J.G. v. S.S.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3245-24 J.G.,1 Plaintiff-Respondent, v. S.S., Defendant-Appellant. Submitted September 15, 2026 – Decided October 2, 2026 Before Judges Gooden Brown and Bergman. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Cumberland County, Docket No. FM-06-0239-17. Weinberger Divorce & Family Law Group, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Michael P. McGuire, on the briefs). Smedley Law Group, Inc., attorneys for respondent (AllynMarie Smedley, on the brief). 1 We use initials for the parties to protect their privacy. R. 1:38-3(d)(10). PER CURIAM Defendant appeals from three Family Part orders entered on February 24, 2025, March 28, 2025, and May 2, 2025. The February 24 order enforced a December 19, 2024, consent order, set emancipation dates for the parties' two children, terminated plaintiff's child support obligation, and awarded plaintiff a credit for support paid prior to the emancipation of the parties' second child. The March 28 order denied defendant's request for counsel fees and awarded plaintiff $9,480 in counsel fees. The May 2 order denied defendant's motion for reconsideration, granted limited enforcement relief, and awarded plaintiff an additional $3,260 in counsel fees. Having considered the arguments of the parties and the applicable legal principles, we affirm all orders substantially for the cogent reasons expressed by the trial court but remand one provision of the February 24 order that set the amount and structure of the child support credit for further consideration. I. The parties divorced by way of Final Judgment of Divorce on June 17, 2019, and are the parents of two children: the first, born in 2002, and the second born in 2006. On August 8, 2024, plaintiff moved for termination of child support, emancipation of both children, and reimbursement of support A-3245-24 2 overpayments. At the time plaintiff filed his motion, he was paying $474 per week in child support to defendant pursuant to the order then in effect. As to the older child's alleged emancipation, plaintiff asserted she had graduated from college on or about May 20, 2024, and began full-time employment on or about June 1, 2024. As to the younger child's alleged emancipation, plaintiff asserted the child was over eighteen and no longer a full-time student. In her opposition, defendant acknowledged the older child had graduated college in May 2024, had begun an internship in June 2024, and was hired thereafter. Nevertheless, defendant asserted the older child remained a dependent and should not be emancipated until at least age twenty-three. As to the younger child, defendant asserted the child was enrolled in an online high school program and remained a dependent. Defendant attached and referenced certain documents concerning that enrollment. Meanwhile, on December 19, 2024, because plaintiff filed a complaint under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act and obtained a temporary restraining order against defendant, the parties entered into a "Consent Order for Civil Restraints" under the divorce docket number. The order resolved the domestic violence matter and several outstanding issues between the parties including emancipation and termination of plaintiff's child support obligation. A-3245-24 3 Most significant was the language contained in two paragraphs of the consent order. Paragraph 9 of the consent order provided: "[t]he parties agree that both children shall be emancipated. The effective date of the emancipation of both children, as well as any child support previously paid by [p]laintiff, is subject to the determination of the pending motion and/or cross-motion pending under docket FM-06-239-17." Paragraph 10 of the consent order stated: "[b]ased upon the above stated emancipation of the children, [p]laintiff's child support obligation shall be terminated as of the date of this Order." The consent order also included standard acknowledgements that both parties were represented by counsel, understood the order, entered it freely and voluntarily, and were not coerced or under the influence of substances. After oral argument, the court entered an order on February 24, 2025, that found the December 19, 2024, consent order "valid and binding upon the parties." The court fixed the older child's emancipation date as August 8, 2024, the date plaintiff filed his original motion. The court fixed the younger child's emancipation date as December 19, 2024, "based on [the] consent order signed on [that] date." The court then addressed plaintiff's request for reimbursement or credit for support paid after the older child's emancipation but before the younger child's emancipation. The court acknowledged that child support is A-3245-24 4 "not generally equally split between the children," but stated that neither party had provided income information from which support could be recalculated for one child. It therefore allocated one-half of the existing $474 weekly support order—$237 per week—to each child and awarded plaintiff a credit of $4,266 for the eighteen weeks from August 8, 2024, through December 19, 2024. The court reserved decision on counsel fees. Defendant moved for reconsideration arguing the trial court misinterpreted the consent order, improperly emancipated the younger child despite alleged continued high school enrollment, and should vacate its ruling or, in the