State of New Jersey v. Rolando Godwin

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0326-24 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ROLANDO GODWIN, a/k/a RAHEEM JONES, Defendant-Appellant. Argued September 15, 2026 – Decided October 5, 2026 Before Judges Gooden Brown and Bergman. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County, Indictment No. 21-12-0806. Patricia B. Quelch argued the cause for appellant (Helmer, Conley & Kasselman, PA, attorneys; Patricia B. Quelch, of counsel and on the brief). Debra G. Simms, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney; Debra G. Simms, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM Defendant Rolando Godwin appeals from an April 3, 2023, order denying his motion to suppress blood evidence and a July 23, 2024, judgment of conviction entered after defendant pled guilty to first-degree aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1) and driving while intoxicated (DWI), N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. He also challenges the trial court's order denying a Franks1 hearing, the court's failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing concerning hospital and forensic laboratory testing standards, and the sentence imposed. Having considered the record, arguments on appeal, and applicable legal principles, we affirm all orders. I. We recite the facts and procedural history contained in the trial court record. A Union County grand jury charged defendant in a seven-count indictment with first-degree aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1); second-degree vehicular homicide, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5(a), (b)(1); second-degree witness tampering, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5(d); third-degree burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:18- 2(a)(1); third-degree hindering apprehension or prosecution, N.J.S.A. 2C:29 - 3(b)(1); third-degree causing death or injury while driving unlicensed, N.J.S.A. 1 Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). A-0326-24 2 2C:40-22(a); and third-degree false government documents, N.J.S.A. 2C:21- 2.1(c). The above charges arose from a fatal two-car accident on the Garden State Parkway in Clark during the early morning hours of February 15, 2021, when dispatch received a report of a two-car crash with one vehicle engulfed in flames. When law enforcement arrived, civilian witnesses had already removed the victim from the burning Lexus. Thereafter, emergency medical personnel transported the victim to the hospital where the victim was later pronounced deceased. Law enforcement found defendant in the second vehicle, a white Range Rover, and he was transported by ambulance to University Hospital in Newark. As part of law enforcement's investigation, a witness reported that he observed the defendant's Range Rover pass him at a very high rate of speed— estimated at 110 to 120 miles per hour—while swerving and weaving through traffic before observing the collision. Additionally, in the subsequent search warrant application, Trooper Juan Vera stated troopers observed defendant with fumbling hands, bloodshot and watery eyes, a short temper, and they smelled an odor of alcoholic beverage emanating from defendant's breath. Troopers also overheard defendant tell medical personnel he had consumed alcohol at a party before driving. Defendant was also observed wearing a yellow club bracelet. A-0326-24 3 Upon defendant's arrival for trauma evaluation, University Hospital records documented that hospital personnel ordered diagnostic testing, including laboratory studies and an ethanol test. The records show defendant was "unable to sign" the consent for treatment form due to his "medical condition." The hospital records also show defendant's blood sample was collected at 4:14 a.m. for the ethanol test, which resulted in a blood alcohol level of .182. The same records show the test was ordered as part of defendant's emergency treatment. Later that morning, the State applied telephonically for a warrant to search defendant's person and vehicle and to obtain a blood sample from him. Trooper Vera described the fatal crash, witness observations, defendant's condition, the odor of alcohol, and defendant's admission to drinking. The court found probable cause and authorized the warrants at approximately 7:22 a.m. During the application, the State requested authority to obtain the blood sample in a medically acceptable manner and, if necessary, with reasonable force because of defendant's "combative nature" at the hospital. The court granted that request but directed officers to attempt a more peaceable manner first. The hospital records noted: "Blood drawn for stat police. Warrant obtained prior to draw." The record indicates the second blood sample pursuant to this warrant was taken later that morning, and testing yielded a BAC of .107. The State thereafter A-0326-24 4 obtained a separate warrant for defendant's hospital treatment records, which included the hospital's diagnostic blood-test results. Pretrial proceedings were conducted before a different judge. The parties appeared for scheduling