Isabella Arias-Urrea v. Family Adventures North Jersey, LLC

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1382-25 ISABELLA ARIAS-URREA, a minor, by her parents, individually, and as Guardians ad Litem, PAOLA URREA, and DIEGO ARIAS, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. FAMILY ADVENTURES NORTH JERSEY, LLC, d/b/a URBAN AIR TRAMPOLINE & ADVENTURE PARK SOUTH HACKENSACK, UATP MANAGEMENT, LLC, d/b/a URBAN AIR ADVENTURE PARK, ARI H. MOSES, and MICHAEL F. KARLEWICZ, Defendants-Respondents. _____________________________ Submitted September 15, 2026 – Decided September 30, 2026 Before Judges Gilson and DeAngelis. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County, Docket No. L-0276-25. Vladimir Rene PC, attorney for appellant (Vladimir Rene, on the brief). Mikhail A. Shah (Messner Reeves LLP), attorney for respondents. PER CURIAM When Isabella Arias-Urrea was three years old, her parents took her to a trampoline park. To gain access to the park, each of her parents were presented with an electronic agreement, which included an arbitration provision. Both parents signed the agreement. The agreement stated, among other things, that the parents were waiving their child's right to bring a claim against the park's owners, employees, and agents and the child could pursue claims only through binding arbitration. Plaintiff unfortunately broke her leg while jumping on a trampoline at the park. She and her parents appeal from an order granting defendants' motion to dismiss her personal-injury complaint and compel her claims to arbitration. Because a parent can waive a minor's right to go to court, Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park, 187 N.J. 323, 343 (2006), we affirm the portion of the order compelling arbitration of the claims against defendants. A-1382-25 2 We reverse the portion of the order dismissing the action. Accordingly, we remand for entry of a new order compelling the claims against the defendants to arbitration and staying the Law Division action. I. On January 22, 2023, plaintiff, Isabella Arias-Urrea, suffered a severely fractured right tibia while jumping on a trampoline at defendants' trampoline park. Plaintiff was three years old at the time of the incident. Plaintiffs, Paola Urrea and Diego Arias, signed a "Waiver, Release and Indemnification" agreement before they were allowed to enter defendants' facility. The agreement contains a Dispute Resolution provision. The agreement stated that the parties were waiving their rights to bring a lawsuit against defendants and, instead, were agreeing to arbitrate any claims related to an injury at the park. The Dispute Resolution provision, in its entirety, states: 6. DISPUTE RESOLUTION A. ARBITRATION. Any dispute or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement, breach thereof, the Premises, Activities, property damage (real or personal), personal injury (including death), or the scope, arbitrability, or validity of this arbitration agreement (Dispute) shall be brought by the parties in their individual capacity and not as a plaintiff or class member in any purported class or representative capacity, and settled by binding arbitration before a single arbitrator administrated by the American A-1382-25 3 Arbitration Association (AAA) per its Commercial Industry Arbitration Rules in effect at the time the demand for arbitration is filed. Judgment on the arbitration award may be entered in any federal or state court having jurisdiction thereof. The arbitrator shall have no authority to award punitive or exemplary damages. If the Dispute cannot be heard by the AAA for any reason, the Dispute shall be heard by an arbitrator mutually selected by the parties. If the parties cannot agree upon an arbitrator, then either party may petition an appropriate court to appoint an arbitrator. Arbitration and the enforcement of any award rendered in the arbitration proceedings shall be subject to and governed by 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. B. WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL. TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY LAW, ADULT PARTICIPANT AND URBAN AIR KNOWINGLY, WILLINGLY, AND VOLUNTARILY, WITH FULL AWARENESS OF THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES, AFTER CONSULTING WITH COUNSEL (OR AFTER HAVING WAIVED THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONSULT WITH COUNSEL) AGREE TO WAIVE THEIR RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL OF ANY DISPUTE AND TO RESOLVE ANY AND ALL DISPUTES THROUGH ARBITRATION. The right to a trial by jury is a right parties would or might otherwise have had under the Constitutions of the United States of America and the state in which the Premises is located. The agreement's severability provision states, that "[p]articipant expressly agrees that this Agreement is intended to be as broad and inclusive as is permitted by the laws of the state in which the Premises is located and that if A-1382-25 4 any portion thereof is held invalid, it is agreed that the balance shall, notwithstanding, continue in full legal force and effect." Both parents electronically signed and dated the agreement. They also provided their birth dates. Plaintiff, Diego Arias, also provided his daughter's information, including her birth date, in his agreement. On January 23, 2025, plaintiffs filed suit seeking to recover damages for the injuries suffered by Isabella. On March 8, 2025, defendants moved to compel arbitration and stay the suit in accordance with the Dispute Resolution provision. Plaintiffs did not oppose the motion to compel arbitration. On April 23, 2025, prior to the return date, plaintiffs' counsel emailed defendants' counsel advising "[w]e will not oppose the proposed motion. Kindly propose a few dates and three arbitrators." The trial court granted the motion to compel arbitration finding that there was a valid arbitration agreement made between the parties. The proposed order also sought to stay the proceedings pending the arbitration, but the trial court struck that provision and dismissed the complaint without prejudice. Plaintiffs' first motion for reconsideration was denied because they failed to provide courtesy copies of the motion papers to the judge. The second motion for A-1382-25 5 reconsideration, filed three months after the denial of the first motion for reconsideration, was denied because the trial court determined there was no good cause to justify reconsideration. II. On appeal plaintiffs seek relief from all three orders contending that the trial court erred by compelling arbitration and dismissing the complaint pending arbitration. Plaintiffs assert that the trial court improperly compelled arbitration and abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint. A. Enforceability of the Arbitration Provision We use a de novo standard of review when determining the enforceability of an arbitration agreement. Goffe v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 238 N.J. 191, 207 (2019) (citing Hirsch v. Amper Fin. Servs., LLC, 215 N.J. 174, 186 (2013)). The validity of an arbitration agreement is a question of law, and we conduct a plenary review of such legal questions. Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 219 N.J. 430, 445-46 (2014) (citing Kieffer v. Best Buy, 205 N.J. 213, 222-23 (2011)); Barr v. Bishop Rosen & Co., Inc., 442 N.J. Super. 599, 605 (App. Div. 2015) (citing Hirsch, 215 N.J. at 186 ). The arbitration provision in the Agreements states that "[a]rbitration and the enforcement of any award rendered in the arbitration proceedings shall be A-1382-25 6 subject to and governed by [the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)] 9 U.S.C. § 1 [to -16]." The FAA applies to "[a] written provision in … a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . ." 9 U.S.C. § 2 . Whether plaintiffs' visit to a New Jersey trampoline park involved interstate commerce and was governed by the FAA is a debatable point. Nevertheless, the issue of whether the FAA or the nearly identical New Jersey Arbitration Act (NJAA), N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 to -36, apply is not a controlling issue to the issue we must resolve. Under both the FAA and the NJAA, arbitration is fundamentally a matter of contract. 9 U.S.C. § 2 ; NAACP of Camden Cnty. E. v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 421 N.J. Super. 