alternative, conduct a plenary hearing. On March 28, 2025, prior to deciding the reconsideration motion, the court entered a supplemental counsel fee order. The order granted plaintiff $9,480 in counsel fees, principally relying on "the reasonableness and good faith of the positions advanced by the parties," under Rule 5:3-5(c). On May 2, 2025, after hearing further argument, the court denied defendant's motion for reconsideration. The court found defendant's arguments were the same as advanced at the original motion, the consent order was clear and unambiguous, and defendant had not produced competent new evidence warranting reconsideration. The court also rejected defendant's renewed request A-3245-24 5 for a plenary hearing, concluding there was no genuine material factual dispute as to the meaning or intent of the consent order. The court granted plaintiff limited enforcement relief on unrelated provisions of the consent order and awarded plaintiff an additional $3,260 in counsel fees. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred by 1) enforcing the consent order to waive child support without a best-interest analysis; 2) emancipating the younger child; 3) failing to apply the child support guidelines; 4) awarding counsel fees; and 5) denying reconsideration. II. We begin with a recitation of the established legal principles that guide our analysis. Our review of Family Part orders is limited. See Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998). "Appellate courts accord particular deference to the Family Part because of its 'special jurisdiction and expertise' in family matters." Harte v. Hand, 433 N.J. Super. 457, 461 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412 ). "Only when the trial court's conclusions are so 'clearly mistaken' or 'wide of the mark' should we interfere." Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008)). "We will reverse only if we find the trial [court] clearly abused . . . its discretion." Clark v. Clark, 429 N.J. Super. 61, 72 (App. Div. 2012). However, A-3245-24 6 "all legal issues are reviewed de novo." Ricci v. Ricci, 448 N.J. Super. 546, 565 (App. Div. 2017) (citing Reese v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super. 552, 568 (App. Div. 2013)). "A consent order is, in essence, an agreement of the parties that has been approved by the court." Hurwitz v. AHS Hosp. Corp., 438 N.J. Super. 269, 292 (App. Div. 2014). As such, a consent order operates as a contract between the parties. See Ibid. When interpreting the terms of a contract, the court's objective is to "discern and implement the intentions of the parties." Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 45 (2016) (citations omitted). When the intent of the parties is clear, "[i]t is not the function of the court to rewrite or revise an agreement. " Ibid. (citing J.B. v. W.B., 215 N.J. 305, 326 (2013)). When determining the intent of the parties, courts "read the document as a whole in a fair and common-sense manner." Hardy ex rel. Dowdell v. Abdul- Matin, 198 N.J. 95, 103 (2009) (citing DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477 , 496- 97 (2005)). If the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, courts should "enforce the agreement as written, unless doing so would lead to an absurd result." Quinn, 225 N.J. at 45 . Emancipation occurs "when the fundamental dependent relationship between parent and child is concluded, the parent relinquishes the right to A-3245-24 7 custody and is relieved of the burden of support, and the child is no longer entitled to support." Filippone v. Lee, 304 N.J. Super. 301, 308 (App. Div. 1997). Although there exists a rebuttable presumption that a child is emancipated at age eighteen, "the issue is always fact-sensitive and the essential inquiry is whether the child has moved 'beyond the sphere of influence and responsibility exercised by a parent and obtains an independent status of his or her own.'" Ibid. (quoting Bishop v. Bishop, 287 N.J. Super. 593, 598 (Ch. Div. 1995)). The court's determination involves a "critical evaluation of the prevailing circumstances including the child's needs, interests, and independent resources, the family's reasonable expectations, and the parties' financial ability, among other things." Dolce v. Dolce, 383 N.J. Super. 11, 18 (App. Div. 2006) (citing Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529, 545 (1982)). Moreover, as a general matter, plenary hearings are required when there are "contested issues of material fact on the basis of conflicting affidavits. " Conforti v. Guliadis, 128 N.J. 318, 322 (1992) (quoting Conforti v. Guliadis, 245 N.J. Super. 561, 565 (App. Div. 1991)); see also Tretola v. Tretola, 389 N.J. Super. 