K.L.P. v. M.H.

RECORD IMPOUNDED NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1221-25 K.L.P.,1 Plaintiff-Respondent, v. M.H., Defendant-Appellant. _______________________ Submitted September 29, 2026 – Decided October 7, 2026 Before Judges Firko and Bergman. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Gloucester County, Docket No. FV-08-0645-26. Law Office of Christopher St. John, attorneys for appellant (Tess A. Berkowitz, on the brief). Respondent has not filed a brief. PER CURIAM 1 We use initials to protect the victim. See R. 1:38-3(d)(10). In this one-sided appeal, defendant M.H. appeals from a final restraining order (FRO) entered against him on October 30, 2025, pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. A Family Part judge entered the FRO based upon his findings defendant committed the predicate act of harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4, against plaintiff K.L.P., and that an FRO is necessary to protect plaintiff from future acts of domestic violence. On appeal, defendant argues there is insufficient evidence supporting the judge's findings he committed the predicate act of harassment, and the judge erred by concluding an FRO is necessary to protect plaintiff from future acts of domestic violence. We affirm. I. We glean the following facts from the record. The parties previously dated for six-and-one-half to seven years before plaintiff ended their relationship on September 27, 2025. On October 1, 2025, plaintiff obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) against defendant alleging harassment. In her complaint, plaintiff claimed on that day, defendant followed her to work and engaged in a verbal argument in the parking lot. According to plaintiff, while she was at work, defendant repeatedly called the business telephone number in an attempt to speak to her, but she refused, and management so advised him over A-1221-25 2 the phone. Plaintiff alleged she texted a friend and asked if they would drive their vehicle through her work parking lot to see if defendant's vehicle was there. Plaintiff claimed her friend located defendant's vehicle, and he engaged in a verbal argument with the friend while waiting for plaintiff to leave work. Plaintiff also alleged since their dating relationship ended, defendant has repeatedly called and texted her. At the one-day hearing conducted on October 30, 2025, plaintiff was self- represented, and defendant was represented by counsel. Plaintiff recounted the October 1, 2025, incident. She explained she worked a full-time job and had a part-time job at 5:30 p.m. as a dog trainer. That day, plaintiff testified she was running late, saw defendant in the parking lot, and had no time to talk to him. Plaintiff testified defendant pulled up in front of her vehicle and pulled out a black trash bag from his vehicle and threw it on the ground in front of her and told her to take her "stuff" if she was "done." As plaintiff picked up the bag containing her things, she claimed defendant "aggressively" told her that he "wasted seven years of a relationship" and prevented her from walking to the front doors of the building where she worked. Plaintiff testified she decided to walk behind her vehicle to the front doors, and defendant was "yelling" at her. A-1221-25 3 Plaintiff entered the building and was in the middle of training a dog when her manager handed her a store phone. Plaintiff recognized defendant's voice even though he portrayed himself to be someone else. He told plaintiff, "[I]t's about time that you can answer the phone" and "have time to talk to me." Plaintiff testified defendant called again using a "fake first name," and threatened to call her boss and complain she was not a good dog trainer. Plaintiff testified that at 8:00 or 8:30 p.m., she had a "slight feeling" defendant was waiting for her in the parking lot to be done with work around 9:00 or 9:30 p.m. Plaintiff then asked her manager to call the police. She stated her phone was "blowing up" with phone calls and text messages from defendant about her breaking up their relationship. She ignored the phone calls and text messages. Plaintiff explained she felt defendant was "intoxicated" at the time and this was not the first time he was intoxicated. Plaintiff testified he needs help "mentally" and for "alcohol abuse." Plaintiff claimed she has been asking defendant to get help for his alcohol problem for years, but he responds he will get better, and then returns to his "cycle of lying." Plaintiff stated being "silent and quiet" is how she copes with the situation. Plaintiff advised defendant on or about September 28, 2025, that she had nothing left to say to him. A-1221-25 4 On cross-examination, plaintiff admitted she still loves and cares for defendant and wanted him to "get help." Plaintiff stated on one occasion, she found defendant at a bar when he was supposed to be sober, and "the trust is gone." Plaintiff conceded that the parties were trying to make their relationship work, and defendant's sobriety was the "only negative." Plaintiff testified defendant's "anger has gotten a lot worse." Defendant testified there was "emotional abuse" by both parties during their relationship, meaning break ups, and plaintiff taking the dog away from him if she was unhappy about something defendant did. Defendant stated the parties broke up multiple times and when that happened, plaintiff would give him the "silent treatment." When this occurred, defendant explained he would try to contact plaintiff and eventually they would talk and move on. Defendant denied there was any physical violence during the relationship. Defendant testified he has a "drinking problem" but does not stagger when he drinks. Defendant stated his drinking "got a little rough in the beginning," but he "cleaned" himself up and was sober for almost a month. Defendant testified he is attending Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings so he can reconcile with plaintiff. A-1221-25 5 Defendant explained he did not interpret plaintiff's statement, "You won this battle," to mean their relationship was over. Defendant claimed he went to plaintiff's work on October 1, 2025, to return her belongings to her and "[t]o figure out if this relationship was over or not." Defendant testified plaintiff still had personal items at