and motion hearings on August 22, 2022, November 29, 2022, and January 30, 2023. Defendant moved to suppress the blood evidence, sought a Franks hearing, and argued the hospital testing was inadmissible because it was not performed by a certified forensic laboratory. The State opposed the motion and argued that the first draw was not directed by the State as it was a hospital draw for treatment purposes and the second draw was pursuant to a valid warrant. In its written decision of February 20, 2023, the court denied the suppression motion, denied a Franks hearing, rejected defendant's challenge to the hospital testing methodology, and granted defendant a negative inference concerning the unpreserved second blood sample. Thereafter, on January 10, 2024, defendant pled guilty to first-degree aggravated manslaughter and DWI. During the plea allocution, defendant admitted that between 2:30 a.m. and 2:45 a.m. on February 15, 2021, he drove his Range Rover on the Garden State Parkway at more than 110 miles per hour while under the influence of alcohol. Defendant admitted he struck the victim's A-0326-24 5 vehicle and caused the victim's death. He acknowledged his conduct manifested extreme indifference to human life. The plea agreement called for a twelve-year term on the aggravated manslaughter conviction subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, a concurrent 180-day term for DWI, an eight-year loss of driving privileges, and dismissal of the remaining charges. When defendant failed to appear for his original sentencing date, a bench warrant was issued, and he was later arrested. On July 19, 2024, the court sentenced defendant according to the terms of the negotiated plea agreement. Pursuant to the sentencing factors of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) and (b) respectively, the court found aggravating factors three, six, and nine, no mitigating factors, and that the aggravating factors substantially outweighed the non-existent mitigating factors. On appeal, defendant raises the following points for our consideration: POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO CONDUCT A SUPPRESSION HEARING WITH TESTIMONY AND ORAL ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL. POINT II THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE THAT THE FIRST BLOOD DRAW FELL WITHIN THE PARAMETERS OF ONE OF THE RECOGNIZED EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT. A-0326-24 6 POINT III THE DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO A FRANKS HEARING. POINT IV THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO CONDUCT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING AS TO THE DIFFERENT STANDARDS EMPLOYED BY A HOSPITAL LABORATORY AND A FORENSIC LABORATORY. POINT V DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE IS EXCESSIVE. II. We initially address defendant's argument that the court erred in failing to suppress the first blood draw evidence. Defendant's principal contention was that the first blood draw was constitutionally infirm because it occurred before any warrant issued, was taken without his consent and that a hearing was necessary to determine the admissibility of the blood testing results. The Fourth Amendment and Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution protect against unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. State v. Navarro, 310 N.J. Super. 104, 107 (App. Div. 1998). The protections do not apply to purely private conduct. State v. Premone, 348 N.J. Super. 505, 511 (App. Div. 2002) (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)). Thus, absent evidence that a private actor functioned as an A-0326-24 7 arm of law enforcement, a hospital's independent treatment-related conduct does not itself implicate the Fourth Amendment. The constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures applies only to governmental action. Navarro, 310 N.J. Super. at 107 ; Premone, 348 N.J. Super. at 511 . A hospital's independent diagnostic blood draw is not transformed into state action simply because law enforcement later obtains the resulting records through lawful process. See State v. Dyal, 97 N.J. 229 , 240- 41 (1984) (recognizing that when a blood sample is drawn by medical personnel for medical purposes, the State may obtain the records by subpoena). 2 The motion record clearly established that defendant was brought to University Hospital after a serious crash and underwent trauma evaluation. Evidence in the record also shows defendant told EMT workers he was drinking at a friend's party before the accident and was wearing a yellow bracelet typically provided for patrons of bars and night clubs. The hospital records 2 The Court's decision in State v. Adkins, 221 N.J. 300 (2015), partially abrogated our decision in Dyal, 97 N.J. at 240 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966)). Adkins, 221 N.J. at 303 , implemented the reasoning of Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 142 (2013), which found the exigency of nonconsensual blood testing must be determined based on the totality of the circumstances and on a case-by-case basis. While the reasoning in Adkins