15, 20 (App. Div. 2006) (reversing an emancipation order and requiring a plenary hearing because the court failed to recognize material facts A-3245-24 8 in dispute and evidence beyond the motion papers necessary for resolution of the matter). We first address defendant's principal contention that the trial court improperly treated the December 19, 2024, consent order as a self-executing waiver of child support without separately analyzing the best interests of the younger child. We are unpersuaded. We conclude the court correctly began its analysis by evaluating the terms in the parties' agreement. Paragraph 9 states: "The parties agree that both children shall be emancipated," and paragraph 10 states: "[b]ased upon the above stated emancipation of the children, plaintiff's child support obligation shall be terminated as of the date of this [o]rder." We concur with the trial court's well-reasoned assessment that when read together, these provisions are clear. We conclude there was no ambiguity that the parties agreed that both children were emancipated. What remained for judicial determination were the effective dates of the emancipations and any credits due for the period between each of these emancipations. (Emphasis added). The order repeatedly recites that both parties were represented by counsel, understood the legal and practical effect of the agreement, entered it freely and voluntarily, and were not coerced. Defendant did not move under Rule 4:50-1 A-3245-24 9 to vacate the consent order for fraud, duress, unconscionability, or mistake. Instead, she argued the order did not mean what its plain terms stated. We conclude the trial court did not err in interpreting the parties' agreement through its plain meaning terms under those circumstances. Further, although we recognize and agree with defendant that settled principles have established that child support belongs to the child, not the parents, we conclude this case did not present a simple prospective waiver of support for an otherwise undisputed unemancipated child. Rather, it involved a negotiated agreement resolving contested issues, including the status of two children, both of whom were indisputably over eighteen years of age, and one who had graduated college and entered the workforce. The agreement's terms clearly emancipated both children, while leaving the effective dates to the court's determination. On this record, we conclude the trial court did not err in distinguishing that circumstance from the ordinary rule against parental waiver of support. We likewise reject defendant's argument that the court was required to hold a plenary hearing regarding the younger child's alleged full-time high school enrollment. A plenary hearing is necessary only where competent evidence demonstrates a genuine material factual dispute. Conforti, 128 N.J. at A-3245-24 10 322. The record before us does not exhibit that any genuine issues were in dispute requiring a hearing. The proofs submitted by defendant concerning the younger child's full-time high school enrollment were facially insufficient to overcome her presumptive emancipated status as agreed upon in the consent order and found by the trial court. We note defendant had multiple opportunities to provide competent documentary support for the younger child's continued full-time high school enrollment status. In her January 31, 2025, certification, defendant asserted the child was enrolled in an online program, and the child was behind academically. In her reconsideration submission, defendant repeated that assertion. The court found, however, that the only documentary proof offered was a one -page statement that lacked meaningful detail about attendance, coursework, advancement, or the nature of the program. The court expressly found that this proof did not establish ongoing full-time enrollment in a manner sufficient to overcome the terms in the parties' consent order. The credible evidence in the record supports this determination. Thereafter, the court's May 2, 2025, reconsideration order appropriately explained that it did not overlook this evidence and, to the contrary, it considered this evidence at the original hearing and again on reconsideration. The court A-3245-24 11 also found more robust proofs including transcripts, attendance information, educational progress, or other verifying records, were plainly available to defendant if they existed, yet were not produced. The trial court's findings are amply supported by the record and were not an abuse of discretion. Defendant relies heavily on the proposition that emancipation is not automatic at age eighteen based on established case law. We agree this proposition is legally correct, but it does not compel reversal here. The trial court did not hold that age alone required emancipation. It enforced the clear and unambiguous consent order, then evaluated whether defendant had produced competent evidence sufficient to disregard or modify the consent order. The trial court concluded she had not. We discern no abuse of discretion with this finding as credible evidence in the record supported such. We therefore affirm the February 24, 2025 order insofar as it enforced the December 19, 2024, consent order, set the emancipation date of the older child as August 8, 2024, set the emancipation date of the younger child as December 19, 2024, and denied a plenary hearing. We also affirm the May 2, 2025, order denying reconsideration of those rulings. However, we reach a different result concerning defendant's challenge to the calculation and amount of the reimbursement or credit awarded to plaintiff A-3245-24 12 set forth at paragraph four of the February 24, 2025 order. As to this issue, the court acknowledged that support for two children is "not generally equally split between the children." The court also recognized that neither party supplied income information to recalculate child support for one child. Faced with that gap, the court deemed it "most equitable" to allocate half of the $474 weekly obligation—$237 per week—to each child and awarded plaintiff a credit of $4,266 for the period from August 