his house. Defendant mentioned he wanted to resume his relationship with plaintiff. On cross-examination, defendant testified plaintiff was at his house sitting in the driveway on September 27, 2025. No other witnesses testified. Text messages between the parties and the TRO were admitted into evidence. The judge rendered a comprehensive oral decision following the parties' testimony and closing statements. The judge found defendant's testimony "slightly less credible" than plaintiff's testimony. The judge pointed out when asked whether he was an alcoholic, defendant did not admit to being an alcoholic, but responded he does "have a drinking problem," and amended his answer to state that, in addition to drinking on the weekends, he maybe also drinks "on Wednesday[s] after work." The judge observed defendant's text messages to plaintiff stating, "You're a child" and "Wasted seven years of my f****** life" established a purpose to A-1221-25 6 harass, "taken together with the extensive series of messages" after plaintiff indicated she did not want to talk to speak to him any longer. The judge rejected defendant's explanation that there was no purpose to harass as not "credible." The judge found plaintiff "more credible" on this issue because she made it "fairly clear" in her text messages that the relationship was over. The judge determined plaintiff was "credible" in describing the text messages, the incident that occurred at her second job, and her manager's involvement. The judge highlighted this incident occurred after defendant pulled his car in front of plaintiff's car and blocked her from going to her second job. The judge found plaintiff established the predicate act of harassment because defendant's actions alarmed and seriously annoyed her. The judge emphasized defendant engaged in "repeated acts." The judge analyzed the N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1)-(7) factors, and found defendant minimized his alcohol "problem," and plaintiff needed protection from his "constant stream of messaging" after she told him to stop and that she was "done with him." Accordingly, the judge entered the FRO. A-1221-25 7 II. Generally, "findings by a trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015). "We accord substantial deference to Family Part judges, who routinely hear domestic violence cases and are 'specially trained to detect the difference between domestic violence and more ordinary differences that arise between couples.'" C.C. v. J.A.H., 463 N.J. Super. 419 , 428 (App. Div. 2020) (quoting J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 482 (2011)). "[D]eference is especially appropriate 'when the evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility.'" MacKinnon v. MacKinnon, 191 N.J. 240, 254 (2007) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998)). We will not disturb a trial court's factual findings unless "they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412 (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). However, we do not accord such deference to legal conclusions and will review such conclusions de novo. Thieme v. Aucoin- Thieme, 227 N.J. 269, 283 (2016). A-1221-25 8 The purpose of the PDVA is to "assure the victims of domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse the law can provide." G.M. v. C.V., 453 N.J. Super. 1, 12 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting State v. Brown, 394 N.J. Super. 492, 504 (App. Div. 2007)); see also N.J.S.A. 2C:25-18. Consequently, "[o]ur law is particularly solicitous of victims of domestic violence," J.D., 207 N.J. at 473 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 584 (1997)), and courts will "liberally construe[] [the PDVA] to achieve its salutary purposes." Cesare, 154 N.J. at 400 . To determine whether the entry of an FRO is appropriate, the court must first "determine whether the plaintiff has proven, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that one or more of the predicate acts set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19[(a)] has occurred." Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112, 125 (App. Div. 2006). If the court finds the defendant committed a predicate act of domestic violence, then the second inquiry "is whether the court should enter a restraining order that provides protection for the victim." Id. at 126 . While the second inquiry "is most often perfunctory and self-evident, the guiding standard is whether a restraining order is necessary, upon an evaluation of the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29[(a)](1) to -29[(a)]([7]), to protect the victim from an A-1221-25 9 immediate danger or to prevent further abuse." Id. at 127 ; see also J.D., 207 N.J. at 475-76 . While the second inquiry "is most often perfunctory and self-evident, the guiding standard is whether a restraining order is necessary, upon an evaluation of the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1) to -29(a)([7])." Ibid. (citation reformatted). Those factors are: (1) The previous history of domestic violence between the plaintiff and defendant, including threats, harassment[,] and physical abuse; (2) The existence of immediate danger to person or property; (3) The financial circumstances of the plaintiff and defendant; (4) The best interests of the victim and any child; (5) In determining custody and parenting time[,] the protection of the victim's safety; (6) The existence of a verifiable order of protection from another jurisdiction; and (7) Any pattern of coercive control against a person that in purpose or effect unreasonably interferes with, threatens, or exploits a person's liberty, freedom, bodily integrity, or human rights . . . . [N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1)-(7).] A-1221-25 10 "[W]hether the victim fears the defendant" is an additional factor the trial court may consider. G.M., 453 N.J. Super. at 13 (quoting Carfagno v. Carfagno, 288 N.J. Super. 