partially abrogated Dyal, we include Dyal for its holding that law enforcement may obtain medical records by subpoena if law enforcement can "establish a reasonable basis to believe the operator was intoxicated." Dyal, 97 N.J. at 240 . A-0326-24 8 show medical personnel ordered diagnostic tests, including an ethanol test, as part of defendant's emergency treatment as defendant was not in a condition enabling him to consent. The 4:14 a.m. blood collection and the 4:49 a.m. result are recorded in those treatment records. There is no evidence in the record that police directed hospital personnel to draw the first sample, participated in the decision to do so, or used the hospital staff as agents to circumvent the warrant requirement. Nor did defendant submit certifications or other competent proofs, including any expert opinion that the blood draw was not a normal hospital procedure for emergency treatment for a patient unable to consent due to his medical status when brought in, creating a factual dispute on these points. Defendant's arguments resting on the timing of the hospital draw, his asserted lack of consent, and his broader legal contention that any nonconsensual blood draw is a state search requiring a warrant have no support in the record and did not create any genuine issues that law enforcement was responsible for the first blood draw. The motion court's finding that there was no evidence that law enforcement instructed the hospital to obtain the first sample nor evidence that the hospital drew blood for any reason other than medical treatment was amply supported by the record. The record shows defendant arrived as a trauma patient after a major crash and underwent triage, imaging, laboratory studies, and repair A-0326-24 9 of a finger laceration. The ethanol test was among the hospital's ordered lab work. The sample was collected before the police had applied for their warrant. This evidence in the record supports that the first blood draw occurred in the ordinary course of medical treatment and was not initiated by law enforcement. Therefore, the trial court's finding to admit this evidence was not an abuse of discretion. Defendant further stresses he did not consent to a blood draw and invokes patient privacy principles. Even if true, absent governmental compulsion or participation in the taking of the first sample, his lack of consent does not convert a private medical procedure into state action. The State did not rely on the first draw as if police themselves had ordered it. Rather, when officers later sought their own sample for investigative purposes, they obtained a warrant from the court. Defendant also relies on Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013), and similarly related blood-draw cases. We determine those cases are inapposite because they concern blood draws which were compelled, undertaken by, or requested at the direction of law enforcement and did not involve the threshold requirement of state action. We therefore conclude the motion court correctly determined that an exception to the warrant requirement was unnecessary to justify the hospital's independent treatment-related draw. A-0326-24 10 We turn next to defendant's contention that the warrant issued by the court resulting in the second blood sample was deficient and the evidence adduced therefrom should not have been considered. We are unpersuaded. We previously set forth the legal standards under the Fourth Amendment, Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution providing legal protections against unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. We note the telephonic warrant transcript reviewed by the motion court fully documented the separate law-enforcement request for the second blood draw later that morning. We conclude this request, together with the hospital records, appropriately distinguished the hospital's treatment-related testing and the later forensic draw pursuant to the warrant. We further conclude the warrant requested by law enforcement for the second blood draw was supported by sufficient probable cause based on the record that provided information concerning defendant's possible alcohol consumption prior to the accident. Defendant also contends the circumstances surrounding the two blood draws required oral argument or an evidentiary hearing and the court erred by not holding these proceedings. Our review of a ruling on a suppression motion is limited. We uphold factual findings of the trial court so long as they are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record, but we review legal conclusions de novo. State v. Cohen, 254 N.J. 308 , 318-19 (2023); State v. A-0326-24 11 Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 263 (2015). In those circumstances we "owe no deference to the trial court's interpretation of the law." Ibid. (citing State v. Lamb, 218 N.J. 300, 313 (2014)). Rule 3:5-7(c) requires a testimonial hearing on a suppression motion challenging a warrantless search only "[i]f material facts are disputed." A defendant must do more than offer bald, conclusory, or speculative assertions to establish such a dispute. State v. Carrillo, 469 N.J. Super. 