8, 2024 through December 19, 2024. We appreciate the practical difficulty the court faced as the record was imperfect, and the court did not have the parties' financial information before it. Even so, the court's own reasoning demonstrates why a limited remand is appropriate as the court expressly recognized that equal division is not how child support is determined after a child's emancipation. Plaintiff was clearly entitled to an adjustment of support given the older child's emancipation date. However, we conclude the court's decision to decrease plaintiff's child support payment by half was contrary to applicable law and misapplied its discretion. The relevant portion of the Child Support Guidelines regarding the emancipation of a child states: Effect of Emancipation of a Child If the guidelines were used to calculate a child support award for two or more children, the emancipation of a A-3245-24 13 child shall not result in a proportionate reduction of the support order (i.e., based on the economic evidence, it is not appropriate to reduce an order for two children by half if one child becomes emancipated). Instead, child support award should be recalculated based upon the current income of the parents and the number of unemancipated children. [Child Support Guidelines, Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, Appendix IX-A to R. 5:6A, ¶ 24, (2026) (emphasis added).] Here, the court's order differs from the standard set forth in the Guidelines at Appendix IX-A requiring a court to utilize "the current income of the parents and the number of unemancipated children" in its calculation. A court may deviate from the Guidelines "only where good cause is shown," and "the determination of good cause shall be within the sound discretion of the court. " R. 5:6A. Because the court did not follow the above standards nor undertake any findings that found good cause, we vacate paragraph four of the February 24, 2025 order granting the $4,266 credit and remand this issue for determination based on our subsequent instructions provided at the conclusion of this opinion. We reiterate, we do not disturb the trial court's determinations that the older child was emancipated as of August 8, 2024, and the younger child as of December 19, 2024. A-3245-24 14 Finally, we address defendant's challenge to the counsel-fee awards entered on March 28 and May 2, 2025. A trial court's decision to grant or deny attorney's fees in a family action will be disturbed "only on the 'rarest occasion,' and then only because of clear abuse of discretion." Strahan v. Strahan, 402 N.J. Super. 298, 317 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 317 (1995)). A clear abuse of discretion occurs when the family court's "decision is 'made without a rational explanation, [and] inexplicably depart[s] from established policies, or rest[s] on an impermissible basis.'" Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) (quoting Achacoso-Sanchez v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 779 F.2d 1260, 1265 (7th Cir. 1985)). The recovery of attorney's fees is specifically authorized in family actions. R. 4:42-9(a)(1); R. 5:3-5(c). Pursuant to these rules, applicants must submit an affidavit of services addressing the factors listed in RPC 1.5(a) and itemize disbursements for which reimbursement is sought. Prior to making such an award, the court "shall consider the factors set forth in the court rule on counsel fees, the financial circumstances of the parties, and the good or bad faith of either party." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. Thus, the court must analyze the following factors: (1) the financial circumstances of the parties; (2) the ability of the parties to pay their own fees or to A-3245-24 15 contribute to the fees of the other party; (3) the reasonableness and good faith of the positions advanced by the parties both during and prior to trial; (4) the extent of the fees incurred by both parties; (5) any fees previously awarded; (6) the amount of fees previously paid to counsel by each party; (7) the results obtained; (8) the degree to which fees were incurred to enforce existing orders or to compel discovery; and (9) any other factor bearing on the fairness of an award. [R. 5:3-5(c).] Additionally, when calculating a fee award, a court must determine the reasonableness of the rates proposed by prevailing counsel and the reasonableness of the time spent. Furst v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 182 N.J. 1, 21-22 (2004) (citing Rendine, 141 N.J. at 335-36 ). The court's March 28 order contains a detailed fee analysis. The court denied defendant's request for counsel fees, finding her amended cross-motion lacked merit and was filed in bad faith. The court then addressed plaintiff's application under the factors set forth in Rule 5:3-5(c), expressly citing the governing factors and stating it relied primarily on "the reasonableness and good faith of the positions advanced by the parties." The court found defendant's amended cross-motion was "without merit and filed without basis and with bad faith." It also referenced defendant's numerous self-represented submissions and communications, which the court found necessitated responsive work by A-3245-24 16 plaintiff's counsel. The court reviewed the billing records, found the hourly rates fair and reasonable, excluded certain internal conferences and other time entries, and awarded