M.L.K. v. H.K.R.

RECORD IMPOUNDED NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3901-24 M.L.K.,1 Plaintiff-Respondent, v. H.K.R., Defendant-Appellant. __________________________ Argued September 15, 2026 ‒ Decided October 2, 2026 Before Judges Natali and Bishop-Thompson. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Burlington County, Docket No. FV-03-1897-25. Mark J. Molz argued the cause for appellant (Mark J. Molz, attorneys; Mark J. Molz, on the brief). Respondent has not filed a brief. 1 We use initials to protect the confidentiality of domestic violence proceedings and the parties. R. 1:38-3(d)(9), (10). PER CURIAM Defendant H.K.R. appeals from a final restraining order (FRO) entered against him and in favor of plaintiff M.L.K. on June 25, 2025, pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. After a bench trial, the Family Part judge found defendant committed the predicate acts of assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(a), and harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4. Based on our review of the record, we affirm the entry of the FRO. I. Plaintiff and defendant were in a three-year dating relationship. During the final months of that relationship, defendant lived in plaintiff's studio apartment from sometime before December 25, 2024, through April 1, 2025. On April 2, 2025, plaintiff went to the police department and filed a complaint alleging defendant assaulted and strangled her, causing injuries, and made threats to her, her family, and her cat. Plaintiff thereafter obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO). At the hearing, plaintiff testified consistently with the allegations contained in the TRO. She recounted, on the morning of April 1, amid an argument, defendant lifted plaintiff "in the air," "flipped" her onto her back on the bed, and "pulled" her ankles toward the edge of the bed. Plaintiff further A-3901-24 2 testified when she attempted to leave the apartment, defendant "grabbed" her from behind by the arms, pulled her back inside, and slammed the front door. According to plaintiff, defendant then "yelled" she could not escape, strangled her, and again lifted her into the air. She stated defendant threw her across the room, causing her head to strike a metal box on the floor and bleed. Plaintiff fell to the floor and sustained bruising to her shoulder. After plaintiff stood up, defendant followed her to the bathroom and then to the kitchen, where he placed both hands around her neck, strangled her, and pushed her against the cabinets. Defendant then walked over to the bed and, while plaintiff sat on the floor crying, threw a football that struck her in the face. When plaintiff moved toward the kitchen doorway, defendant approached her, struck the open wound on the top of her head, and yelled at her to stop crying. Plaintiff stated defendant eventually stopped hitting her. Defendant told plaintiff to get into the shower, undressed her, and continued yelling at her. While she was in the shower, he kept berating her, calling her "stupid," "dumb," "c**t," and "b***h." Plaintiff testified she awoke around 2:00 a.m. on April 2 and found defendant on the couch, "completely blacked out." When he awoke, another argument ensued, during which he hit, slapped, and strangled her. As her body A-3901-24 3 became limp, defendant said, "I'll let you breathe this time," and struck her in the head and face. Plaintiff further testified, while defendant was in the shower, he threatened her family, stated he would put a hollow-tip bullet through her skull, and threatened to kill her cat. Photographs admitted into evidence corroborated plaintiff's testimony regarding her injuries. Plaintiff also introduced a handwritten letter from defendant describing his childhood, pain, and their relationship, in which he wrote, in all capital letters: "I TAKE FULL ACCOUNTABILITY." Plaintiff also testified defendant engaged in a pattern of violence beginning in January 2025, which included strangulation and physical assault. Photographs admitted into evidence corroborated those incidents. Defendant offered a materially different account of the parties' prior history and the events of April 2025. He testified the argument began in the morning after he packed his belongings and told plaintiff he wanted a break from the relationship. According to defendant, plaintiff scratched her face and struck him, and he grabbed her only to remove her from him. He further claimed plaintiff threw objects around the apartment while he remained seated on the couch. Defendant generally denied the alleged strangulation incidents, or testified he did not recall them. He also maintained any name-calling or A-3901-24 4 profanity on his part occurred in response to plaintiff's conduct during their arguments. Defendant further testified, later that evening, he gave plaintiff money to purchase alcohol. After plaintiff returned, defendant drank but claimed he remembered nothing else from that evening or the early morning hours of April 2. He denied threatening plaintiff. In support of his account, defendant presented testimony from two witnesses, neither of whom observed any physical altercation between the parties. Plaintiff also did not tell either witness defendant had strangled her. Following closing arguments, the court reserved decision. On June 25, 2025, the court placed its decision on the record. The court addressed credibility, finding plaintiff credible notwithstanding rigorous cross- examination by defense counsel. It observed plaintiff did not waver, her testimony remained consistent, and she testified with "profound emotion" as if she were "reliving the moment all over again." By contrast, the court highlighted portions of defendant's eight-page handwritten letter, which it found "[spoke] loudly to the fragility of [d]efendant's mental state." Applying the two-prong framework set forth in Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112 (App. Div. 2006), the court considered the evidence in light of A-3901-24 5 plaintiff's allegations of assault under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(a), and harassment under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a), (b), and (c). The court found defendant subjected