318 , 332-33 (App. Div. 2021) (citing State v. Hewins, 166 N.J. Super. 210, 214-15 (Law Div. 1979), aff'd, 178 N.J. Super. 360 (App. Div. 1981)). The record reflects the motion was the subject of multiple pretrial appearances and briefings related to the suppression issues. We conclude defendant has failed to identify or provide sufficient factual contentions as to how additional live testimony or oral argument would develop any genuine factual issues garnering a different result. Because we conclude there were no material factual issues exhibited in the record surrounding the legitimacy of the two blood draws, the court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to conduct oral argument or hold an evidentiary hearing under Rule 3:5-7(c). See Carrillo, 469 N.J. Super. at 332-33. We next turn to defendant's contention he was entitled to a Franks hearing because the warrant application for the second blood draw did not inform the A-0326-24 12 court that: (1) hospital personnel had already taken blood at 4:14 a.m.; (2) defendant had refused consent; and (3) defendant had grabbed a nurse's arm to prevent her from touching him. We are again unpersuaded. Our review of a trial judge's decision whether to grant a Franks hearing is for an abuse of discretion. State v. Broom-Smith, 406 N.J. Super. 228, 239 (App. Div. 2009), aff'd, 201 N.J. 229 (2010). In Franks, the United States Supreme Court imposed limitations on when a defendant may "challenge the truthfulness of factual statements made in an affidavit supporting [a search] warrant." 438 U.S. at 155 . In State v. Howery, the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted the analytical framework set forth in Franks. 80 N.J. 563, 568 (1979). Under that standard, a "presumption of validity with respect to the affidavit supporting the search warrant" must be overcome before a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171 ; accord Howery, 80 N.J. at 566 . "First, the defendant must make a 'substantial preliminary showing' of falsity in the warrant." Howery, 80 N.J. at 567 (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 170 ). Second, they must allege "'deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth,' pointing out with specificity the portions of the warrant that are claimed to be untrue." Ibid. (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 171 ). "Finally, the misstatements claimed to be false must be material to the extent that when they are excised from the affidavit, that document no longer contains facts A-0326-24 13 sufficient to establish probable cause." Id. at 568 (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-72 ). In Broom-Smith, we emphasized that a Franks/Howery hearing "is aimed at warrants obtained through intentional wrongdoing by law enforcement agents and requires a substantial preliminary showing." 406 N.J. Super. at 240 . As our Supreme Court recently reaffirmed, a "defendant's burden under Franks and Howery is high." State v. Desir, 245 N.J. 179 , 198 (2021). The telephonic warrant application in the record before us reflects a detailed presentation of probable cause consisting of the following: a fatal crash, a witness account that defendant was driving approximately 110 to 120 miles per hour while swerving and weaving, defendant's physical signs of intoxication, the odor of alcohol from his breath, and defendant's admission to medical personnel that he had attended a party and consumed alcohol. Based on this evidence, the court expressly found probable cause to authorize the blood draw and related searches. Given the above described evidence, we conclude defendant's claimed omissions fail to satisfy the required materiality component to hold a Franks hearing. Whether hospital staff had already drawn blood for treatment purposes does not negate probable cause for law enforcement to obtain its own evidentiary sample. Nor would defendant's refusal to consent to the blood draw defeated A-0326-24 14 probable cause. If anything, it explains why police sought judicial authorization rather than proceed without a warrant. The motion court correctly observed that a warrant becomes necessary precisely when a defendant refuses consent. Defendant's assertion that the alleged omission from the warrant application—that defendant grabbed a nurse's arm—also does not undermine probable cause. The warrant application disclosed defendant's "combative nature" at the hospital and based on that circumstance, the prosecutor requested authorization to use reasonable force, if necessary, in a medically acceptable manner. Thus, the record evidence does not support defendant's contention that the issuing court was misled to believe defendant was wholly cooperative. More fundamentally, whether defendant resisted hospital staff does not bear on the existence of probable cause that his blood would contain evidence of alcohol use. We conclude defendant failed to satisfy the substantial preliminary showing required to establish deliberate or reckless falsehood. Defendant's assertions stating the omitted details were intentionally or recklessly withheld to mislead the issuing court were speculative at