V.M. v. P.V.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0966-24 V.M.,1 Plaintiff-Respondent, v. P.V., Defendant-Appellant. _______________________ Argued September 15, 2026 – Decided September 22, 2026 Before Judges Natali and Bishop-Thompson. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Middlesex County, Docket No. FM-12-0885-05. P.V., self-represented appellant. V.M., self-represented respondent. PER CURIAM 1 We use initials to refer to the parties and their family members to protect their privacy and preserve the confidentiality of these proceedings. R. 1:38-3(d)(3). In this post-judgment matrimonial matter, defendant P.V. challenges certain portions of the court's October 25, 2024 order. Because we discern no abuse of discretion or legal error, we affirm. I. Plaintiff V.M. and defendant were married in May 2000 and divorced over six years later in November 2006. They share one child together, S.M., who was born in February 2004. He was twenty years old at the time of the October 25 order and had already attended Rutgers University and later Middlesex County College and was living with plaintiff. The parties' post-judgment litigation addressed the extent of S.M.'s contact with his parents, their responsibility for educational and medical expenses, and the amount of any support credits. When S.M. began college in 2022, plaintiff moved to recalculate child support as he was then living at Rutgers, and the court concluded that S.M.'s enrollment and residence on campus qualified as a changed circumstance. Following discovery related to the parties' updated financial information and a plenary hearing, the court, in an April 5, 2023 order, allocated responsibility for S.M.'s college costs and related expenses including the cost of an automobile between the parties based on their current incomes. The court found plaintiff A-0966-24 2 earned approximately $133,000 and defendant approximately $70,000 annually, concluded the parties' pro rata share of parental income was sixty-five percent to plaintiff and thirty-five percent to defendant, and determined the parties' weekly child support obligations accordingly. Motion practice ensued regarding enforcement issues and payment of S.M.'s educational expenses, in part, because defendant challenged her child support obligation, support credits, and probation account balance . Following several hearings, the court directed the parties to comply with the April 5 order related to college costs, automobile expenses, and other one-time expenses. In subsequent orders, the court also updated defendant's arrears to reflect her outstanding payments related to his education and car but credited defendant $2,000 for direct payments she had made directly to S.M. Notably, in a May 8, 2024 order, the court also directed the parties to participate in post-judgment economic mediation to address disputes regarding additional credits for prior support deficiencies. Following a series of medical issues, S.M. left Rutgers, began residing exclusively with plaintiff, and enrolled at Middlesex County College. After plaintiff filed a renewed application for changed circumstances reflecting S.M.'s change in residency, the court entered another order on September 11, 2024, in A-0966-24 3 which it imposed a new child support obligation on defendant that required her to pay plaintiff $123 per week in child support. Although the guidelines yielded a weekly support amount of $180, the court reduced defendant's obligation to $123 per week because defendant was already paying $57 per week directly to S.M. toward car and cellphone-related expenses. The court ordered probation to continue collecting the $57 weekly amount payable to S.M. and to collect the new $123 weekly support. The court also emphasized to the parties that S.M., now twenty years old, is still considered unemancipated for purposes of support, but that the court would not "micromanage" the parties' interactions regarding their adult child. The record does not indicate that either party appealed or moved to reconsider the September 11 order. Rather, defendant filed an application seeking, among other relief, to terminate or modify the newly-imposed child support obligation, and plaintiff filed a cross-motion, in relevant part, seeking to enforce the previous order. The court considered the parties' applications on October 25, 2024. At that hearing, defendant argued that her child support obligation to the plaintiff should be terminated, she should be permitted to pay support directly to S.M. to foster their relationship, and she was entitled to various credits for A-0966-24 4 overpayments and for funds allegedly withdrawn by the plaintiff from a joint account. She argued that plaintiff's higher income and her own financial circumstances were not adequately considered. She also requested to withhold payments for her son's college tuition until he maintains a certain grade point average and raised concerns about her access to S.M.'s medical information and her involvement in his medical care. In its corresponding order, the court denied the defendant's request to terminate her child support obligation, finding that S.M., though twenty years old, remained unemancipated and resided with the plaintiff, who was the parent of primary residence. The court found no "valid legal basis" to terminate or require that support be paid directly to S.M. and concluded plaintiff was entitled to child support to "help defray his shelter expenses and other expenses incurred on behalf of [S.M.]