21, 2026 Before Judges Firko and Bergman. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Passaic County, Docket No. FV-16-2179-25. L.O.R., self-represented appellant. Respondent has not filed a brief. PER CURIAM 1 We use initials to protect the victim. See R. 1:38-3(d)(10). In this one-sided appeal, defendant L.O.R. appeals from a final restraining order (FRO) entered against her on June 24, 2025, pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. A Family Part judge entered the FRO based upon her findings defendant committed the predicate act of harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4, against plaintiff J.S.A., and that an FRO is necessary to protect plaintiff from future acts of domestic violence. On appeal, defendant argues there is insufficient evidence supporting the judge 's findings she committed the predicate act of harassment, and the judge erred by concluding an FRO is necessary to protect plaintiff from future acts of domestic violence. Unconvinced, we affirm. I. The facts were presented at the two-day hearing conducted on June 4 and June 24, 2025.2 Plaintiff was self-represented, and defendant was represented by counsel. The parties dated for three or four months before ending their relationship in the summer of 2023. At the time of the hearing, plaintiff was 2 Defendant did not include a copy of the domestic violence complaint in her appendix. A-0692-25 2 subject to an FRO entered in favor of defendant against him in December 2023, which was amended in June 2024. 3 Plaintiff filed a domestic violence complaint against defendant alleging the predicate acts of assault and harassment based on an April 18, 2025 incident. The court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) based on the allegations in the complaint. Defendant resides in the same building as plaintiff's mother. Both parties testified. Defendant presented her sister, D.R., and brother, M.R., as witnesses. The judge was provided with documents by both parties, including photographs. The parties offered differing versions of the events leading up to plaintiff's filing of his complaint and the court's issuance of the TRO. Plaintiff testified that he was "blocked" from seeing his mother where she resides because of the FRO defendant had issued against him. Plaintiff explained that his mother resides on the fifth floor, and defendant resides on the fourth floor of the same building. According to plaintiff, the parties dated for three months in 2023. Regarding the predicate acts alleged in the complaint, plaintiff testified that on April 18, 2025, defendant drove to his residence and "slapped" him in the face because he refused to dismiss the charges he filed against her pending in municipal court. Plaintiff stated he recognized 3 Docket number FV-16-1019-24. A-0692-25 3 defendant's car because "she slashed [his] tire before" and "busted [his] window." Plaintiff testified he was walking out of his house and was on his way to work when the incident occurred. In response, plaintiff testified he called the police. Plaintiff recalled defendant's "outfit" and "hairstyle" and identified her. Plaintiff stated defendant was wearing the same outfit at the hearing as she had worn on the date of the incident. Plaintiff explained defendant was "so angry" because she was about to be evicted for non-payment of rent and used him as an "excuse" to stay in her apartment. Plaintiff's prior domestic violence complaint against defendant, which he dismissed, was marked as evidence by the judge and provided the prior history of domestic violence between the parties. The police report was entered into evidence for the sole purpose of "corroborating" plaintiff's testimony that he called the police on the date of the incident. Plaintiff showed the judge a photograph he took before the police arrived depicting the damage to his car window, which was moved into evidence. Plaintiff testified defendant had showed up at his residence "two to three times." Plaintiff sought the issuance of an FRO because he "can see this going for [ten], [twenty] years," and defendant should not "get away with coming by [him]" without being held "accountable." A-0692-25 4 On cross-examination, plaintiff conceded defendant had an FRO entered against him and that he was charged with contempt for violating the FRO. In particular, plaintiff admitted he was charged with contempt for appearing outside of defendant's apartment building. Plaintiff acknowledged he kicked the mirror off defendant's vehicle and was ordered to pay $506 in damages. Plaintiff testified he observed defendant "smash" his car window with a "brick in her hand." The judge then asked plaintiff how close in proximity defendant was when she came to his home on April 18, 2025. Plaintiff answered "three" or "four inches away from him." He stated that defendant "tried to" slap him, but he "moved away." Defendant testified that on April 18, 2025, she was staying with relatives at her mother's home to "feel safe." Defendant explained she uses Google Timeline to "document" her movements and location. A phone