plaintiff to offensive touching and thereby committed the predicate act of assault. It further found defendant committed the predicate act of harassment, concluding that, through the offensive and accompanying threats, defendant acted with the purpose to alarm or to seriously annoy her. Accordingly, the court determined plaintiff had established the predicate acts of assault and harassment by a preponderance of the evidence. With respect to the second Silver prong, the court found the need for continued protection was self-evident, particularly in light of the seriousness of plaintiff's injuries as depicted in the photographs, as well as the parties' "substantial" history of physical violence. Having concluded plaintiff satisfied both Silver prongs, the court entered the FRO. II. On appeal, defendant challenges the entry of the FRO, arguing the court erred in finding he committed the predicate acts of assault and harassment because the parties' interactions amounted to no more than "ordinary domestic contretemps." He contends the court failed to adequately consider plaintiff's testimony concerning her mental health challenges, history of self-harm, and the A-3901-24 6 parties' "rough" intimate relations. Defendant further maintains plaintiff sought the TRO in retaliation for his decision to move out and end the relationship. He also argues plaintiff failed to satisfy her burden under Silver, and the court's findings as to both prongs of that analysis were unsupported by the record. Finally, defendant asserts the court failed to make the requisite credibility findings and deprived him of due process rights by improperly limiting defense counsel's cross-examination of plaintiff. Having reviewed the record, we conclude the court's factual findings and legal conclusions under both Silver prongs are supported by ample, credible evidence in the record. III. Our scope of review is limited in an appeal from an FRO entered following a bench trial. C.C. v. J.A.H., 463 N.J. Super. 419 , 428 (App. Div. 2020). We "accord substantial deference to Family Part judges, who routinely hear domestic violence cases and are 'specially trained to detect the difference between domestic violence and more ordinary differences that arise between couples.'" Ibid. (quoting J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458 , 482 (2011)); see also T.B. v. I.W., 479 N.J. Super. 404 , 412 (App. Div. 2024). That deference is particularly strong when the evidence is largely testimonial and rests on the court's credibility findings. Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015). A-3901-24 7 "The general rule is that findings by the trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Ibid. We will not disturb a trial court's factual findings unless "they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). However, we do not accord such deference to legal conclusions and review such conclusions de novo. C.C., 463 N.J. Super. at 429. At the outset, we reject defendant's argument the court failed to make credibility findings. The record reflects it considered the parties' conflicting testimony and credited plaintiff's account, finding "there was nothing about the content of her testimony or her demeanor to cause the [c]ourt to discredit it in any way." In fully accepting plaintiff's testimony, the court also noted defendant's handwritten letter "[spoke] loudly to the fragility of [his] mental state" and was a "raw and candid cry for help." A trial court must engage in a two-step analysis prior to making certain findings before entering an FRO under the PDVA. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 125-26 . "First, the [court] must determine whether the plaintiff has proven, by A-3901-24 8 a preponderance of the credible evidence, that one or more of the predicate acts set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19[(a)] has occurred." Id. at 125 . Assault is a predicate act under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a)(2). A person is guilty of assault when a person "[a]ttempts to cause or purposely, knowingly[,] or recklessly causes bodily injury to another." N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(a)(1). "Bodily injury" is defined as "physical pain, illness[,] or any impairment of physical condition." N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1(a); see also State v. Stull, 403 N.J. Super. 501, 505 (App. Div. 2008). "'Even the slightest physical contact, if done intentionally, is considered a simple assault under New Jersey law.'" N.B. v. T.B., 297 N.J. Super. 35, 43 (App. Div. 1997) (quoting State v. Bazin, 912 F. Supp. 106, 115 (D.N.J. 1995)). The record demonstrates the court made factual findings of fact that defendant strangled, struck, bit, and threw plaintiff against the wall, corroborated by photographs depicting "significant" bruising to her neck and her head injury. Accepting the entirety of plaintiff's credible testimony, it found plaintiff carried her burden by at least a preponderance of the evidence by proving an act of an assault. Based on our review of the record, the court's findings are supported by ample, credible testamentary and documentary evidence. A-3901-24 9 While only one predicate act is required to find domestic violence, Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 125 , we address the court's finding defendant committed harassment. Harassment is a predicate act under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a)(13). Under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4, a person is guilty of harassment when "a person commits a petty disorderly persons offense, if with purpose to harass another," the person: a. Makes, or causes to be made, one or more communications anonymously or at extremely inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse language, or any other manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm; b. Subjects another to striking, kicking, shoving, or other offensive touching, or threatens to do so; or c. Engages in any other course of alarming conduct or of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy such other person. We likewise reject defendant's contention his conduct was domestic contretemps. The court analyzed each subsection and properly concluded defendant committed harassment under the PDVA. We are satisfied the court made a fact-sensitive inquiry whether defendant acted with a purpose to harass plaintiff. Corrente v. Corrente, 281 N.J. Super. 