." The court granted defendant's request for information regarding access to S.M.'s medical appointments and providers and ordered both plaintiff and S.M. to keep her informed, but cautioned that defendant should respect S.M.'s increasing independence as a young adult. The court also granted mutual restraints with respect to interference regarding hospital visitation and directed both parties to refrain from denigrating each other to S.M. A-0966-24 5 The court further denied, without prejudice, defendant's requests for credits related to the joint account and for additional credits for alleged overpayments, finding her proofs deficient and noting that mediation on these issues had not yet occurred as required by its May 8, 2024 order. The court ordered the defendant to pay her share of S.M.'s college costs and directed wage garnishment for defendant's support obligation due to her arrears. Before us, defendant first argues that the court's order failed to address properly her concerns regarding S.M.'s well-being. She maintains that throughout their marriage and after the divorce, plaintiff has consistently interfered with her ability to participate in S.M.'s medical care and must inform her regarding his mental health. She explains that harassment, both during the marriage and in the years since, and manipulation of the legal system, warrants the termination of substantial modification of her child support obligations. Defendant also contends the court failed to consider the effect on S.M.'s well- being based on plaintiff's history of domestic violence and harassment. In her second argument, defendant maintains the court erroneously considered her "financial status" because she does "no[t have a] strong financial background to support this kind of [c]hild support obligation." She explains that her income has significantly reduced since the COVID-19 pandemic and A-0966-24 6 maintains the court failed to base its support order on the parties' respective incomes and resources and instead based it on the fact that plaintiff is the parent of primary residence. Finally, she also reprises her argument that the court failed to properly credit her for child support payments she made, and specifically $3,350 that she paid for S.M.'s support and expenses. We reject all of defendant's arguments and affirm the court's October 25, 2024 order substantially for the reasons detailed by the court in the order, concluding the court's factual findings are fully supported by the record and its consequent legal conclusions unassailable. 2 We add the following remarks. II. As a general proposition, "we accord great deference to discretionary decisions of Family Part judges." Milne v. Goldenberg, 428 N.J. Super. 184, 197 (App. Div. 2012) (citing Donnelly v. Donnelly, 405 N.J. Super. 117, 127 (App. Div. 2009)). This is "[b]ecause of the family courts' special jurisdiction 2 We note defendant's notice of appeal identifies provisions of the court's order which she has not addressed in her merits brief. We decline to address any issue not briefed and accordingly deem any unaddressed challenges waived. 539 Absecon Blvd., L.L.C. v. Shan Enters. Ltd. P'ship, 406 N.J. Super. 242 , 272 n. 10 (App. Div. 2009) (portions of final judgment set forth in notice of cross- appeal but not briefed deemed abandoned); see also Sklodowsky v. Lushis, 417 N.J. Super. 648, 657 (App. Div. 2011) ("An issue not briefed on appeal is deemed waived."). A-0966-24 7 and expertise in family matters . . . ." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998). We defer to factual findings "supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence" in the record. Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015) (citing Cesare, 154 N.J. at 411-12 ). "Reversal is warranted only when . . . the trial court's factual findings are 'so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice . . . .'" Reese v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super. 552, 567 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)) (alteration in original). Conversely, we review questions of law and the Family Part's legal rulings de novo. Amzler v. Amzler, 463 N.J. Super. 187 , 197 (App. Div. 2020). Child support determinations are governed by Rule 5:6A and the Child Support Guidelines under Appendix IX. See Child Support Guidelines, Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, Appendix IX to Rule 5:6A, www.gannlaw.com (2027). A Family Part judge must apply the Guidelines to all actions to establish or modify child support unless the court finds that their application would be inappropriate in a particular case. Gormley v. Gormley, 462 N.J. Super. 433 , 450 (App. Div. 2019). The Child Support Guidelines clarify that either "the PPR [Parent of Primary Residence] or the PAR [Parent A-0966-24 8 of Alternative Residence] may be the obligor of the support order depending on income and the time spent with the child." Pressler & Verniero, Appendix IX- A to R. 5:6A at ¶ 14(b). The support order is calculated based on the combined net income of the parents, adjusted to consider each parent's proportional share of the child support amount and the expenses incurred while caring for the child. Id. at ¶ 14(a). N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 authorizes the Family Part to modify alimony and child support awards when circumstances warrant. See Spangenberg v. Kolakowski, 442 N.J. Super. 