R.J. v. S.E.

RECORD IMPOUNDED NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0487-25 R.J.,1 Plaintiff-Appellant, v. S.E., Defendant-Respondent. ________________________ Submitted September 24, 2026 – Decided October 7, 2026 Before Judges Mawla and Chase. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Bergen County, Docket No. FM-02-2055-19. R.J., self-represented appellant. Respondent has not filed a brief. PER CURIAM 1 We use initials pursuant to Rule 1:38-3(d)(9), (10), and (12). Plaintiff R.J. appeals from an August 25, 2025 order denying his post- judgment motion concerning custody and parenting time. We affirm. I. Plaintiff and defendant S.E. married in 2009. Their only child was born in 2018. When the child was two months old, the court entered a final restraining order against plaintiff and awarded defendant temporary custody. In 2019, both parties filed divorce complaints. That same year, after plaintiff alleged defendant had abused and neglected their child, the Division of Child Protection and Permanency filed a complaint for supervision. In February 2020, the court dismissed that matter and awarded defendant residential custody, with supervised parenting time for plaintiff. In July 2020, the court in the dissolution case expanded plaintiff's parenting time to include two weekly video calls. In December 2022, the court entered an amended final dual judgment of divorce. The court found plaintiff had established irreconcilable differences, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-2(i), and defendant had established extreme cruelty, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-2(c). The court described plaintiff as sometimes "well-reasoned," but also "argumentative and inflexible." It further found plaintiff became "explo[sive]" A-0487-25 2 when others disagreed with him and used "foul and abrasive language" toward the court and defense counsel. He was also "argumentative, disrespectful, and insolent" when challenged by counsel or the court, even though he could otherwise make "cogent" arguments. Although the court recognized plaintiff's sincere love for the parties' child, it did not find his testimony credible. Turning to custody, the court correctly noted the child's best interests controlled. See N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c). After reviewing the statutory factors, the court ordered the following: (1) defendant would have sole legal custody and be the parent of primary residence; (2) plaintiff's parenting time would remain supervised along with video calls unless and until he (a) engaged in therapy for six consecutive months, (b) continued to remain compliant with psychiatric treatment and medications, (c) refrained from actions constituting domestic violence, and (d) had no reports of negative actions from the parenting tim e supervisor; (3) once plaintiff satisfied those conditions he could move to modify his parenting time; (4) Family Guidance 2 would discontinue its services because 2 The Bergen County Division of Family Guidance provides clinical, residential, educational, correctional, case management, and monitoring services to at -risk children, adolescents, and families, particularly those who are otherwise unable to receive needed services. About Family Guidance, Bergen County, N.J., https://bergencountynj.gov/bergen-county-department-of-human- services/about-family-guidance/ (last visited Sep. 28, 2026). A-0487-25 3 of plaintiff's threats of litigation and the shared animosity between plaintiff and Family Guidance's employees, and plaintiff would obtain supervisory services at his own expense; (5) plaintiff's father could attend supervised visits; and (6) the parties would only communicate through Our Family Wizard. The court also outlined how plaintiff's supervised parenting time could expand after multiple consecutive successful visits. After the court denied plaintiff's order to show cause in August 2023, he advised the court Care Plus 3 would supervise visits. Plaintiff later filed another order to show cause, which the court denied in November 2023. The order provided plaintiff "shall have no video contact with [the child] until the No Contact Provision of [p]laintiff's Pre-Trial Release Order, Complaint #W-2023- 000945-1616, is lifted." In March 2024, the court allowed plaintiff to resume video calls with the child. Plaintiff then filed another order to show cause, and the court issued a nine-part March 2024 order. The order: (1) granted in part plaintiff's application to seal certain communications sent by defendant to the court; (2) denied plaintiff's application to seal the entire matter; (3) denied plaintiff's request to 3 Care Plus Bergen, Inc. is the not-for-profit operator of Bergen New Bridge Medical Center. Board of Trustees, Bergen New Bridge Med. Ctr., https://www.newbridgehealth.org/about/trustees/ (last visited Sep. 28, 2026). A-0487-25 4 lift the parenting time supervision requirement and barred any application for unsupervised parenting until the end of plaintiff's criminal matter; (4) denied plaintiff's request to expand parenting time; (5) directed plaintiff to use court- provided resources if he could not find supervisors; (6) granted in part plaintiff's request to expand video call time; (7) barred the parties from releasing each other's medical information; (8) denied plaintiff's request to have defendant pay for supervisory services; and (9) barred both parties from discussing the litigation with their child or disparaging each other in the child's presence. On July 12, 2024, the court entered another order: (1) permitting plaintiff supervised weekly parenting time, on Sundays from 12:00 to 2:00 p.m., at Care Plus; (2) directing Care Plus to facilitate the parenting time exchange between the parties to avoid contact; (3) granting plaintiff make-up parenting time insofar as defendant cancels scheduled visits; (4) requiring visitation reports from Care Plus; and (5) constraining plaintiff from attending the child's "camp, school[,] or any other extracurricular activity," without court approval. Plaintiff had supervised parenting time with Care Plus from August 