243, 249 (App. Div. 1995). It properly found defendant's name-calling and threats were made with the purpose to alarm as they were made during acts of strangulation. Accordingly, A-3901-24 10 defendant's actions fell within subsection (a). State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 576 (1997). We also note defendant's act of strangulation constituted an offensive touching and was intended to not only assert physical dominance over plaintiff but was also to foster fear. G.G.S. v. A.C.B., 484 N.J. Super. 546 , 582 (App. Div. 2026). Defendant's threats to plaintiff reasonably put plaintiff in fear for herself, her family and her cat's safety. See State v. Burkert, 231 N.J. 257, 284-85 (2017). We are satisfied the judge considered "the totality of the circumstances" before determining whether the harassment statute had been violated. H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 175 N.J. 309, 326 (2003). Finally, defendant contends the court improperly determined plaintiff satisfied the second Silver prong because the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25- 29(a)(1) to (7) were not addressed and there is no credible history of domestic violence between the parties. His contentions lack merit. With regard to the second prong, the court must determine that a restraining order is necessary to provide protection for the victim. Silver at 126- 27. In reaching that determination, a court is not required to incorporate all of the statutory factors in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a) in its findings; however, "the [PDVA] does require that 'acts claimed by a plaintiff to be domestic violence . . . . be evaluated in light of the previous history of violence between the parties.'" A-3901-24 11 Cesare, 154 N.J. at 401 -02 (quoting Peranio v. Peranio, 280 N.J. Super. 47, 54 (App. Div. 1995)). Whether a restraining order should be issued depends on the seriousness of the predicate offense, "the previous history of domestic violence between the plaintiff and defendant including previous threats, harassment and physical abuse," and "whether immediate danger to the person or property is present." Corrente, 281 N.J. Super. at 248 . This prong also "requires the conduct must be imbued by a desire to abuse or control the victim." R.G. v. R.G., 449 N.J. Super. 208, 228 (App. Div. 2017) (citing Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 126-27 ). However, "[w]hen the predicate act is an offense that inherently involves the use of physical force and violence, the decision to issue an FRO 'is most often perfunctory and self-evident.'" A.M.C. v. P.B., 447 N.J. Super. 402, 417 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 127 ). The act of strangulation, a predicative type of coercive control, is a "sufficient egregious action" to invoke the perfunctory and self-evident principle. G.G.S., 484 N.J. Super. at 583-84. In addition, the record does not support defendant's claim plaintiff failed to timely report the harassment and assault on April 1. Plaintiff testified she feared defendant, even though she purchased alcohol for defendant and returned A-3901-24 12 to her apartment. Given the chronology of events on April 1 and 2, we discern no unreasonable delay by plaintiff that would suggest an FRO was unnecessary for her protection. Nor does the record support defendant's assertion there was no credible history of domestic violence, particularly in light of plaintiff's testimony, which was corroborated by photographs. In evaluating the domestic violence dispute, the court found the parties' relationship involved a "substantial history" of domestic violence. See Pazienza v. Camarata, 381 N.J. Super. 173, 183 (App. Div. 2005). We are satisfied the parties' history, together with defendant's actions in April 2025, supports the court's finding that entry of an FRO was necessary to prevent further abuse. Having considered the record under our deferential standard of review, we affirm the entry of the FRO. Finally, we address defendant's argument the court improperly interfered with defense counsel's cross-examination of plaintiff regarding name-calling and her alleged dishonesty during their relationship. During cross-examination, it curtailed questioning about the specific curse words plaintiff used after she admitted she cursed at defendant. Counsel also questioned plaintiff about whether she had not been truthful with defendant about her sexual history. A-3901-24 13 Defendant's challenge implicates Rule 611, which authorizes a trial court to exercise reasonable control over the mode of examining witnesses. With respect to this ruling, we are obligated to give it "substantial deference and will not overturn such a ruling unless it constitute[s] a clear abuse of discretion. " Hrymoc v. Ethicon, Inc., 254 N.J. 446 , 463 (2023). "Judges are accorded 'wide discretion in exercising control over their courtrooms' and trial proceedings." Martin v. Newark Pub. Schs., 461 N.J. Super. 330 , 340 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting State v. Stewart, 453 N.J. Super. 55, 67 (App. Div. 2018)). They "perform a necessary 'gatekeeper role' regarding testimony adduced at any proceeding." Stewart, 453 N.J. Super. at 67 (quoting State v. Nesbitt, 185 N.J. 504, 514 (2006)). Based on our review, we discern no error in the trial court's management of the bench trial. The court's limitations on questioning fell within the broad discretion afforded trial courts to manage proceedings and control witness examination to ensure the orderly presentation of competent evidence. Neither the specific profanities plaintiff nor her prior sexual history was relevant to the allegations underlying the TRO or her credibility. These rulings did not unfairly prejudice defendant. State v. Bitzas, 451 N.J. Super. 51, 76 (App. Div. 2017). A-3901-24 14 To the extent we have not specifically addressed any of defendant 's remaining arguments, it is because they are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Affirmed. A-3901-24 15