424, 435 (Ch. Div. 1995)). A. Defendant claims there is insufficient evidence supporting the judge's finding he committed the predicate act of harassment under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a) and (c). More particularly, he argues the record lacks evidence he acted with the purpose to harass plaintiff. Defendant maintains his communications with plaintiff were "clearly" domestic contretemps, were not sufficiently egregious to justify an FRO, and were not the kind of acts the PDVA intended to prevent. Defendant argues the judge did not consider the "totality of the circumstances" in determining whether defendant committed harassment. Defendant further contends the judge did not properly consider plaintiff's "alternative motives," and there was "no clear request or declaration of the relationship's ultimate end." Defendant further asserts that the judge based his finding, in part, "on the unfounded opinion" that defendant's "alcohol problem" created a need to issue the FRO. Defendant contends he testified he was seeking "help" for what remains to be "an undiagnosed, unhealthy relationship with A-1221-25 11 alcohol," and the judge dismissed those efforts "without basis" and found he was only doing so to support his defense at trial. Although harassment is "one of the most frequently reported" predicate acts of domestic violence, it also "presents the greatest challenges to our courts[.]" J.D., 207 N.J. at 475 . A harassment claim presents such a challenge because it "confounds [the court's] ability to fix clear rules of application" between "acts that constitute harassment" and acts that are "ordinary domestic contretemps." L.M.F. v. J.A.F., 421 N.J. Super. 523, 534 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting J.D., 207 N.J. at 475 ). To determine whether conduct constitutes harassment in the domestic violence context, a court must consider the parties' prior relationship. Cesare, 154 N.J. at 405 . Only by considering the parties' prior relationship and the parties' conduct under the totality of the circumstances can a court determine whether a communication constituted harassment. Compare Pazienza v. Camarata, 381 N.J. Super. 173, 182-84 (App. Div. 2005) (finding, based on the defendant's repeated prior unwanted contact with the plaintiff, that a single text message to the plaintiff about the show she was watching at the moment defendant sent the text message constituted harassment), with L.M.F., 421 N.J. Super. at 535 -37 A-1221-25 12 (holding an isolated incident of the defendant making a remark to the plaintiff when he was angry in the midst of their divorce was not harassment). In relevant part, a person commits the offense of harassment if, with purpose to harass another, he [or she]: (a) [m]akes, or causes to be made, one or more communications anonymously or at extremely inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse language, or any other manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm; .... (c) [e]ngages in any other course of alarming conduct or of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy such other person. [N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a), (c).] Critical to this analysis is whether the defendant's actions were taken with a purpose to harass. R.G. v. R.G., 449 N.J. Super. 208, 226 (App. Div. 2017). "'Purpose[]' . . . is the highest form of mens rea contained in our penal code, and the most difficult to establish." State v. Duncan, 376 N.J. Super. 253, 262 (App. Div. 2005). "A person acts purposely with respect to the nature of his [or her] conduct or a result thereof if it is his [or her] conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result." Ibid. (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:2- 2(b)(1)). We may infer "a 'purpose to harass another' 'from the evidence A-1221-25 13 presented' and from 'common sense and experience.'" Ibid. (quoting Hoffman, 149 N.J. at 577 ). Here, the evidence amply supports the judge's finding defendant engaged in conduct likely to cause annoyance or alarm with the purpose to alarm and seriously annoy plaintiff. Defendant's purpose was established by h is own words and conduct. Plaintiff's unrefuted testimony established that defendan t did not sufficiently address his alcohol problem and could not control his behavior, as evidenced by his barrage of text messages after she told him to stop, and then showing up at her second place of employment when she gave him the silent treatment. We reject defendant's contention that the judge had a possible bias towards him based on the judge's references and findings on defendant's admitted use of alcohol and attendance at AA meetings. Defendant's argument is based on mere speculation and not the facts adduced at the hearing. The judge made appropriate credibility findings and referenced the parties' testimony, the evidence, and their demeanor. While demeanor is a permissible consideration in determining witness credibility, it was only one of the factors the judge considered. The judge found defendant's explanations not credible, placing on the record exactly why he found the explanations did not make sense. Thus, we conclude the judge properly found defendant engaged in A-1221-25 14 conduct that annoyed plaintiff and alarmed her. See J.D., 207 N.J. at 478 . The record supports that determination. We note the judge also properly considered there was no history of domestic violence reported in the context of the incidents alleged in the TRO complaint. In light of the above, we reject defendant's arguments, which ostensibly ask us to second-guess the judge's factual and credibility findings. B. The evidence also demonstrated plaintiff proved she needed an FRO for defendant to leave her alone. "At its core, the [PDVA] effectuates the notion that the victim of domestic violence is entitled to be left alone. To be left alone is, in essence, the basic protection the law seeks to assure these victims." Hoffman, 149 N.J. at 584 . Having considered the record and the applicable law, we conclude the judge made adequate and appropriate findings under the second Silver prong and analyzed the N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1)-(7) factors. Defendant's actions were not domestic contretemps but rather comprised a conscientious effort to continue to purposely annoy and harass plaintiff after the relationship ended. The record amply supports the judge's finding an FRO is necessary to protect plaintiff against future acts of domestic violence. A-1221-25 15 To the extent we have not addressed an argument raised on appeal, it is because it lacks sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Affirmed. A-1221-25 16