S.J.M. v. Camden County Intoxicated Driver Resource Center

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2551-24 S.J.M.,1 Petitioner-Appellant, v. CAMDEN COUNTY INTOXICATED DRIVER CENTER, DIVISION OF MENTAL HEALTH AND ADDICTION SERVICES and NEW JERSEY MOTOR VEHICLE COMMISSION, Respondents-Respondents. ______________________________ Submitted September 24, 2026 – Decided October 5, 2026 Before Judges Chase and Augostini. On appeal from the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission. 1 Because the non-suppressed parties use initials in their respective briefs, we use initials for appellant, whose privacy interests are compelling interests that outweigh the Judiciary's commitment to transparency. See N.J.A.C. 10:162-2.9. Foda Law Group, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Rasha B. Foda, on the brief). Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney for respondent Division of Mental Health and Addiction Services, Intoxicated Driving Program (Sookie Bae- Park, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Laura N. Morson, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney for respondent New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission (Sookie Bae-Park, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Amy Chung, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). PER CURIAM S.J.M. appeals from a March 21, 2025 order of the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission (MVC) suspending his driver's license because he failed to satisfy the requirements of the Intoxicated Driving Program (IDP) and the Intoxicated Driver Resource Center (IDRC). We dismiss the appeal as moot. In February 2023, S.J.M. pled guilty in Shamong Township and was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI) offenses. The municipal court sentenced him to twelve months with an ignition interlock device installed on his vehicle and required him to complete two IDRC education programs: a twelve-hour program and a forty-eight-hour program. The judgment of conviction also provided his "[f]ailure to satisfy those requirements [would] be reported to the court and [would] result in a [two]-day term of imprisonment in A-2551-24 2 the county jail and an additional period of license suspension until such requirements are satisfied." S.J.M. signed the order, certifying he understood those consequences. About two years later, the IDRC notified S.J.M. he had failed to satisfy the program requirements. The notice gave him ten working days to comply before the IDRC would report his noncompliance to the sentencing court for appropriate action. It also directed him to N.J.A.C. 10:162, which requires license suspension after thirty days of continued noncompliance. When S.J.M. still did not comply, the IDRC mailed a noncompliance report to the municipal court on February 17, 2025, and sent S.J.M. a copy. That report again directed him to N.J.A.C. 10:162. On March 19, 2025, after thirty days of continued noncompliance, the IDRC forwarded its noncompliance report to the IDP through the electronic DUI Tracking System. The IDP then forwarded the IDRC's finding to the MVC, which suspended S.J.M.'s driver's license. On March 21, 2025, the MVC mailed S.J.M.'s notice of the suspension under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. S.J.M. then filed an emergent application seeking an immediate stay of the suspension. We denied that application. He next renewed the application A-2551-24 3 before the Supreme Court, which denied relief the same day. This appeal followed. While this appeal was pending, S.J.M. moved before the Shamong Township Municipal Court to dismiss the IDRC's finding of noncompliance, vacate the MVC's suspension order, and stay that order. On November 5, 2025, the municipal court denied the motion as moot, finding S.J.M. had become IDRC compliant and could apply to restore his driver's license. On appeal, S.J.M. argues his right to due process was violated when his license was suspended without a formal hearing and an opportunity to be heard. He also contends the IDRC's treatment plan was unlawful because it was unsupported by the facts. We need not consider these arguments on the merits because they are moot. "Mootness is a threshold justiciability determination rooted in the notion that judicial power is to be exercised only when a party is immediately threatened with harm." Stop & Shop Supermarket, Co. v. Cnty. of Bergen, 450 N.J. Super. 286, 291 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting Betancourt v. Trinitas Hosp., 415 N.J. Super. 301, 311 (App. Div. 2010)). "[C]ourts normally will not entertain cases when a controversy no longer exists and the disputed issues have become moot." Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Loc. 400 v. Borough of Tinton Falls, A-2551-24 4 468 N.J. Super. 214 , 224 (App. Div. 2021) (quoting De Vesa v. Dorsey, 134 N.J. 420, 428 (1993)). Further, our courts generally "do not resolve issues that have become moot due to the passage of time or intervening events." Wisniewski v. Murphy, 454 N.J. Super. 508, 518 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting State v. Davila, 443 N.J. Super. 577, 584 (App. Div. 2016)). "An issue is 'moot when [the] decision sought in a matter, when rendered, can have no practical effect on the existing controversy.'" Redd v. Bowman, 223 N.J. 87, 104 (2015) (quoting Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Mitchell, 422 N.J. Super. 214, 221-22 (App. Div. 2011)). Although S.J.M. styles this matter as an agency appeal, he is essentially challenging a consequence of failing to comply with the terms of his sentence. Appeals from a judgment of conviction in a criminal action in a court of limited criminal jurisdiction, such as the municipal court here, "must be taken to the Law Division." Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. on R. 3:23- 1 (2027); see also State v. Buchan, 119 N.J. Super. 297, 298 (App. Div. 1972) ("All appeals from judgments of conviction in a court of limited jurisdiction are to be taken to the County Court[.]"). S.J.M. was sentenced in the Shamong Township Municipal Court. He later sought relief from that court, which ruled A-2551-24 5 he was IDRC compliant and could apply to restore his driver's license. Because no live controversy remains, the appeal is moot. Dismissed as moot. A-2551-24 6