State of New Jersey v. Yevgeniy Dekhtyar

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3775-24 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. YEVGENIY DEKHTYAR, Defendant-Appellant. _______________________ Argued September 17, 2026 – Decided September 23, 2026 Before Judges Mawla and Chase. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, Municipal Appeal No. MA25-005. Keith G. Napolitano Jr. argued the cause for appellant (Levow DWI Law, PC, attorneys; Evan M. Levow, of counsel and on the brief; Keith G. Napolitano Jr., on the brief). Melinda A. Harrigan, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Raymond S. Santiago, Monmouth County Prosecutor, attorney; Monica do Outeiro, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief; Paula Echeverria, Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief). PER CURIAM Defendant Yevgeniy Dekhtyar appeals from a July 14, 2025 Law Division order denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) from his 2019 driving while intoxicated (DWI) conviction. We affirm. In October 2018, Freehold Township police stopped defendant and charged him with DWI, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50; reckless driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-96; and unsafe lane change, N.J.S.A. 39:4-88. In January 2019, defendant, who was represented by counsel, entered a plea agreement. He agreed to plead guilty to DWI, and in exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the reckless-driving and unsafe-lane-change charges. During the plea hearing in Freehold Township Municipal Court, defendant admitted that, on the date of the stop, he consumed five to seven shots of vodka within thirty minutes and then drove while intoxicated. The court accepted the plea and imposed the mandatory sentence: fines; forty-eight hours at the Intoxicated Driver Resource Center; thirty days of community service; and a two-year driver's license suspension. Defendant did not file a direct appeal. In December 2024, nearly six years after his conviction, defendant filed a PCR petition. He argued the municipal court lacked authority to accept his plea A-3775-24 2 and impose a sentence because his factual basis did not include an admission establishing jurisdiction. He asked the court to vacate his guilty plea and restore the matter to the trial list. The municipal court heard the PCR petition in January 2025 and denied it the following month. The court concluded defendant had provided a sufficient factual basis because he knew he was appearing in Freehold Township Municipal Court. It also found defendant entered the plea knowingly and voluntarily. Defendant then appealed to the Law Division. After conducting a de novo review, the Law Division denied relief in July 2025. The court addressed the petition on the merits rather than on timeliness grounds. It reasoned that because defendant had not challenged the municipal court's jurisdiction before or during the plea hearing, the court was not required to elicit jurisdictional facts as part of the factual basis. The court also noted defendant had offered no proof the stop occurred outside Freehold Township and the traffic ticket was sufficient to support judicial notice that the stop occurred within the township. On appeal, defendant raises the following point for our consideration: THE LAW DIVISION ERRED IN HOLDING THE FACTUAL BASIS ELICITED BY THE COURT WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION. A-3775-24 3 At the outset, we affirm the denial of PCR, but on different grounds because defendant filed his petition more than five years after his DWI conviction. See State v. Heisler, 422 N.J. Super. 399, 416 (App. Div. 2011) (recognizing an appellate court may affirm on grounds different from those relied on below). Even if the time bar was relaxed, defendant's claim fails on the merits. On appeal from a Law Division decision reviewing a municipal court judgment, we review the Law Division's decision, not the municipal court. State v. Oliveri, 336 N.J. Super. 244, 251 (App. Div. 2001). We defer to the Law Division's factual findings if sufficient credible evidence supports them. State v. Powers, 448 N.J. Super. 69, 72 (App. Div. 2016). However, we review the Law Division's legal conclusions de novo. State v. Goodman, 415 N.J. Super. 