R.M. v. New Jersey State Parole Board

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3398-23 R.M., Appellant, v. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD, Respondent. _____________________ Argued September 15, 2026 – Decided October 5, 2026 Before Judges Gilson, Gummer, and Paganelli. On appeal from the New Jersey State Parole Board. Jennifer B. Condon argued the cause for appellant (Center for Social Justice Seton Hall Law School, attorneys; Jennifer B. Condon, Nicholas Giaquinto, law student, appearing pursuant to Rule 1:21 3(b), and Holly Prince, law student, appearing pursuant to Rule 1:21 3(b), on the briefs). Christopher C. Josephson, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney; Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Christopher C. Josephson, on the brief). PER CURIAM Appellant R.M. has been incarcerated for over thirty-six years for a murder he committed in 1989. 1 He became eligible for parole in 2020. In 2022, we vacated the first decision by the New Jersey State Parole Board (the Board), which denied R.M. parole. We remanded and directed the Board to conduct a new hearing and consider a psychological evaluation, which had concluded R.M. had a low to moderate risk of committing a new crime if released on parole. R.M. now appeals from a series of subsequent Board decisions denying him parole. The record establishes that the Board has repeatedly failed to adequately consider the psychological evaluations by two doctors, who have both concluded that R.M. has a low to moderate risk of committing a new crime if released on parole. The record also establishes that the Board has failed to identify credible evidence that there is a substantial probability that if released on parole R.M. will commit a crime. So, the Board has failed to follow the law and instructions that the New Jersey Supreme Court set forth in Acoli v. New Jersey State Parole Board, 250 N.J. 431 (2022). Accordingly, we vacate the 1 We use initials to protect appellant's privacy interests because the appeal requires us to discuss his mental-health records. See R. 1:38-3(a)(2). A-3398-23 2 Board's 2024 and 2025 decisions denying R.M. parole and remand with instructions that R.M. be released on parole with appropriate conditions. I. In 1989, defendant deliberately struck a woman and her eight-year-old daughter with his vehicle as they were walking outside a grocery store. Thereafter, R.M. got out of his car, saw that the woman was still alive, took a butcher's knife, and stabbed the woman eight times. The woman died of her wounds. The daughter was injured and witnessed the murder of her mother. R.M. was arrested at the scene and, through investigations, police learned that he and the victim, who was a former coworker, previously had an extramarital affair. Law enforcement personnel also learned that five months before the murder, R.M. had attacked the victim at work, had poured hot coffee on her, and had struck her in her face several times. R.M. had been fired because of that assault. At trial, R.M. claimed insanity and diminished capacity. The jury rejected those defenses and found R.M. guilty of first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11- 3(a)(1) and (2); third-degree possession of a weapon for unlawful purposes, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d); and disorderly persons simple assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12- 1(a)(1). In 1993, R.M. was sentenced to life in prison with thirty years of parole A-3398-23 3 ineligibility for the murder, and a consecutive six months in prison for the assault.2 Defendant became eligible for parole in January 2020. On July 2, 2019, Dr. Andrew Greenberg conducted a mental-health parole-eligibility evaluation of R.M. (the 2019 Greenberg Evaluation). Dr. Greenberg noted that R.M. had been diagnosed with "[m]ajor [d]epressive [d]isorder, [r]ecurrent, [s]evere, with [p]sychotic [f]eatures in [r]emission." Dr. Greenberg explained that in 2019 R.M. had "no acute psychiatric concerns to be considered if [he] is released." In that regard, Dr. Greenberg noted R.M.'s "satisfactory emotional and behavior control for more than twenty-five years" while incarcerated. In assessing R.M.'s risk of recidivism, Dr. Greenberg considered his "[m]ental health problems" but pointed out that those problems had been treated and had been stable for over twenty-five years. Dr. Greenberg also cited various mitigating factors, indicating R.M.'s likely success on parole, which included: minimal prior criminal history; above average adjustment to incarceration; college education; positive work history; positive support in the community; 2 The sentence was imposed before the enactment of the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. A-3398-23 4 expressed family and religious values; and an expressed motivation to make changes in lifestyle and behavior. Dr. Greenberg opined that R.M. presented "a low risk [of] recidivism" based on a score of eleven on his Level of Service Inventory-Revised (LSI-R). Accordingly, Dr. Greenberg concluded that R.M. "presents as able to function independently in the community