location screenshot from defendant's cell phone was moved into evidence. Defendant stated she had Ring camera footage depicting the entire day of the alleged incident, which was played in court and moved into evidence. Defendant testified about text messages she exchanged with plaintiff through their "WhatsApp" chat in 2023. According to defendant, plaintiff texted he was going A-0692-25 5 to leave her alone, but he was "obsessed" and called her a "bum person," who is "not real," and "only wanted to f***." The text messages were moved into evidence. Defendant denied ever damaging plaintiff's vehicle and claimed she "never touched" him. Defendant stated plaintiff continued "to harass [her]" after she obtained the first restraining order against him, which she later dismissed "in good faith" because plaintiff assured her that "he would leave [her] alone." Defendant testified that two weeks later, plaintiff "broke [the] side view window" of her car, "peed all over [her] front door," made "several threats," and told her the restraining order "wasn't going to do anything." Defendant stated plaintiff sent her mother and sister threatening messages and "mailed things" to her mother's house. Defendant testified plaintiff's "stalking" has "escalated" since she obtained the FRO. Defendant testified she "lost her job because of this" and has pending criminal charges in municipal court based on alleged "terroristic threats" allegedly contained in the text messages. D.R. testified that on April 18, 2025, she picked up defendant from their mother's house around 2:00 p.m. and proceeded to attend a birthday party. D.R. testified that defendant was with her until "9:30, nine, nine-ish, 10:00." According to D.R., defendant does not drive, and "doesn't go out . . . since the A-0692-25 6 whole situation went down." D.R. testified that defendant is "trying to be on full surveillance" and "make sure she's seen." D.R. stated defendant does not go to plaintiff's residence "at all." On cross-examination, D.R. testified she "was told" plaintiff was caught on defendant's surveillance cameras. However, D.R. never reviewed the footage. D.R. testified she never met plaintiff before. M.R. testified he did not know plaintiff "at all" and had previously seen him "maybe twice." On one occasion, M.R. explained plaintiff stopped him and asked if he was defendant's brother. M.R. testified he had never seen plaintiff before and questioned who he was. In response, M.R. testified that plaintiff stated, "I got your sister [defendant] arrested. I'm the reason why your sister went to jail." On the second occasion, M.R. explained he was coming out of a pharmacy sometime in 2024, when plaintiff pulled up in a car and told him, "I found you." M.R. stated he did not know anything about plaintiff at the time. On cross-examination, M.R. confirmed he never saw plaintiff at any time previously. M.R. also denied seeing plaintiff at the shelter where his cousin worked. Following the testimony and closing statements, the judge rendered an oral decision. The judge found jurisdiction under the PDVA based on the A-0692-25 7 parties' prior dating relationship. The judge found plaintiff "more credible" than defendant, D.R. "credible," and M.R. "credible," but did not give M.R.'s testimony any weight because he did not remember any dates or pertinent events. The judge noted that during plaintiff's testimony, defendant "was often very dramatic," "interrupted his testimony," and "made a lot of faces." In contrast, the judge found plaintiff "credible" and highlighted that he "admit[ted] facts not in his favor." The judge observed that plaintiff offered the prior domestic violence complaint in evidence to "corroborate his prior history," which was "quite awful." The judge found defendant committed the predicate act of harassment. Although both parties testified that their three-month dating relationship ended in 2023, the judge determined a year later, defendant was "busting windows" and "slashing tires" on plaintiff's vehicle. The judge remarked plaintiff's demeanor and tone of his voice expressed he is "aggravated," and credited his testimony that defendant "continues to show up at places he's at." The judge found plaintiff is "afraid" of what defendant is "going to do," "how she is going to set him up," and he wants to be "left alone." The judge recounted plaintiff dismissed his last restraining order against defendant hoping the parties "would have no more contact," but that did not A-0692-25 8 happen. The judge emphasized defendant's contact with plaintiff "has just not stopped despite the fact that she has [an FRO] against him." The judge determined defendant's conduct "is annoying and upsetting" to plaintiff. Accordingly, the judge entered the FRO based on the predicate act of harassment. The judge found the predicate act of assault was not established. This appeal followed. II. Generally, "findings by a trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015). "We accord substantial deference to Family Part judges, who routinely hear domestic violence cases and are 'specially trained to detect the difference between domestic violence and more ordinary differences that arise between couples.'" C.C. v. J.A.H., 463 N.J. Super. 