less than the total sought. The May 2 order similarly reflects a reasoned exercise of discretion. Again, citing Rule 5:3-5(c), the court found defendant's reconsideration motion "without merit and filed without basis," and observed that her argument that the consent order either did not mean what it said or was not understood by her "simply does not make logical sense." The court also considered prior counsel- fee obligations, including defendant's failure to timely pay the remaining $420 due under the December 2024 consent order after plaintiff's recovery from the Victim Crime Compensation Office. The court reviewed counsel's billing submissions and awarded $3,260, again less than the total plaintiff requested. Defendant argues the court failed to adequately consider the parties' finances. The record shows, however, that the court was familiar with the prolonged procedural history of the case and chose to emphasize bad faith and the reasonableness of the parties' positions, which Rule 5:3-5(c) expressly permits. Although a fuller financial record is always preferable, we do not read Rule 5:3-5(c) to require reversal whenever a court does not discuss every factor at equal length, particularly where the judge makes clear findings on the factors A-3245-24 17 deemed most significant and where the litigation conduct itself drove the fee award. Nor do we view the fee awards as punitive as asserted by defendant. The court explained why it regarded defendant's filings as repetitive, meritless, and contrary to the plain language of the parties' own agreement. On this record, and under our deferential standard of review, we cannot conclude the court's findings were made without rational explanation or rested on an impermissible basis. We therefore affirm the March 28, 2025, counsel-fee order and the May 2, 2025, supplemental counsel-fee award. Notwithstanding the foregoing determinations as to counsel fees, because we have remanded limited issues surrounding the calculation of support credits due to plaintiff, we leave to the trial court's discretion as to whether the remanded issues require a reassessment of the counsel fee award previously entered since a portion of defendant's arguments rejected by the trial court prevailed on appeal. Finally, we affirm the trial court's denial of reconsideration. We review an order denying reconsideration under Rule 4:49-2 for abuse of discretion. Parke Bank v. Voorhees Diner Corp., 480 N.J. Super. 254 , 262 (App. Div. 2024). A-3245-24 18 We note defendant's reconsideration motion did not challenge the calculation of the child support credit awarded to plaintiff. We concur with the trial court's determination that defendant's reconsideration motion largely repeated the arguments she had already made including the consent order did not actually resolve emancipation, the younger child remained in high school, and a plenary hearing was required. We conclude the court squarely addressed those arguments. In its May 2, 2025 order, the court held there was no different meaning reasonably attributable to paragraphs 9 and 10 of the consent order and defendant had offered no competent new evidence showing the court overlooked significant facts at the first hearing. Here, the court specifically rejected defendant's contention that it had ignored the one-page school document presented by her. It stated the document had been reviewed and discussed at the original hearing but was insufficient because it lacked detail as to actual attendance, progress, and the legitimacy or recognized status of the program. The court also observed that defendant had still not produced the more complete documentation she claimed she could obtain. Based on our review of the record, we conclude defendant's motion did not identify a palpably incorrect legal premise in the court's earlier ruling, nor A-3245-24 19 did it present previously unavailable competent evidence. It sought, instead, a second opportunity to relitigate the same issues on a better record. Rule 4:49-2 does not require that result. The court therefore acted within its discretion in denying reconsideration. In summary, we hereby affirm the portions of the challenged orders enforcing the December 19, 2024, consent order, fixing the children's emancipation dates, terminating plaintiff's child support obligation, denying reconsideration, and awarding counsel fees. We remand to the trial court to determine if plaintiff's child support obligation at the time of his motion was guidelines based, and if so, to calculate the amount and form of plaintiff 's reimbursement or credit for the period between August 8, 2024 and December 19, 2024—the children's respective emancipation dates—pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines. On remand, the parties shall submit documents or other proofs for the court to determine whether the initial child support award for the parties' two children was based on the Child Support Guidelines. If so, the parties shall provide updated financial information for the time period in question sufficient to address the credit calculation issue. We leave to the trial courts discretion to determine if updated Case Information Statements or other A-3245-24 20 financial information are necessary and whether a case management conference would be appropriate to accomplish the submission of this information. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. A-3245-24 21