with assistance of family members to aid him in his transition into the community." On August 26, 2020, the full Board issued a final decision denying R.M. parole and establishing a 120-month future eligibility term (FET). R.M. appealed from that decision to this court. The Board moved to remand, acknowledging that it had not considered the 2019 Greenberg Evaluation in denying parole. We granted the remand, and, following further consideration, the Board again denied R.M. parole. The Board explained that it had considered all relevant evidence, including the 2019 Greenberg Evaluation, but noted that it did not expressly address the Greenberg Evaluation in its decision because it considered that document confidential. In 2022, we vacated and remanded the Board's first decisions to deny R.M. parole. R.M. v. N.J. State Parole Bd., No. A-0493-20 (App. Div. Nov. 9, 2022) (slip op. at 2). We determined that the record did not support the Board 's belief A-3398-23 5 that R.M. was likely to commit a crime if released on parole. In that regard, we pointed out that the Board "did not adequately assess the Greenberg Evaluation or the other factors set forth in the Board's regulations." Id. at 11. We explained: Neither the two-member panel nor the full Board pointed to any material deficiencies in the Greenberg Evaluation. Although the Board noted that R.M. told it a few things not disclosed to Dr. Greenberg, including the hallucination, the doctor was not given the opportunity to state whether the identified omissions were material. Moreover, the Board had no other expert report and did not have the medical expertise to assess the Greenberg Evaluation. In short, there was only one psychological evaluation and it concluded R.M. posed little risk of recidivism. [Id. at 11-12.] Regarding other factors, we determined that the Board had not adequately considered R.M.'s institutional record, numerous programs completed during R.M.'s incarceration, and studies on the age-crime curve, which demonstrate that as people age the likelihood of them committing crimes diminishes. See id. at 12-13. We also noted that the Board had treated R.M.'s disciplinary history as an aggravating factor, even though R.M. had committed only two infractions while incarcerated, both of which stemmed from the same incident eighteen years earlier in 2002. Id. at 12. A-3398-23 6 On remand, we directed the Board to give R.M. access to the 2019 Greenberg Evaluation. Finally, we directed the Board to "explain the reasons for [imposing] an FET" if, on remand, it decided to impose an FET beyond the twenty-seven-month presumptive term. Id. at 14. On the second remand, the Board reinitiated the parole process and R.M. was psychologically evaluated three more times. Dr. Greenberg conducted a second evaluation. Another psychologist, Dr. Dione Johnson, evaluated R.M. in November 2024, and in August 2025. Additionally, R.M.'s treating psychiatrist, Dr. David Kalal, prepared a report in October 2023, detailing R.M.'s mental-health treatment history. Dr. Greenberg conducted his second psychological evaluation of R.M. in May 2023 (the 2023 Greenberg Evaluation). After reviewing four more years of information concerning R.M. and his treatment, Dr. Greenberg reached the same conclusions that he had reached in 2019; that is, R.M. was at a low risk of recidivism and a low to moderate risk for future violence. He listed the factors that supported release, including R.M.'s minimal prior criminal history, positive institutional adjustment, and community support. He noted that R.M. had continued to comply with psychiatric care and his current medications were adequate to control his symptoms. Finally, Dr. Greenberg opined that R.M. was A-3398-23 7 at a lower risk of reoffending than in 2019, because R.M. was then over the age of sixty-five, which Dr. Greenberg explained "statistically reduc[es] his likelihood of engaging in criminal violence." In his October 2023 report, Dr. Kalal explained that he had been R.M.'s treating psychiatrist since 2011. Dr. Kalal stated that R.M. has "maintained spotless compliance" with his prescribed medications, has undergone individual psychotherapy, and has been "actively engaged in treatment" for over twelve years. Dr. Kalal concluded that R.M. "has demonstrated both significant insight and a willingness to reflect on the consequences of his actions and the[] effect on the family of the victim." Dr. Johnson conducted independent psychological evaluations of R.M. in 2024 and in 2025. Like Dr. Greenberg, she concluded R.M. was at a low risk of reoffending and his chances of completing a successful term of parole were "GOOD." Dr. Johnson noted that R.M. was "stable with no evidence of a major mood, anxiety, or thought disorder." In her August 2025 evaluation, Dr. Johnson reviewed R.M.'s medical records and treatment notes, which showed that R.M. had made significant improvements in his rehabilitation, particularly regarding the victim and insights into the crime. In that regard, she referenced Dr. Kalal's treatment note, stating: R.M. "has shown consistent improvement A-3398-23 8 into understanding the impact of his