404, 424 (App. Div. 2011). "[T]he FAA 'permits states to regulate . . . arbitration agreements under general contract principles, ' and a court may invalidate an arbitration clause 'upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.'" Atalese, 219 N.J. at 441 (omission in original) (quoting Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc., 173 N.J. 76, 85 (2002)). In determining whether a matter should be submitted to arbitration, the court must evaluate whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985); Martindale, 173 N.J. at 83, 92 . "Like all contractual agreements, an arbitration A-1382-25 7 agreement must be the product of mutual assent." Kernahan v. Home Warranty Adm'r of Fla., Inc., 236 N.J. 301, 330 (2019) (Albin, J., concurring). In turn, "[m]utual assent requires that the parties have an understanding of the terms to which they have agreed." Atalese, 219 N.J. at 442 . "No particular form of words is necessary to accomplish a clear and unambiguous waiver of rights." Atalese, 219 N.J. at 444 . If, "at least in some general and sufficiently broad way," the language of the clause conveys that arbitration is a waiver of the right to bring suit in a judicial forum, the clause will be enforced. Id. at 447 . We have held that an arbitration provision presented to a consumer entering a trampoline park is enforceable, so long as the arbitration provision is clearly identified and clearly explained. See Perez v. Sky Zone LLC, 472 N.J. Super. 240 , 248-49 (App. Div. 2022). A parent can bind a minor to an arbitration agreement so long as the adult assents to the arbitration agreement on behalf of the minor. Hojnowski, 187 N.J. at 343 . In Hojnowski, the Court held that a parent could not sign a pre-injury release of a minor's future tort claims arising out of the use of a commercial recreational facility. Id. at 338 . The Court based that ruling on New Jersey's public policy of protecting minors. Id. at 333 . In contrast, the Court also ruled that a parent can bind a minor to an arbitration agreement because an agreement A-1382-25 8 to arbitrate is not a waiver of the right to bring a claim; rather, the arbitration agreement provides for the forum where the claim will be heard. Id. at 343 . The Dispute Resolution provision is compliant with the law and, therefore, enforceable. It sets forth the waiver of jury trial, as well as the process for completing the arbitration process. The language of the Dispute Resolution provision in the agreement signed by plaintiffs states that if a participant is injured while at the trampoline park, she has waived her right to trial in a court of law before a jury and that she could pursue personal injury claims only through binding arbitration. Plaintiffs contend on appeal that there was no enforceable agreement between the parties, but plaintiffs did not raise this issue in response to the motion. To the contrary, plaintiffs' counsel conceded that the arbitration agreement was enforceable in his email to defendants' counsel by requesting the parties propose three arbitrators. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's decision compelling arbitration. B. Enforcement of the Release and Indemnity Provision The agreement plaintiffs signed contained a Release and Indemnity provision. The Release and Indemnity provision purports to permit defendants A-1382-25 9 to be indemnified by plaintiffs for their daughter's personal injury damage award. The Release and Indemnity provision provides: 5. RELEASE AND INDEMNITY. TO THE FULLEST EXTENT PERMITTED BY LAW, ADULT PARTICIPANT ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF, CHILD PARTICIPANT, AND THEIR HEIRS, EXECUTORS, AND REPRESENTATIVES RELEASES, AGREES NOT TO SUE, AND SHALL INDEMNIFY AND DEFEND URBAN AIR, UATP MANAGEMENT, LLC, THE LEGAL OWNER OF THE PREMISES, THE LANDLORD, MORTGAGEES AND MANAGEMENT COMPANY OF THE PREMISES, AND ANY OF THEIR LENDERS, PARENTS, AFFILIATES, SUBSIDIARIES, OFFICERS, DIRECTORS, SHAREHOLDERS, MEMBERS, MANAGERS, PARTNERS, AGENTS, EMPLOYEES, CONTRACTORS, REPRESENTATIVES, HEIRS, ASSIGNS, VOLUNTEERS, INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS, EQUIPMENT SUPPLIERS, AND INSURERS OF ALL OF THEM (COLLECTIVELY, PROTECTED PARTIES) FROM AND AGAINST ALL