best. Here, we determine the court reasonably concluded defendant had not shown intentional wrongdoing by the State, see Franks, 438 U.S. at 171 ; Howery, 80 N.J. at 567-68 , or make a substantial preliminary showing of a knowing or reckless material A-0326-24 15 misrepresentation or omission. Therefore, we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion by denying a Franks hearing. Defendant next argues the hospital blood-test result was unreliable and therefore inadmissible because hospital laboratories and forensic laboratories use different methodologies and standards. We conclude the court correctly rejected this argument when finding this evidence went to weight of the evidence, not to its admissibility. Defendant relies principally on N.J.S.A. 2C:35-19 and several articles discussing differences between clinical and forensic testing. The above statute concerns the designation of State forensic laboratories and the use of certificates in certain prosecutions involving controlled dangerous substances. The court correctly found the statute inapplicable because the State did not contend University Hospital was a designated State forensic laboratory; the State also did not seek to admit a laboratory certificate under the statute. Therefore, the issue was not whether the hospital met the statutory certification scheme for forensic drug testing, but whether the hospital's ethanol test result was categorically inadmissible in a criminal prosecution. The motion court properly concluded that the hospital's ethanol test result samples were admissible. We concur with the court's finding that blood samples are admissible when taken in a medically acceptable manner at a hospital or other A-0326-24 16 suitable healthcare facility. In addition, defendant failed to present any evidence that the hospital's blood draw itself was performed in a medically unacceptable manner making it unreliable. Defendant's submission of materials about serum testing, confirmation procedures, and chain-of-custody concerns also do not compel preclusion of the testing results. Although these considerations may affect the persuasive force of the evidence, the foundation the State must lay at trial, and the scope of any cross-examination or competing expert testimony, these considerations fail to establish that the hospital results were inadmissible as a matter of law on this record. Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to conduct a separate evidentiary hearing on clinical-versus-forensic laboratory standards. Finally, we turn to defendant's contention that his sentence was excessive. We conclude this argument lacks sufficient merit to warrant extended discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We add only the following. Our review of sentencing is highly deferential. We do not substitute our judgment for that of the sentencing court. We consider whether the court identified and weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors based on competent credible evidence and whether the sentence shocks the judicial conscience. State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 70 (2014); State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 65 (2014). A-0326-24 17 At sentencing, the court appropriately considered the parties' arguments, defendant's allocution and criminal history and the victim statements. The judgment of conviction expressly reflects the court's findings of aggravating factors three, six, and nine, no mitigating factors, and the conclusion that the aggravating factors substantially outweighed the non-existent mitigating factors. See N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) and (b). Defendant had prior convictions, including prior DWI infractions, and admitted he drove more than 110 miles per hour while intoxicated causing the victim's death. These facts support a risk of re- offense, the seriousness of defendant's prior record, and the need for deterrence. The court also considered and appropriately rejected the asserted hardship to defendant's dependent child. The sentencing record shows the court found no evidence of hardship beyond the inherent hardship of incarceration itself. We conclude these findings by the trial court adequately utilized the factors in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1 and were not error. Defendant also suggests the sentencing judge was improperly influenced by defendant's failure to appear for his original sentencing date. We determine the record does not support such a claim. Although the court mentioned the non- appearance in the context of defendant's conduct and the procedural history, the court nonetheless imposed the bargained-for sentence that was below the A-0326-24 18 sentencing range permitted. We conclude these facts do not demonstrate the court was improperly influenced or otherwise abused its discretion. We further add that the sentence was near the bottom of the statutory range for first-degree aggravated manslaughter and conformed to the negotiated plea. We therefore conclude, on this record, that the sentence does not shock the judicial conscience. Fuentes, 217 N.J. at 70 . Affirmed. A-0326-24 19