210, 225 (App. Div. 2010). Defendant's PCR petition is time-barred under Rule 7:10-2(b). That Rule permits a petition to correct an illegal sentence at any time, but it requires a petition based on any other ground to be filed within five years of the judgment of conviction or sentence unless the defendant shows excusable neglect. Rule 3:22-12(a)(1)(A), the parallel rule governing criminal PCRs, uses similar A-3775-24 4 language but also requires a showing of a reasonable probability that enforcing the time bar would result in a fundamental injustice. Defendant's challenge is not of an illegal sentence. An illegal sentence is one that exceeds the maximum penalty for the offense or is otherwise not imposed in accordance with law. State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 247 (2000). Here, the municipal court imposed the minimum sentence within the statutory range for DWI. See N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a). The petition, therefore, does not fall within the Rule permitting an illegal sentence claim to be raised at any time. Defendant also cannot rely on Rule 7:10-2(g), which permits certain DWI PCR petitions to be filed at any time. That Rule is limited to petitions seeking Laurick1 relief. State v. Patel, 239 N.J. 424 , 447-48 (2019). Laurick relief applies to defendants who were not properly advised of their right to counsel and were not represented by counsel. Id. at 438 (citing Laurick, 120 N.J. at 4). Defendant does not fit that category because he was represented by counsel when he entered his guilty plea. As Patel makes clear, a defendant who seeks to vacate a DWI conviction on traditional PCR grounds remains subject to the general five-year time bar absent excusable neglect. 1 State v. Laurick, 120 N.J. 1 (1990). A-3775-24 5 Defendant also failed to show excusable neglect. In evaluating excusable neglect, we consider the length and cause of the delay, the prejudice to the State, and the importance of the defendant's claim. State v. Weil, 421 N.J. Super. 121, 129 (App. Div. 2011). Those considerations do not support relaxation of the five-year bar here. Nothing in the record establishes excusable neglect for that delay. The petition therefore should have been dismissed as untimely under Rule 7:10-2(b)(2). Even if the petition was timely, defendant's claim fails on the merits. Rule 7:6-2 governs guilty pleas in municipal court and requires the judge to address the defendant personally and determine that the plea is voluntary, informed, and supported by a factual basis. R. 7:6-2(a)(1). Rule 7:6-2(a)(1) follows the language of Rule 3:9-2 and is intended to afford defendants the same protection. Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2.1 on R. 7:6-2 (2015); see also State v. Gale, 226 N.J. Super. 699, 704 (Law Div. 1988). "For a plea to be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, the defendant must understand the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea." State v. Johnson, 182 N.J. 232, 236 (2005) (citing R. 3:9-2). A plea to DWI requires a defendant admit he "operate[d] a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or A-3775-24 6 habit-producing drug." N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. A court cannot accept a defendant's guilty plea "unless the defendant provides a factual basis establishing that he is guilty of the offense." State v. Tate, 220 N.J. 393, 397 (2015); R. 3:9-2; State v. Barboza, 115 N.J. 415, 420-21 (1989). A factual basis is sufficient when a defendant provides "either an admission or the acknowledgment of facts that meet 'the essential elements of the crime.'" Tate, 220 N.J. at 406 (citing State ex rel. T.M., 166 N.J. 319, 333 (2001)); State v. Gregory, 220 N.J. 413, 420 (2015). Defendant's plea provided an adequate factual basis because he admitted each material element of DWI during the plea colloquy. He told the court that on October 18, 2018, he drank five to seven shots of vodka and then drove his vehicle while intoxicated. Those admissions satisfied the elements of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. Defendant did not expressly state during the plea colloquy that he was driving in Freehold Township. But territorial jurisdiction is a non-material element and does not become an issue unless a factual dispute is raised before final judgment. State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 41 (2006); see also N.J.S.A. 2C:1- 14(i). As Denofa explains, territorial jurisdiction does not go to the heart of whether the offense was committed. 187 N.J. at 41 . A-3775-24 7 Because territorial jurisdiction is not a material element of DWI, the municipal court was not required to elicit an express jurisdictional admission as part of the factual basis unless defendant raised a factual dispute. He did not do so. During the plea hearing, defendant never challenged the court's jurisdiction or suggested Freehold Township Municipal Court was the wrong venue. As the Law Division noted, defendant also had notice of the court's asserted jurisdiction through the traffic ticket and by appearing in that court. In those circumstances, the absence of express admission that the offense occurred in Freehold Township did not render the plea defective. Defendant's remaining arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). Affirmed. A-3775-24 8