LIABILITIES, LOSSES, DAMAGES, CLAIMS, DEMANDS, ACTIONS, SUITS, CAUSES OF ACTION, COSTS, FEES, AND EXPENSES (INCLUDING REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COURT OR OTHER COSTS) (COLLECTIVELY, CLAIMS) RELATING TO, RESULTING FROM, OR ARISING OUT OF OR ALLEGED TO HAVE ARISEN OUT OF (IN WHOLE OR IN PART) ANY PROPERTY DAMAGE OR BODILY INJURY (INCLUDING DEATH) TO PARTICIPANT RESULTING IN ANY WAY FROM (A) PARTICIPANT'S USE OF THE PREMISES, (B) PARTICIPANT'S ACTIVE OR PASSIVE A-1382-25 10 PARTICIPATION IN THE ACTIVITIES, (C) LOSS OR THEFT OF PERSONAL PROPERTY, (D) FROM THE CONSUMPTION OF ALCOHOL AT THE PREMISES BY PARTICIPANT OR ANY OTHER INVITEE OF URBAN AIR, OR (E) PARTICIPANT'S BREACH OF THIS AGREEMENT. THIS RELEASE AND INDEMNITY SHALL APPLY EVEN IF ANY CLAIM IS CAUSED IN WHOLE OR IN PART BY THE NEGLIGENCE, GROSS NEGLIGENCE, STRICT LIABILITY, OR WILLFUL MISCONDUCT OF THE PROTECTED PARTIES OR PARTICIPANT. THE INDEMNITY SHALL ALSO INCLUDE ADULT PARTICIPANT'S OBLIGATION TO INDEMNIFY THE PROTECTED PARTIES FROM (A) ANY SUM OR SETTLEMENT PAID TO OR ON BEHALF OF THE CHILD PARTICIPANT RESULTING FROM A CLAIM IN ANY WAY INVOLVING THE FOREGOING SUBSECTIONS AND (B) ALL CLAIMS RESULTING FROM OR RELATING TO ANY INSUFFICIENCY OF PARTICIPANT'S LEGAL CAPACITY OR AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE THIS AGREEMENT FOR OR ON BEHALF OF THE CHILD PARTICIPANT. In Hojnowski, the Court explained that consistent with the parens patriae doctrine and New Jersey's public policy reflected in Rule 4:44, "after a minor has suffered a tortious injury, a minor's parent or guardian may not dispose of a minor's existing cause of action without statutory or judicial approval." Hojnowski, 187 N.J. at 334 . We have explained that exculpatory clauses, such as release, waiver, indemnity, or fee-shifting provisions, are disfavored and are A-1382-25 11 unenforceable when they purport to avoid a statutory duty of care or otherwise contravene public policy; accordingly, such clauses are "strictly construed against the indemnitee." Dare v. Freefall Adventures, 349 N.J. Super. 205 , 220- 23 (2002). Accordingly, we hold that the Release and Indemnity provision contained in the agreement is unenforceable and against New Jersey's public policy. As set forth in Dare, the Release and Indemnity provision "discourages the average recreational participant from seeking the refuge of our courts for fear that he may face the retribution of a substantial legal fee if he does so. It is one thing to hold a party to a fee-shifting provision in a contract negotiated in a commercial setting; it is another when an amateur sports participant is asked to agree to such a provision shortly before he engages in the activity." Dare, 349 N.J. Super. at 223 . C. Dismissal of the Complaint Plaintiffs also contend that the trial court erred by dismissing the complaint pending arbitration, as opposed to entering a stay. The NJAA provides that "[i]f the court orders arbitration, the court on just terms shall stay any judicial proceeding that involves a claim subject to the arbitration." N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-7(g). Similarly, the FAA states that "upon any A-1382-25 12 issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action . . . ." 9 U.S.C. § 3 . Therefore, when a party moves to stay the proceedings pending arbitration, pursuant to the NJAA and FAA, the court should stay the proceedings if it grants a motion to compel arbitration. We reverse the decision dismissing the complaint without prejudice and remand the matter back to the trial court for the entry of an order staying the proceedings pending the completion of arbitration. D. Motions for Reconsideration Plaintiffs also appeal the June 19, 2025 order denying reconsideration based on plaintiffs' failure to comply with Rule 1:6-4, and the November 17, 2025 order denying reconsideration on the merits. Because we affirmed the order compelling arbitration, reversed the order dismissing the complaint, and remanded for entry of an order staying this matter pending arbitration, the reconsideration arguments are moot. A-1382-25 13 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for entry of a new order. We do not retain jurisdiction. A-1382-25 14