Michael Spece v. Chubb Limited

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1775-25 MICHAEL SPECE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHUBB LIMITED, Defendant, and ACE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY d/b/a/ CHUBB, JOHN LUPICA, JAY MISTRY, MIRZA DELIBEGOVIC, CELIA CHEN, ASHIT DESAI, FRANK ZAFFINO, KATIE VISCOUNT, and SARAH PETERSON, Defendants-Respondents. ______________________________ Submitted September 22, 2026 – Decided September 30, 2026 Before Judges Natali and Jablonski. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County, Docket No. L-3813-25. Michael Spece, self-represented appellant. Cozen O'Connor, PC, attorneys for respondents (Joseph P. Sirbak, II and Jason A. Cabrera, on the brief). PER CURIAM Plaintiff Michael Spece appeals from the December 19, 2025 order of the Law Division granting defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint and to compel arbitration. Based on our de novo review, we conclude the arbitration clause in plaintiff's employment contract is enforceable and affirm the trial court's order compelling arbitration. We reverse, however, the portion of the order dismissing plaintiff's complaint and remand for entry of an order staying the case pending arbitration. I. Defendant Ace American Insurance Company hired plaintiff as a lead machine learning engineer. Plaintiff's employment contract contained an arbitration agreement (Agreement) that covered "all employment-related disagreements" that might potentially arise between the parties: By signing below, I confirm my agreement that in the event I have any employment related legal claims A-1775-25 2 covered by the Chubb Employment Dispute Arbitration Policy (Policy) recited above, I will submit them to final and binding neutral third-party arbitration in accordance with the Policy, which is made a part of this Agreement. I understand that the Policy is a mutually binding contract between me and Chubb. I understand and agree that I cannot bring any employment related claims covered by the Policy in court and that I waive my right to a jury trial for such claims.1 The Agreement also specifically defines the broad scope of claims that were subject to arbitration: This policy covers all employment-related disagreements and problems that concern a right, privilege or interest recognized by applicable law. Such disputes include claims, demands, disputes, controversies or actions under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Equal Pay Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act . . . and any other federal, state or local statute, regulation, ordinary or common law doctrine regarding unfair competition, the employment relationship, employment discrimination, retaliation, whistleblowing, wage and hour matters, conditions of employment or termination of employment. 1 The Agreement was governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 . A-1775-25 3 The Agreement also "specifically covers state statutory whistleblower claims, such as those arising under the New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act, and state discrimination or fair employment practices statutes, such as . . . the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination . . . ." After defendant terminated plaintiff's employment, plaintiff sued and alleged violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-12; the Conscientious Employee Protection Act, N.J.S.A. 34:19-1; and common-law claims for breach of contract, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendants moved to compel arbitration under the Agreement. In an oral decision, the Law Division judge enforced the Agreement finding the arbitration requirement was clear and unambiguous and plaintiff signed the Agreement voluntarily. The judge dismissed the complaint without prejudice. Plaintiff appealed. II. We review de novo the question of whether a contractual arbitration provision is enforceable because it is a question of law. See Fazio v. Altice U.S.A., 261 N.J. 90 , 103 (2025). Thus "we 'need not give deference to the [legal] analysis by the trial court.'" Santana v. SmileDirectClub, LLC, 475 A-1775-25 4 N.J. Super. 279 , 285 (App. Div. 2023) (alteration in original) (quoting Goffe v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 238 N.J. 191, 208 (2019)); see also Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc., 244 N.J. 30 , 46 (2020) (quoting Kernahan v. Home Warranty Adm'r of Fla., Inc., 236 N.J. 301, 316 (2019)). "The [FAA] and the nearly identical New Jersey Arbitration Act [(NJAA)] . . . N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 to [-36] enunciate federal and state policies favoring arbitration." Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 219 N.J. 430, 440 (2014). Under the FAA, courts must "place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts and enforce them according to their terms." Id. at 441 (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 , 339 (2011)). In reviewing an order compelling arbitration, "we are mindful of the strong preference to enforce arbitration agreements, both at the state and federal level." Hirsch v. Amper Fin. Servs. LLC, 215 N.J. 174, 186 (2013); see also Flanzman v. Jenny Craig, Inc., 244 N.J. 119 , 133 (2020) (quoting Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc., 173 N.J. 76, 92 (2002) ("[T]he affirmative policy of this State, both legislative and judicial, favors arbitration as a mechanism of resolving disputes.")). In determining whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists, we apply "state contract-law principles." Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park, 187 N.J. 323, 342 (2006). "An arbitration agreement is valid only if the parties intended to A-1775-25 5 arbitrate because parties are not required 'to arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so.'" Kernahan, 236 N.J. at 317 (quoting Volt Info. Scis. Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. Of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)). The key inquiry, then, is whether the parties actually and knowingly agreed to arbitrate their dispute. Id. at 322; see also Atalese, 219 N.J. at 442 . That inquiry begins with the language of the arbitration clause itself. To reflect a mutual assent to arbitrate, the terms must be "sufficiently clear to place a[n] [individual] on notice that [they are] waiving a constitutional or statutory right . . . ." Atalese, 219 N.J. at 443 . "[A]lthough a waiver-of-rights provision need not 'list every imaginable statute by name to effectuate a knowing and voluntary waiver of rights,' employees should at least know that they have 'agree[d] to arbitrate all statutory claims arising out of the employment relationship or its termination.'" Id. at 447 (second alteration in original) (quoting Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 168 N.J. 124, 135 (2001)). "No magical language is required to accomplish a waiver of rights in an arbitration agreement." Morgan v. Sanford Brown Inst., 225 N.J. 289, 309 (2016). If, "at least in some general and sufficiently broad way," the language of the clause conveys arbitration is a waiver of the right to bring suit in a judicial forum, the clause will be enforced. A-1775-25 6 Atalese, 219 N.J. at 447 ; see also Arafa v. Health Express Corp., 243 N.J. 147 , 172 (2020) (finding a jury trial waiver "was knowing and voluntary in light of the . . . broad agreement to resolve 'all disputes' between the parties through binding arbitration"); Martindale, 173 N.J. at 81-82, 89 . (upholding an arbitration clause stating "all disputes relating to [the party's] employment . . . shall be decided by an arbitrator" and that party "waive[d their] right to a jury trial"). In the employment setting particularly, an arbitration "provision must reflect that an employee has agreed clearly and unambiguously to arbitrate the disputed claim. Generally, we determine a written agreement's validity by considering the intentions of the parties as reflected in the four corners of the written instrument." Leodori v. CIGNA Corp., 175 N.J. 293, 302 (2003). An arbitration agreement's waiver-of-rights language must be "clear and unambiguous." Atalese, 219 N.J. at 445 . "No particular form of words is necessary to accomplish a clear and unambiguous waiver of rights." Id. at 444 . "Arbitration clauses . . . will pass muster when phrased in plain language that is understandable to the reasonable consumer." Ibid. The Atalese Court reiterated: "We do not suggest that the arbitration clause has to identify the specific constitutional or statutory right guaranteeing a citizen access to the A-1775-25 7 courts that is waived by agreeing to arbitration." Id. at 446-47 . The Court held an agreement, however, must "at least in some general and sufficiently broad way, . . . explain that the plaintiff is giving up [their] right to bring [their] claims in court or have a jury resolve the dispute." Id. at 447 . Plaintiff primarily advances a nuanced argument that the trial court erred in compelling arbitration on the papers without first addressing plaintiff 's pleaded and argued contractual defenses, including the alleged failure to comply with contractual preconditions and substantive misrepresentation. These arguments, however, are largely unsupported by relevant case law and overlook the jurisprudence governing the enforceability of arbitration clauses in New Jersey employment contracts. The plain language of the Agreement clearly and unambiguously informed plaintiff he was waiving his right to pursue in court all claims asserted in his complaint, each of which constitutes an "employment-related legal claim" and therefore falls squarely within the scope of the arbitration agreement. Accordingly, plaintiff waived his right to a jury trial as to those claims. We conclude the Agreement satisfies the requirements of Atalese and is therefore enforceable. A-1775-25 8 III. Under the FAA, if parties are referred to arbitration in "any suit or proceeding," the court, "upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement . . . . " 9 U.S.C. § 3 ; see also Smith v. Spizzirri, 601 U.S. 472, 475-76 (2024) ("When a federal court finds that a dispute is subject to arbitration, and a party has requested a stay of the court proceeding pending arbitration, the court does not have discretion to dismiss the suit on the basis that all the claims are subject to arbitration" because "shall" under 9 U.S.C. § 3 "creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion."). The NJAA contains a comparable provision. It provides, in pertinent part: "[i]f the court orders arbitration, the court on just terms shall stay any judicial proceeding that involves a claim subject to the arbitration." N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-7(g). Thus, under both the FAA and the NJAA, when arbitration has been compelled, as it has here, the appropriate judicial action is to stay the litigation until arbitration is completed. See Antonucci v. Curvature Newco, Inc., 470 N.J. Super. 553 , 567 (App. Div. 2022) (reversing the provision of an A-1775-25 9 order compelling arbitration that dismissed the case with prejudice because a court action should be stayed if it involves "any issue referable to arbitration" under 9 U.S.C. § 3 ). To the extent we have not addressed any of plaintiff's remaining arguments on appeal, it is because they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded to the trial court for the entry of an order staying the action pending arbitration. We do not retain jurisdiction. A-1775-25 10