419 , 428 (App. Div. 2020) (quoting J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 482 (2011)). "[D]eference is especially appropriate 'when the evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility.'" MacKinnon v. MacKinnon, 191 N.J. 240, 254 (2007) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998)). We will not disturb a trial court's factual findings unless "they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and A-0692-25 9 reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412 (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). However, we do not accord such deference to legal conclusions and will review such conclusions de novo. Thieme v. Aucoin- Thieme, 227 N.J. 269, 283 (2016). The purpose of the PDVA is to "assure the victims of domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse the law can provide." G.M. v. C.V., 453 N.J. Super. 1, 12 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting State v. Brown, 394 N.J. Super. 492, 504 (App. Div. 2007)); see also N.J.S.A. 2C:25-18. Consequently, "[o]ur law is particularly solicitous of victims of domestic violence," J.D., 207 N.J. at 473 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 584 (1997)), and courts will "liberally construe[] [the PDVA] to achieve its salutary purposes." Cesare, 154 N.J. at 400 . To determine whether the entry of an FRO is appropriate, the court must first "determine whether the plaintiff has proven, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that one or more of the predicate acts set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19[(a)] has occurred." Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112, 125 (App. Div. 2006). If the court finds the defendant committed a predicate act of domestic violence, then the second inquiry "is whether the court should enter a A-0692-25 10 restraining order that provides protection for the victim." Id. at 126 . While the second inquiry "is most often perfunctory and self-evident, the guiding standard is whether a restraining order is necessary, upon an evaluation of the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29[(a)](1) to -29[(a)](6), to protect the victim from an immediate danger or to prevent further abuse." Id. at 127 ; see also J.D., 207 N.J. at 475-76 . A. Defendant claims there is insufficient evidence supporting the judge's finding she committed the predicate act of harassment. More particularly, she argues the record lacks evidence she acted with the purpose to harass plaintiff because the judge relied on "pending, unadjudicated allegations to corroborate credibility." Defendant maintains the judge's credibility findings were "infected by legally improper considerations" and "demeanor-based observations." Defendant further argues the judge failed to conduct the independent second- step analysis required by Silver and N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a), and her "evidentiary management" deprived defendant of a meaningful opportunity to present a defense. Although harassment is "one of the most frequently reported" predicate acts of domestic violence, it also "presents the greatest challenges to our courts." A-0692-25 11 J.D., 207 N.J. at 475 . A harassment claim presents such a challenge because it "confounds [the court's] ability to fix clear rules of application" between "acts that constitute harassment" and acts that are "ordinary domestic contretemps." L.M.F. v. J.A.F., 421 N.J. Super. 523, 534 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting J.D., 207 N.J. at 475 ). To determine whether conduct constitutes harassment in the domestic violence context, a court must consider the parties' prior relationship. Cesare, 154 N.J. at 405 . Only by considering the parties' prior relationship and the parties' conduct under the totality of the circumstances can a court determine whether a communication constituted harassment. Compare Pazienza v. Camarata, 381 N.J. Super. 173, 182-84 (App. Div. 2005) (finding, based on the defendant's repeated prior unwanted contact with the plaintiff, that a single text message to the plaintiff about the show she was watching at the moment defendant sent the text message constituted harassment), with L.M.F., 421 N.J. Super. at 535-37 (holding an isolated incident of the defendant making a remark to the plaintiff when he was angry in the midst of their divorce was not harassment). In relevant part, a person commits the offense of harassment if, with purpose to harass another, he [or she]: (a) [m]akes, or causes to be made, one or more communications anonymously or at extremely A-0692-25 12 inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse language, or any other manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm; .... (c) [e]ngages in any other course of alarming conduct or of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy such other person. [N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a), (c).] Critical to this analysis is whether the defendant's actions were taken with a purpose to harass. R.G. v. R.G., 449 N.J. Super. 