mental illness on his index offense and its consequences to his victims . . . . [Moreover,] his psychiatric symptoms and treatment continue to stabilize." She concluded that all the other factors cited in her previous report, and other mental-health records, indicated that R.M. presented as a low risk of reoffending. On October 17, 2023, the full Board held a parole hearing and thereafter denied R.M. parole. Although the Board had access to both the 2019 and 2023 Greenberg Evaluations and the report from Dr. Kalal, the Board did not consider those evaluations or the report. Several months later, on January 17, 2024, the Board established a ninety-six-month FET. R.M. administratively appealed those decisions, and on June 20, 2024, the full Board affirmed its October 17, 2023 denial of parole and its January 17, 2024 establishment of a ninety -six- month FET. R.M. then filed this appeal. After R.M. filed his merit briefs on this appeal, the Board moved for a remand to conduct a rehearing so that it could address and consider the factors set forth in this court's 2022 opinion, including the Greenberg Evaluations. In seeking remand, the Board acknowledged it had not adequately explained its consideration of the evaluations and other factors in its October 2023 and June 2024 decisions. A-3398-23 9 We granted the Board's motion for a remand, and, on June 26, 2025, we ordered the Board to complete the remand within forty-five days. In July 2025, the Board vacated its earlier decisions issued on October 17, 2023, and January 17, 2024. After obtaining an extension of the remand, the Board conducted a parole hearing on August 28, 2025. Following that hearing, the Board again denied R.M.'s request for parole, issuing a checklist decision and, later, a short, written decision. In its August 2025 decision, the Board focused on the facts and circumstances of the 1989 murder and assault, as well as its perception that R.M. lacked insight into the crimes. In that regard, the Board stated: The record reflects [R.M.] had an escalating history of negative behavior towards the victim, culminating in the act of murder. This included harassing the victim at work (where they were coworkers), throwing hot coffee in her face and striking her. [R.M.] reports accepting responsibility for murdering the victim in front of her child. However, he also deflected some culpability by asserting he was hallucinating at the time of the murder . . . . Now age [sixty-seven] and more than [thirty] years since the murder, after completion of numerous programs, and while addressing mental health concerns, [R.M.] continues to be unable to connect the emotions he displayed towards the victim . . . . There is a lack of introspective growth and recognition how anger and resentment toward the victim impacted his actions. A-3398-23 10 The Board did not discuss the four psychological evaluations or the assessment of R.M.'s treating psychiatrist in its August 2025 decision. Instead, the Board placed those items in a confidential appendix and noted that it had considered those items. The Board, however, did not provide any evaluation or analysis of the psychological evaluations. Nor did the Board explain how it had reached opposite conclusions from the two psychologists and R.M.'s treating psychiatrist. II. Initially, we clarify what decisions are before us on this appeal. When R.M. filed the second appeal, he challenged the Board's June 20, 2024 decision denying him parole and imposing a ninety-six-month FET. The Board moved for a remand, which we granted. The Board then vacated its October 17, 2023 decision denying parole and its January 17, 2024 decision imposing a ninety- six-month FET. Because the June 20, 2024 decision was based on and affirmed the October 2023 and January 2024 decisions, the Board effectively also vacated its June 20, 2024 decision. Thereafter, on August 28, 2025, the Board issued a new decision denying R.M. parole and on October 8, 2025, the Board issued a decision establishing a thirty-six-month FET. Because we retained jurisdiction when we remanded this A-3398-23 11 matter in June 2025, we have jurisdiction over and now review the Board 's decisions issued on August 28, 2025, and October 8, 2025. In doing so, we also consider the history of the Board's denial of parole since 2020, as well as its failure to comply with our directions on previous remands. See Acoli, 250 N.J. at 428; Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd. (Trantino VI), 166 N.J. 113, 122 , 126- 41 (2001). III. On this appeal, R.M. makes four main arguments, with related sub- arguments. First, he contends the Board's denial of parole and imposition of extended FETs following our 2022 remand were arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable because they ignored "highly favorable" psychological evaluations, his advanced age, and the programs and treatment he had received while incarcerated, all of which indicated that he had a low risk of committing a crime if released on parole. Second, R.M. asserts that the Board erred in placing undue emphasis on the facts and circumstances of the crimes he committed over thirty-six