State of New Jersey v. Hugo F. Oliveira

RECORD IMPOUNDED NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3233-24 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. HUGO F. OLIVEIRA, Defendant-Appellant. _______________________ Submitted September 16, 2026 – Decided October 1, 2026 Before Judges Mayer and Vinci. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Burlington County, FO-03-0354-25. Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP, attorneys for appellant (Deanne J. Lowden, on the briefs). Lachia L. Bradshaw, Burlington County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Jennifer B. Paszkiewicz, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM Defendant Hugo Oliveira appeals from a June 5, 2025 order finding him guilty of contempt, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(b)(2), for violating a December 4, 2024, temporary restraining order (TRO). We affirm. Defendant's then-wife obtained a TRO which precluded defendant from having any oral, written, personal, electronic, or other form of communication with his wife. During a hearing on December 10, 2024, defendant purportedly said to his then-wife, "I'm coming after you . . . and your attorney." The judge heard defendant's statement and admonished him for violating the TRO. As a result of his utterance in open court, defendant's then-wife filed a criminal complaint because she felt threatened by defendant's statement and they were engaged in a contentious divorce. Defendant was criminally charged with contempt and harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a).1 Prior to trial, defendant moved to dismiss the criminal charges. Defendant argued his alleged violation of the TRO was de minimis under N.J.S.A. 2C:2- 11. After hearing the parties' arguments on the dismissal motion, the judge denied the motion. In his twelve-page written statement of reasons, the judge found defendant threatened his then-wife in court by stating he was "coming 1 At trial, defendant was acquitted of the harassment charge. On appeal, defendant challenges only the contempt conviction. A-3233-24 2 after" her and her lawyer. The judge concluded defendant made the statement with the intent to harass and in a manner likely to cause alarm based on the history of domestic violence between the parties and the entry of prior restraining orders against defendant. The judge held defendant's utterance in open court violated the no-communication provision in the TRO. The criminal matter proceeded as a bench trial. The State presented several witnesses, including defendant's then-wife and her attorney. Defendant testified on his own behalf. In addition to the testimony, the judge reviewed a copy of the December 4 TRO and the audio recording of the court proceedings on December 10. The judge found the testimony from defendant's then-wife "extremely credible." He also concluded defendant was familiar with protective orders having been involved in "as many as five" such proceedings. The judge determined defendant was served with the December 4 TRO on December 5, 2024, and both defendant and his then-wife appeared in court on December 10. At the end of the court proceedings on December 10, defendant's then- wife explained defendant left the courtroom first. As defendant exited, his then- wife said defendant stared at her, leaned toward her, and uttered "I'm coming A-3233-24 3 after you . . . and your attorney." The statement made defendant's then-wife afraid based on defendant's prior aggressive and unpredictable behaviors. The attorney for defendant's then-wife also testified, and the judge found her testimony "very credible." The attorney attended the court hearing with defendant's then-wife on December 10. The attorney's testimony regarding defendant's threat was consistent with her client's testimony. The sheriff's officer who testified at defendant's criminal trial was not physically present in court on December 10. However, after receiving the complaint filed by defendant's then-wife, the sheriff's officer obtained the audio recording of the courtroom proceedings on December 10. The sheriff's officer told the judge the audio recording played during the criminal trial was an "unaltered depiction of the audio" from the December 10 hearing. Regarding defendant's testimony, defendant admitted he made the statement recorded on December 10. However, the judge found defendant's overall testimony "was lacking any kind of credibility," particularly defendant's claimed unawareness that the TRO precluded any contact with his then-wife. Based on the testimony and documentary evidence, the judge found the State proved "the protective order of December 4 was in place at the time and that [defendant] had knowledge of that order." Because defendant appeared in A-3233-24 4 court on December 10, the judge concluded defendant "clearly and unequivocally . . . had knowledge of the [TRO] that was in effect." Further, the judge found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant "knowingly violated a provision of the [TRO]" and he did so for the purpose of causing alarm. Given these factual findings, the judge determined the State met its burden of proving the contempt charge. However, the judge found the State did not meet its burden of proof on the harassment charge. Consequently, the judge dismissed that charge. The judge sentenced defendant to eighteen months of non-custodial probation and required him to complete various programs as a condition of probation. The judge also imposed monetary fines. On appeal, defendant raises the following arguments: POINT I The Court Did Not Consider All the Relevant Factors When Determining That This Single Statement Amounted to Contempt. A. The Court Failed to Consider the Circumstances When and Where [Defendant] Uttered the Word[s] Alleged. B. The Court Failed to Consider the Circumstances How [Defendant] Uttered the Words Alleged. A-3233-24 5 C. The Court improperly considered and weighed other non-relevant allegations to find contempt. POINT II The Prevention of Domestic Violence is Not Intended to Regulate and Adjudicate the Content of Every Contact Between Persons Connected by a Familial Relationship. Our scope of review of Family Part orders is limited. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998). We owe substantial deference to the Family Part's findings of fact because of its special expertise in family matters. Id. at 413 . Deference is especially appropriate in bench trials "when the evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility." Id. at 412 (quoting In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 117 (1997)). A trial judge who observes witnesses and hears their testimony is in the best position "to make first-hand credibility judgments about the witnesses who appear on the stand. " N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008). We will not disturb a trial court's factual findings unless "they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant[,] and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412 (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. A-3233-24 6 474, 484 (1974)). However, we review a trial court's legal conclusions de novo. Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269, 283 (2016). The purpose of the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35 is to "assure the victims of domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse the law can provide." G.M. v. C.V., 453 N.J. Super. 1, 12 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting State v. Brown, 394 N.J. Super. 492, 504 (App. Div. 2007)); see also N.J.S.A. 2C:25-18. "Our law is particularly solicitous of victims of domestic violence," J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 473 (2011) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 584 (1997)), and courts will "liberally construe [the PDVA] to achieve its salutary purposes," Cesare, 154 N.J. at 400 . A person is guilty of the disorderly persons offense of contempt if that individual "purposely or knowingly violates an order entered under the provisions of the [PDVA]." N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(b)(2). Under this statute, the State must prove the following beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the existence of a restraining order; (2) defendant knowingly or purposely violated the restraining order; and (3) defendant's conduct constituted a crime or disorderly persons offense. See State v. Chenique-Puey, 145 N.J. 334, 341-42 (1996). A-3233-24 7 Defendant does not dispute the State satisfied its burden of proving his awareness and knowledge of the December 4 TRO. Rather, defendant disputes the State's proof that he knowingly and purposely violated the TRO at the conclusion of the December 10 court proceedings. A person acts "purposely" if they consciously engage in conduct or cause a certain result. N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(1). A person acts "knowingly" if they are aware of their conduct, the circumstances surrounding that conduct, or there is a high probability that those circumstances exist. N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(2). The TRO clearly and unambiguously prohibited defendant from any form of contact or communication with his then-wife. Based on the trial testimony and evidence, the judge found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant purposely and knowingly made a threat to his then-wife in open court on December 10 in violation of the December 4 TRO. The judge's factual and credibility findings are well supported by the record. Thus, we are satisfied the judge correctly found defendant guilty of the disorderly persons offense of contempt for violating the December 4 TRO. Affirmed. A-3233-24 8