208, 226 (App. Div. 2017). "'[P]urpose[]' . . . is the highest form of mens rea contained in our penal code, and the most difficult to establish." State v. Duncan, 376 N.J. Super. 253, 262 (App. Div. 2005). "A person acts purposely with respect to the nature of his [or her] conduct or a result thereof if it is his [or her] conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result." Ibid. (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:2- 2(b)(1)). We may infer "a 'purpose to harass another' 'from the evidence presented' and from 'common sense and experience.'" Ibid. (quoting Hoffman, 149 N.J. at 577 ). Here, the evidence amply supports the judge's finding defendant engaged in conduct likely to cause annoyance or alarm with the purpose to alarm and seriously annoy plaintiff. Defendant's purpose was established by her own words and conduct. Plaintiff's unrefuted testimony established that defendant A-0692-25 13 slashed his car tire, broke his car window a couple of days before, and then sent him a picture of the broken window along with a text message. The judge made appropriate credibility findings and referenced the parties' testimony, the evidence, and defendant's demeanor. While demeanor is a permissible consideration in determining witness credibility, it was only one of the factors the judge considered. The judge found defendant's explanations not credible, placing on the record exactly why she found the explanations did not make sense. Thus, we conclude the judge properly found defendant engaged in conduct that annoyed plaintiff with knowledge it would frighten him. See J.D., 207 N.J. at 478 . The record supports that determination. Our Supreme Court has held "[t]he requirement that a court consider the past history of the parties, in the context of an allegation of . . . harassment, or other domestic violence, comports with the legislative intent of the statute." Cesare, 154 N.J. at 405 . The history of domestic violence is important "[b]ecause a particular history can greatly affect the context of a domestic violence dispute." Ibid. Therefore, trial courts must weigh the entire relationship between the parties and must specifically set forth their findings of fact in that regard. Furthermore, in making their determinations, trial courts can consider evidence of a defendant's prior abusive acts regardless of whether A-0692-25 14 those acts have been the subject of a domestic violence adjudication. [Ibid. (citing Roe v. Roe, 253 N.J. Super. 418, 431-32 (App. Div. 1992)).] With these principles in mind, we reject defendant's arguments, which ostensibly ask us to second-guess the judge's factual and credibility findings. Defendant challenges the admission of the police report into evidence not "for the truth of the matter" but to "corroborate" plaintiff's testimony. We review for plain error. R. 2:10-2. "[H]earsay[,] subject to a well-founded objection[,] is generally evidential if no objection is made." J.D., 447 N.J. Super. at 348-49 (citing State v. Ingenito, 87 N.J. 204 , 224 n.1 (1981) (Schreiber, J., concurring)). We have recognized: [a] party is free to waive objection to the admission of hearsay evidence. In some cases, parties may have no reason to question the accuracy of such hearsay, or may make "a strategic decision to try the case based on the documents, instead of possibly facing a witness's direct testimony." [Id. at 349 (quoting N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Perm. v. N.T., 445 N.J. Super. 478, 503 (App. Div. 2016)).] Here, the judge emphasized the police report was admitted into evidence solely to corroborate plaintiff's testimony that he called the police. As such, the A-0692-25 15 judge did not commit plain error. We are convinced the judge did not rely on inadmissible hearsay evidence to make her findings. The substantial credible evidence supports the judge's findings on both the predicate act of domestic violence and the parties' history of domestic violence. B. The evidence also demonstrated plaintiff proved he needed an FRO for defendant to leave him alone. "At its core, the [PDVA] effectuates the notion that the victim of domestic violence is entitled to be left alone. To be left alone is, in essence, the basic protection the law seeks to assure these victims." Hoffman, 149 N.J. at 584 . Having considered the record and the applicable law, we conclude the judge made adequate and appropriate findings under the second Silver prong. Defendant's actions were not domestic contretemps but rather comprised a conscientious effort to continue to purposely annoy and harass plaintiff years after the relationship ended. The record amply supports the judge's finding an FRO is necessary to protect plaintiff against future acts of domestic violence. To the extent we have not addressed an argument raised on appeal, it is because it lacks sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). A-0692-25 16 Affirmed. A-0692-25 17