years ago and substituted its lay judgment concerning R.M.'s lack of insight by ignoring expert opinions that concluded R.M. now understands the gravity of the crimes he committed and is remorseful. Third, R.M. alleges that the Board inappropriately considered how he practices his A-3398-23 12 religious faith and unlawfully injected religiously biased reasoning into the denial of parole. Finally, R.M. argues that the Board violated his due process rights by withholding from him, and treating as confidential, the reports of his psychological evaluations and the records of his mental-health treatment. A. Our Standard of Review. The Board is charged with the responsibility to determine whether an incarcerated person should be paroled. Acoli, 250 N.J. at 454. An appellate court's review of a parole decision is deferential. Ibid. Courts will overturn a Board's decision only if it is contrary to the law or arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Trantino VI, 166 N.J. at 173 . Accordingly, the Board's factual findings will not be disturbed if they "could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence in the whole record." Hare v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 368 N.J. Super. 175, 179 (App. Div. 2004) (citing Trantino VI, 166 N.J. at 172 ). We accord that level of deference because "[t]he decision of a parole board involves 'discretionary assessment[s] of a multiplicity of imponderables.'" Trantino VI, 166 N.J. at 201 (Baime, J., dissenting) (second alteration in original) (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 10 (1979)). A-3398-23 13 "The discretionary power exercised by the Parole Board, however, is not unlimited or absolute." Acoli, 250 N.J. at 455. A Board's decision will not be sustained if it violates law, "is not supported by 'substantial evidence' in the record, or 'could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.'" Ibid. (quoting Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd. (Trantino IV), 154 N.J. 19 , 24-25 (1998)). B. The Governing Law. The Parole Act of 1979, N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53 (1979), governs R.M.'s parole because the 1979 Act was in effect when R.M. committed his crimes in 1989, and when he was sentenced in 1993. The Parole Act of 1979 states that an inmate "shall be released on parole at the time of parole eligibility, unless [it is shown] by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a substantial likelihood that the inmate will commit a crime . . . if released on parole at such time." Trantino VI, 166 N.J. at 126 (alternation and omission in original) (quoting N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53 (1979)). "'Likelihood' is defined as a 'probability,' or 'the appearance of probable success,' and 'substantial' is defined as 'considerable in amount' or 'being that specified to a large degree.'" Acoli, 250 N.J. at 455-56 (quoting Webster's Third International Dictionary 1310, 2280 (1981)). Consequently, the Board must demonstrate that there is a "substantial A-3398-23 14 'probability' that an inmate will reoffend . . . even though such an assessment will defy scientific rigor or involves a certain degree of subjectivity." Id. at 456. The New Jersey Supreme Court has explained: Assessing the risk that a parole-eligible candidate will reoffend requires a finding that is more than a mere probability and considerably less than a certainty. To be sure, the mere 'potential' that an inmate if released may reoffend is not sufficient. Only when the risk of reoffending rises to 'a substantial likelihood' may a parole-eligible inmate be denied parole. [Ibid. (quoting N.J. State Parole Bd. v. Cestari, 224 N.J. Super. 534, 550 (App. Div. 1988)).] "Under the 1979 Parole Act, the Parole Board must assess a number of factors for the purpose of determining 'what a [person] is and what [he or she] may become rather than simply what he [or she] has done.'" Ibid. (quoting Acoli v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 224 N.J. 213, 222 (2016)). "The weight to be assigned to any one factor will depend on the unique history, background, and characteristics of the individual and the institutional record developed during the years of incarceration." Id. at 457. The factors that the Board must consider include: "facts and circumstances related to the underlying crime; offenses and disciplinary infractions committed while incarcerated; participation in institutional programs and academic or vocational education or programs; documentation reflecting personal goals, A-3398-23 15 personal strengths or motivation for law-abiding behavior; mental and emotional health; parole plans; availability of community resources or support services; statements by the inmate reflecting on the likelihood that he [or she] will commit another crime; the failure to rehabilitate; history of employment and education; and statements or testimony of any victim." [Ibid. (citing N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11(b)).] The Court has also explained that the factors may be given different weight. Ibid. "For example, although the '[f]acts and circumstances