Carline Inginac v. New Jersey Department of Corrections

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3674-24 CARLINE INGINAC, Appellant, v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent. ___________________________ Submitted September 15, 2026 – Decided September 23, 2026 Before Judges Vanek and Bergman. On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Corrections. Carline Inginac, self-represented appellant. Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Sookie Bae-Park, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Elizabeth Micheletti, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). PER CURIAM Appellant Carline Inginac, an incarcerated person at Edna Mahan Correctional Facility, appeals from the April 3, 2025, final agency decision of the New Jersey Department of Corrections (DOC) following a disciplinary hearing. The Acting Administrator of the DOC upheld a Disciplinary Hearing Officer's (DHO) finding of guilt and imposition of sanctions for commission of prohibited act *.153 (stealing/theft in violation of N.J.A.C. 10A-4- 4.1(a)(2)(xi)).1 We affirm. I. We glean the following facts from the record. The charges against Inginac stemmed from an incident on March 12, 2025, where video footage showed Inginac and other inmates entering the bed areas of two other inmates, who were in the infirmary, and removing items. Inginac was specifically observed placing items in the bed area of a third inmate. On April 3, 2025, the two inmates who owned the alleged stolen items submitted property claims, prompting an investigation and subsequent disciplinary charges against all inmates involved. 1 Under N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a), an inmate who commits a prohibited act "shall be subject to disciplinary action and a sanction . . . imposed by a [DHO]." "Prohibited acts preceded by an asterisk (*) are considered the most serious and result in the most severe sanctions." Ibid. A-3674-24 2 Procedurally, Inginac was served with the disciplinary report on April 4, 2025, and a hearing was held on April 8, 2025, before the DHO. Inginac entered "no plea," received counsel substitute assistance, and presented statements from two other inmates, which asserted she was performing her job duties as a property packer and did not steal any items. The DHO relied on the video and documentary evidence to find Inginac guilty, imposing a thirty-day loss of privileges. Inginac appealed administratively, and the guilty finding and sanctions were upheld by the Acting Administrator in an April 10, 2025, disposition. On appeal, Inginac argues: (1) the evidence, particularly the video recording, did not constitute substantial evidence of theft, as she was authorized to pack property and did not take items for herself; and (2) the DOC failed to comply with its own regulations regarding timely service of charges and hearings, resulting in prejudice. She contends that the delay between the incident and the service of the charge upon her was not justified by "exceptional circumstances" and that the violation of procedural rules warrants reversal. II. Our role in reviewing a decision on an incarcerated person's discipline is limited. Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J. Super. 186, 190 (App. Div. A-3674-24 3 2010). Generally, the decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless it was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or lacked the support of "substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole." Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980); see also N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.15(a) ("A finding of guilt at a disciplinary hearing shall be based upon substantial evidence that the inmate has committed a prohibited act."). "'Substantial evidence' means 'such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Figueroa, 414 N.J. Super. at 192 (quoting In re Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 35 N.J. 358, 376 (1961)). Nevertheless, while we accord deference to the agency, "we will not perfunctorily review and rubber stamp the agency's decision," Balagun v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 361 N.J. Super. 199, 203 (App. Div. 2003), and we must "engage in a 'careful and principled consideration of the agency record and findings, '" Williams v. Dep't of Corr., 330 N.J. Super. 197, 204 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting State–Operated Sch. Dist. of Newark v. Gaines, 309 N.J. Super. 327, 332 (App. Div. 1998)). Nonetheless, we "may not substitute [our] own judgment for the agency's, even though [we] might have reached a different result." In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011) (quoting In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474 , 483 (2007)). We also defer to the DOC's expert judgment in matters that "threaten A-3674-24 4 prison safety and security," such as drug possession. Blanchard v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 461 N.J. Super. 231 , 238 (App. Div. 2019) (citing Hamilton v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 366 N.J. Super. 284, 289 (App. Div. 2004)). When reviewing a prison disciplinary matter, we also consider whether the DOC followed the regulations adopted to afford inmates limited procedural due process. See McDonald v. Pinchak, 139 N.J. 188, 194-95 (1995); Jacobs v. Stephens, 139 N.J. 212, 220-22 (1995). In that regard, "[p]rison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due [to] a defendant in such proceedings does not apply." Jenkins v. Fauver, 108 N.J. 239, 248-49 (1987) (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974)). An inmate's more limited procedural rights, initially set forth in Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 525-46 (1975), are codified in a comprehensive set of DOC regulations. See N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.1 to -9.28. Those rights include entitlement to a limited right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.14, the opportunity to present witnesses, N.J.A.C. 10A:4- 9.13, and, in certain circumstances, the assistance of counsel substitute, N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.12. These regulations "strike the proper balance between the security concerns of the prison, the need for swift and fair discipline, and the due-process A-3674-24 5 rights of the inmates." Williams, 330 N.J. Super. at 203 (citing McDonald, 139 N.J. at 202 ). Applying these principles, we are satisfied there was substantial credible evidence in the record to support the DHO and Acting Administrator's findings. Moreover, we determine Inginac was afforded all the process she was due. We conclude the DHO's findings affirmed by the Acting Administrator were not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, and substantial credible evidence existed in the record supporting the finding that Inginac committed the prohibited act of theft. The record supports that the DHO reviewed the preliminary incident report, special custody report, clinical summary, statement s of the two inmates offered by Inginac, clinical study, and a videotape on file in the disciplinary office. The DHO noted that Inginac had been "observed on video stealing another [inmate's] property," that Inginac had "entered 'no plea'" and "explained what transpired," and that the staff reports and video evidence corroborated Inginac's guilt. Inginac did not dispute the authenticity of the security video, or that it accurately depicted the theft, the scene, and the people involved. Consequently, A-3674-24 6 the hearing officer was entitled to rely on the contents of the video as accurately depicting its contents. The record shows that the DHO and the Assistant Supervisor considered: (1) evidence that showed that two inmates had asserted property claims that multiple items had been stolen from their bed areas after they went to the infirmary; (2) video evidence and reports that reflected, instead of placing items in designated bags, Inginac hid items in another inmate's bed area; and (3) a special custody report claiming the inmate receiving the property from Inginac had made threats to retaliate against anyone who might make statements about the stolen belongings. We conclude the above proofs were substantial, credible evidence supporting the DHO's finding of guilt as affirmed by the Acting Administrator. In addition, the record adequately supports that Inginac received all the procedural safeguards required by Avant. She was provided notice of the charge against her more than twenty-four hours before the hearing. The DOC afforded Inginac the assistance of a counsel substitute for the hearing under N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.12. N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.8(b) provides that an inmate is entitled to a hearing "within seven calendar days of the alleged violation . . . unless such a hearing A-3674-24 7 is prevented by exceptional circumstances, unavoidable delays or reasonable postponements." N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.9 provides that a failure to adhere to this timeframe "shall not mandate the dismissal of a disciplinary charge," but the DHO "may, in its discretion, dismiss a disciplinary charge because a violation of time limits," considering "[t]he length of the delay," "[t]he reason for the delay," "[p]rejudices to the inmate in preparing his/her defenses[,]" and "[t]he seriousness of the alleged infraction." After our review of the record, we concur with the State that there was a reasonable basis for the short delay. The credible evidence shows the DOC was unaware of the theft until April 3, 2025, when a member of its team first received the allegation and conducted a review of the recorded videotape. After the DOC became aware of the incident, it served a disciplinary report upon Inginac the very next day, charging her with prohibited act, *.153, stealing/theft. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the short delay did not prejudice Inginac as she had adequate notice and an ample opportunity to assert all her defenses at the hearing. Affirmed. A-3674-24 8