Tahir Zaman v. Jonathan Addo

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0266-25 TAHIR ZAMAN, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JONATHAN ADDO,1 Defendant-Appellant. __________________________ Submitted September 15, 2026 – Decided September 30, 2026 Before Judges Firko and Vanek. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County, Docket No. DC-005413- 24. Jonathan Addo, self-represented appellant. Respondent has not filed a brief. PER CURIAM 1 In his notice of appeal, defendant Jonathan Addo identified George Kearney and Sonya T. Williams as parties. However, the August 11, 2025 order being appealed from effectively denied defendant's request to add those individuals as necessary parties to the litigation. Defendant Jonathan Addo appeals from an August 11, 2025 order 2 denying his motion to vacate a June 6, 2024 judgment in favor of plaintiff Tamir Zaman. We vacate the order and remand for further proceedings pursuant to Rule 1:7-4(a). I. We recount the salient facts material to this appeal from the record. In 2019, defendant acquired certain real property located in Willingboro Township (the property) subject to a mortgage held by United Wholesale Mortgage (United). Defendant contends a default judgment of foreclosure was erroneously entered in favor of United because he had recorded a "discharge of mortgage" showing satisfaction of the debt four months earlier.3 Plaintiff purchased the property at an April 25, 2024 sheriff's sale . On May 13, plaintiff filed an ejectment action after defendant refused to vacate the property. The deed vesting plaintiff with title to the property was recorded on 2 Defendant's notice of appeal appears to have erroneously listed the date of the order as August 19, 2025. We discern from the record that the order was entered August 11, 2025. 3 The record does not contain the date the default judgment of foreclosure was entered. A-0266-25 2 May 20. That same day, the trial court scheduled a hearing on plaintiff's order to show cause seeking an ejectment order. After plaintiff filed proof of service, defendant filed an answer and counterclaim asserting the ejectment order should not be entered because the foreclosure judgment on which it was predicated was invalid because it was based on a discharged mortgage. A few days later, defendant filed supporting documentation with the court, including a putative satisfaction of the mortgage. On June 6, 2024, the court entered an order declaring that "plaintiff is entitled to the uninterrupted possession of the subject premises" based on "admissible documentary evidence presented, and the testimony which the court finds believable." The court issued a writ of possession (the writ) allowing plaintiff to remove defendant from the property. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff served defendant with the order. Although an initial stay of the execution of the writ was entered on defendant's request, the court denied his subsequent stay application. On June 18, 2024, defendant was removed from the property through effectuation of the writ. Almost a year later, defendant moved to vacate the June 6, 2024 order and dismiss plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. Defendant also asserted in his motion that George Kearney and Sonya T. Williams should be joined in the A-0266-25 3 litigation as necessary parties and that his possession of the premises should be restored. Defendant claimed he was not properly served with process and that the default judgment of foreclosure was invalid because the underlying mortgage had been satisfied. Plaintiff did not oppose the motion. The court granted defendant's request for disposition of the motion on the papers . On August 11, 2025, the court entered an order denying defendant's unopposed motion, for "the reasons set forth on the record on June 5, 2025." On appeal, defendant argues the judge failed to set forth findings of fact and conclusions of law underpinning the August 11, 2025 order in violation of Rule 1:7-4(a). Defendant primarily argues that, although the order states otherwise, the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) issued a document stating no proceeding on the record took place on June 5, 2025. II. "We review a motion under Rule 4:50-1 to vacate final judgment under an abuse of discretion standard." 257-261 20th Ave. Realty, LLC v. Roberto, 477 N.J. Super. 339 , 366 (App. Div. 2023), aff'd as modified, 259 N.J. 417 (2025) (citing U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012)). "Although the ordinary abuse of discretion standard defies precise definition, it arises when a decision is made without a rational explanation, inexplicably A-0266-25 4 departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis." Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[A] functional approach to abuse of discretion examines whether there are good reasons for an appellate court to defer to the particular decision at issue." Ibid. "The decision whether to vacate a judgment . . . is a determination left to the sound discretion of the trial court, guided by principles of equity." F.B. v. A.L.G., 176 N.J. 201, 207 (2003). "The trial court's determination under [Rule 4:50-1] warrants substantial deference, and should not be reversed unless it results in a clear abuse of discretion." Guillaume, 209 N.J. at 467 . However, Rule 1:7-4(a) requires that "[t]he court shall, by an opinion or memorandum decision, either written or oral, find the facts and state its conclusions of law thereon in all actions tried without a jury, on every motion decided by a written order that is appealable as of right." See also Schwarz v. Schwarz, 328 N.J. Super. 275, 282 (App. Div. 2000) ("We have frequently noted that an articulation of reasons is essential to the fair resolution of a case."). Without a statement of reasons, we are "left to conjecture as to what the judge may have had in mind." Salch v. Salch, 240 N.J. Super. 441, 443 (App. Div. A-0266-25 5 1990). "Meaningful appellate review is inhibited unless the judge sets forth the reasons for his or her opinion." Ibid. On this record, we are constrained to vacate the August 11, 2025 order and remand to the trial court to provide oral or written findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting the entry of the order. See Kas Oriental Rugs, Inc. v. Ellman, 407 N.J. Super. 538, 561 (App. Div. 2009) (finding we were "compelled to vacate the award under review and remand for further proceedings because the judge's findings do not comport with Rule 1:7-4(a) in a number of respects."); see also United Consumer Fin. Servs. Co. v. Carbo, 410 N.J. Super. 280, 313 (App. Div. 2009) (finding that the trial court's decision was not sufficiently explained to permit Appellate Division review and remanding the matter for reconsideration). Although the August 11, 2025 order denying defendant's motion relies on "the reasons set forth on the record on June 5, 2025," the AOC has certified there is no record of any such proceeding ever taking place. On remand, the court shall conduct further proceedings as may be deemed appropriate in its discretion. We express no opinion as to what the outcome of the proceedings should be. In the event the August 11, 2025 order contains reference to an erroneous date when oral reasons were in fact set forth on the record, the court shall enter A-0266-25 6 an amended order reflecting the accurate date. The remand shall be completed within thirty days. Vacated and remanded for proceedings in accordance with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. A-0266-25 7