of the offense' is one factor, 'the gravity of the crime' cannot serve as an 'independent reason for continuing punishment and denying parole' under the 1979 Act." Ibid. (alteration in the original) (quoting N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11(b) and Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd. (Trantino II), 89 N.J. 347, 373-74 (1982)). In that regard, the Court has pointed out that "[i]nmates serving sentences under the Code . . . have presumptively satisfied all punitive aspects of their sentence at the time they become eligible for parole." Id. at 456 (omission in original) (quoting N.J. State Parole Bd. v. Byrne, 93 N.J. 192 , 205 n.6 (1983)). C. The Board's Inadequate Decisions Denying R.M. Parole. On August 28, 2025, the full Board interviewed R.M. via a video teleconference. Immediately following the interview, the Board conducted a short conference among its members and then informed R.M. that his application A-3398-23 16 for parole had been denied. That same day, the Board issued a one-page checklist decision. The Board checked two factors in support of its denial of parole: (1) "[f]acts and circumstances of the offense[s.] Specifically[,] murder [first-] degree[.] With his car, struck victim and child in parking lot. Exited vehicle and stabbed victim multiple time[s];" and (2) "[i]nsufficient problem[s] resolution[.] Specifically[,] lack of insight into criminal behavior." The Board then added a short, handwritten note, which focused on R.M.'s 1989 crimes and the Board's perception that R.M. refused to take full responsibility for his criminal conduct and its consequences. Over a month later, on October 8, 2025, the Board issued a five-page written decision further explaining why it had denied R.M. parole. The written decision identified two main concerns. First, the "Board noted [R.M.'s] history of interpersonal relationships is marked with disagreements [R.M.] had with others based on [R.M.'s] religious views and [R.M.'s] religious principles." Second, the Board reiterated that its "concern[] is [R.M.'s] apparent lack of rehabilitative growth as it relates to [R.M.'s] acknowledging and understanding that on the day of the murder, [R.M.] essentially targeted the victim to kill her." In neither the checklist decision nor the written decision did the Board discuss the four psychological evaluations of R.M. Instead, in a "Confidential A-3398-23 17 Addendum" also issued on October 8, 2025, the Board summarized those psychological evaluations, which had been prepared by Dr. Johnson and Dr. Greenberg. The Addendum also summarized Dr. Kalal's report of the mental- health treatment R.M. had received while incarcerated. The Board "note[d]" the findings of the psychological evaluations and rejected those findings "based [on its] extensive interviews" of R.M. The chronology of the Board's decisions and its lack of meaningful discussion of the psychological evaluations and other mitigating factors demonstrate that the Board did not adequately consider the four "in-depth" psychological evaluations. As already summarized, all those evaluations concluded that R.M. had a low to moderate risk of committing a new crime if released on parole. Nowhere in any of its decisions does the Board explain why it rejected the conclusions of three doctors. More critically, the Board failed to identify a preponderance of the evidence demonstrating that R.M. is substantially likely to commit a crime if released. The 1979 Act directs that a person is to be released on parole unless the Board shows, by a preponderance of evidence, that that person is substantially likely to commit a crime if released. Acoli, 250 N.J. at 455; N.J.S.A. 30:4- 123.53(a) (1979). The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that an individual's A-3398-23 18 "eligibility for parole does not depend on his reciting a version of events" about the crime "that are acceptable to the Parole Board." Acoli, 250 N.J. at 463. When the Board denied R.M. parole in August 2025, the record before the Board included the following information: (1) Two psychological evaluations by Dr. Greenberg, both concluding that R.M. presented a low to moderate risk of reoffending. (2) Two psychological evaluations by Dr. Johnson, also concluding that R.M. had a low to moderate risk of re-offense. (3) The most recent psychological evaluation, prepared by Dr. Johnson on August 13, 2025, found that based on assessments, R.M. had "a low risk for recidivism with a 20% chance of re-arrest and a 13.3% chance of reconviction within two years of release." That report concluded: "[t]he likelihood of [R.M.] successfully completing a projected term of parole is generally GOOD." (4) A report from Dr. Kalal, who had treated R.M. for his mental-health conditions for over twelve years and had reviewed R.M.'s prior treatment history. Dr. Kalal found R.M. had received treatment for over twenty-three years and "maintains spotless compliance" with his mental-health treatment, including taking all prescribed medications. Based on monthly meetings with R.M. for over twelve years, Dr. Kalal also found R.M. "has demonstrated both significant