529, 535 (App. Div. 2015). The statute expressly provides that support orders "may be revised and altered by the court from time to time as circumstances may require." Our courts have long interpreted this language to require a party seeking a modification to demonstrate "changed circumstances." Spangenberg, 442 N.J. Super. at 536 (alteration in original) (quoting Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 157 (1980)). In determining child support for college students specifically, the court must consider the factors provided in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. Jacoby v. Jacoby, 427 N.J. Super. 109, 121-22 (App. Div. 2012). A proper changed circumstances analysis "requires a court to study the parties' financial condition at the time of the divorce, as well as at the time of the application." Deegan v. Deegan, 254 N.J. Super. 350, 355 (App. Div. 1992). A-0966-24 9 For this reason, Rule 5:5-4(a) requires the moving party to append a copy of his or her prior and current case information statement. As we have stated: This mandate is not just window dressing. It is, on the contrary, a way for the trial judge to get a complete picture of the finances of the movants in a modification case. This is important because the movant bears the initial burden in such a case under Lepis, . . . [Palombi, 414 N.J. Super. 274, 287 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting Gulya v. Gulya, 251 N.J. Super. 250, 253-54 (App. Div. 1991) (citation reformatted)).] Further, "[c]ourts have consistently rejected requests for modification [of support obligations] based on circumstances which are only temporary or which are expected but have not yet occurred." Lepis, 83 N.J. at 151 . "[S]upport, whether set by court order or agreement, [may] be modified upon a showing of substantial, non-temporary changes in ability to support oneself or pay support." Gordon v. Rozenwald, 380 N.J. Super. 55, 67-68 (App. Div. 2005). Temporary unemployment is not grounds for a modification of support. Bonanno v. Bonanno, 4 N.J. 268, 275 (1950). Thus, the movant must show that the alleged change in circumstances is both permanent, Innes v. Innes, 117 N.J. 496, 504 (1990), and involuntary, id. at 523-24 (Stein, J., concurring in part). Contrary to defendant's arguments, there was no basis to terminate her child support obligation. Lepis, 83 N.J. at 157 . The court correctly concluded A-0966-24 10 that S.M., then twenty years old, living with his father, and attending college, remained unemancipated. The court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that S.M. was sufficiently mature to decide which parent he wished to live with and as the parent of primary residence, plaintiff was responsible for the shelter-related costs of S.M.'s residence. Because plaintiff also bore the higher pro rata share of child-related expenses, the court properly found that he was entitled to receive support directly from defendant to mitigate shelter and related expenses clearly contemplated by the Guidelines. Pressler & Verniero, Appendix IX-A to R. 5:6A at ¶ 14(a). We reach a similar conclusion with respect to defendant's challenges to the court's decision regarding the amount of any credits owed to defendant and her reimbursement obligation for college expenses. The court, based on the limited record before it, evaluated each of her claims individually and explained the basis for denial of certain of her claims on a prejudice basis based on the lack of competent evidence supporting her claims or the inability of the court to discern between support, payments, college expenses or voluntary payments due to the manner in which defendant commingled the funds and payments. Gnall, 222 N.J. at 428 (citing Cesare, 154 N.J. at 411-12 ). A-0966-24 11 The court also based its decision on defendant's failure to complete the previously ordered post-judgment economic mediation to specifically address the overpayment and credit issues which would have provided greater clarity to issues and objections raised by defendant. Nevertheless, the court granted defendant appropriate relief when defendant supported her claims with competent proofs. For example, the court ordered the Probation Department to remove improperly accrued arrears and acknowledged that a previous $2,000 credit was applied. Finally, defendant's remaining arguments regarding plaintiff's alleged misconduct, her own current financial hardship, and S.M.'s medical issues do not support reversal or a remand. Lepis, 83 N.J. at 151 . The court granted appropriate relief where the record and applicable law warranted it, and denied defendant's application to the extent her proofs were either insufficient or arguments reflected mere disagreements with the court's prior rulings. Defendant's claim that she could not afford the support obligation was raised at the 2023 plenary hearing and again in the 2024 motion proceedings. In 2023, the court expressly found that defendant failed to substantiate a loss of income. In 2024, the court denied termination of support because there was no valid legal A-0966-24 12 basis to do so given S.M.'s unemancipated status and residence with plaintiff, and we have found no basis in the record to disturb those findings. The court also acted within its discretion when it declined to micro- manage the personal interactions between the parties' twenty-year-old son without sufficient evidence of improper parental interference. As noted, however, it did grant defendant significant relief regarding access to S .M.'s medical information and also addressed visitation issues properly. Affirmed. A-0966-24 13