insight and a willingness to reflect on the consequences of his actions and their effect on the family of the victim as well as the negative impact on his family." A-3398-23 19 (5) Reports that R.M. had been a "model inmate," had productively worked while incarcerated in repairing electronic devices, had completed numerous courses, had tutored other inmates in various subjects for years, and had regularly attended religious services. (6) R.M. had a very limited history of infractions while incarcerated. R.M. had not been disciplined in the past twenty-four years and his only disciplines were in 2002, related to possession of a TV antenna. (7) Numerous letters recommending R.M. for parole and commenting on his good behavior and service while he was incarcerated. The Board made only passing references to all that mitigating information. Moreover, even after we remanded this matter in 2022, the Board did not follow our instructions. Although the Board is free to disagree with our decision, it is not free to disregard a court's instructions on remand. See Kosmin v. State Parole Bd., 363 N.J. Super. 28, 40 (App. Div. 2003) (explaining that while "state administrative agencies are free to disagree with our decisions[,]" "[t]hey are not, however, free to disregard them"). The Board also failed to adequately address R.M.'s advanced age. In August 2025, R.M. was sixty-seven years old. Both Drs. Greenberg and Johnson pointed out that R.M.'s advanced age made it unlikely that he would reoffend if released on parole. The Board cryptically dismissed R.M.'s age, reasoning that A-3398-23 20 his "age has not altered how the Board finds [R.M.] will behave." That opinion is not supported by evidence, much less substantial credible evidence. IV. Having determined that the Board did not establish by a preponderance of evidence that R.M. was likely to commit a crime if released on parole and having considered the Board's failure to follow our previous remands, there is no reason to remand this matter again. Instead, like the records before the New Jersey Supreme Court in Acoli and Trantino VI, the record in this matter establishes that R.M. should be released on parole with appropriate conditions. Here, like in Acoli, "the Board stated it 'reviewed the entire record in rendering its decision' and then cursorily enumerated some generic mitigating factors" but never "substantively addressed" the evidence showing R.M. had a low risk of reoffending. Acoli, 250 N.J. at 465. Rejecting evaluations and reports based on years of treatment and good behavior without analysis and then announcing a contrary conclusion is not the reasoned decision required by the law. See ibid.; Berta v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 473 N.J. Super. 284 , 320 (App. Div. 2022) (explaining "[i]f the Board is to part company with these professional assessments, it must explain the reasons for doing so given that it bears the A-3398-23 21 burden of overcoming the presumption of parole by a preponderance of the evidence"). We previously emphasized the chronology of the Board's decisions because that chronology demonstrates that the Board did not follow our instructions regarding what it had agreed to do when it requested remands. In short, the chronology establishes that a further remand is not warranted. Moreover, a further remand would not be fair to R.M. who, under the law, has the right to be released because in the six years since R.M. became eligible for parole the Board has repeatedly failed to show there is a substantial likelihood he will commit a new crime if released on parole. In every decision denying R.M. parole, the Board has relied on its belief that R.M. has not accepted responsibility for the murder and assault he committed in 1989. The record does not support that belief. R.M. has repeatedly told the Board that he knows he committed those crimes and accepts responsibility for his past actions. Although the Board has the right not to accept R.M.'s acknowledgements, it still must point to sufficient evidence demonstrating that R.M. has a substantial likelihood of reoffending if released on parole. The Board has failed to point to that evidence and the record that has been developed since 2019 does not contain that evidence. A-3398-23 22 Accordingly, we vacate the Board's decisions denying R.M. parole. We remand with instructions that no later than October 30, 2026, R.M. be released on parole with appropriate conditions. Given our decision, we need not address R.M.'s arguments concerning religious bias or violations of his due process rights. Nevertheless, we point out that the Board's designations of R.M.'s psychological evaluations and his medical records as confidential were inconsistent with the law. See In re Petition for Rulemaking to Amend N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11, 262 N.J. 428 (2026) (reiterating that a parole eligible person has a due process right to review mental- health records and directing the Board to adopt a new rule to comply with those due process rights). Reversed, vacated, and remanded with instructions. We do not retain jurisdiction. A-3398-23 23