2024, until July 2025—when Care Plus terminated the parties' visitation services. It cited five reasons for the termination: (1) a prior financial hold, which had been rectified; (2) prolonged inactivity, with the last visit having occurred on April A-0487-25 5 6, 2025; (3) defendant's report the child "no longer wishe[d] to engage in visits or communication" and was "actively denying interactions with" plaintiff; (4) concerns regarding a late April 2025 video call which defendant reported contained "an inappropriate comment" by plaintiff leading to the child not wanting to continue visitation; and (5) the child's refusal to participate in visits, precluded Care Plus from continuing to render services to the parties. Most of plaintiff's supervised visitation sessions went well. However, there were a few exceptions, such as a December 2024 visit at an arcade, where plaintiff "felt two men were staring at him and [the child]." He yelled "do we have a problem?" before approaching them. Plaintiff then spoke with the men outside the earshot of supervisory staff. No physical altercation followed. During the incident, however, the child told staff plaintiff was "being aggressive" and then said to plaintiff, "why were you being aggressive, don't do that." After Care Plus ended services, plaintiff filed another motion in the Family Part. The court scheduled oral argument after an adjournment. Plaintiff then advised the court: "[n]o need for oral arguments, but not waived. I will rely on my papers. Please confirm next steps." After confirming plaintiff A-0487-25 6 wished to proceed on the papers, and after receiving defendant's consent, the court decided the motion without oral argument. On August 25, 2025, the court issued an order: (1) denying plaintiff's request to lift the court's August 9, 2023 order; (2) denying his request to enforce parenting time; (3) granting plaintiff's request for make-up parenting time; (4) denying his request to modify the parenting time schedule; (5) restricting the parties from discussing the litigation or disparaging each other in the child's presence; (6) appointing a guardian ad litem; (7) denying plaintiff's request for court-ordered therapeutic reunification counseling; (8) denying his request to transfer custody and reallocation of responsibilities; (9) denying plaintiff 's request for a forensic custody evaluator; (10) denying his request that defendant's submit to co-parenting classes; and (11) granting defendant's request that plaintiff's parenting time remained supervised. II. "Appellate courts accord particular deference to the Family Part because of its 'special jurisdiction and expertise' in family matters." Harte v. Hand, 433 N.J. Super. 457, 461 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998)). Therefore, we review a Family Part's factual findings under an abuse of discretion standard. See Gonzalez-Posse v. Ricciardulli, 410 N.J. A-0487-25 7 Super. 340, 354 (App. Div. 2009). A court abuses its discretion "when a decision is 'made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.'" Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC Caging Fulfillment, 440 N.J. Super. 378, 382 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "We do not disturb the 'factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless . . . convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice."' Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974) (internal quotation marks omitted)). However, we review all legal conclusions de novo. Ricci v. Ricci, 448 N.J. Super. 546, 565 (App. Div. 2017). III. On appeal, plaintiff argues the court abused its discretion by: failing to enforce its orders; disregarding a so-called roadmap to achieve reunification; not finding defendant in violation of litigant's rights; not holding a plenary hearing; restricting his parenting time without input from an expert; violating due process; constructively terminating his parental rights without clear and A-0487-25 8 convincing evidence; failing to consider less-restrictive alternatives to facilitate parenting time; ignoring and rewarding defendant's misconduct and alienation; not making findings of fact and conclusions of law; and rendering a decision not based on the facts or the parties' agreement. These arguments are without merit. Rule 1:7-4(a) requires a court to "find the facts and state its conclusions of law thereon." "The [Rule] requires findings to be made on all motions decided by written orders appealable as of right." Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Ct. Rules, cmt. 1 on R. 1:7-4 (2026). "Naked conclusions" do not satisfy the Rule. Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 570 (1980). The Rule's requirements are "unambiguous." Est. of Doerfler v. Fed. Ins. Co., 454 N.J. Super. 298, 302 (App. Div. 2018). Although the trial court's August 25, 2025, order could have been more detailed, it was adequate in context. The order expressly referred to: (1) the December 28, 2022 Amended Judgement of Divorce outlining plaintiff's parenting time; (2) the August 9, 2023 order affirming restrictions on plaintiff's parenting time; and (3) the March 15, 2024 order expanding plaintiff's parenting time. The court also explained several of its rulings. It denied plaintiff's request to enforce parenting time because he first had to secure a parenting-time A-0487-25 9 supervisor. It granted plaintiff's request for make-up parenting time once he did so. And it denied plaintiff's request to modify the parenting-time schedule because his criminal matter remained pending. Further, the court outlined all relevant details regarding the guardian ad litem. Read in context, the order reflects plaintiff failed to show changed circumstances sufficient to modify the existing parenting-time arrangement imposed by the court's previous orders. See Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J. Super. 102, 105 (App. Div. 2007) ("A party seeking to modify custody must demonstrate changed circumstances that affect the welfare of the children"). Generally, decisions regarding parenting time or custody are within "the sound discretion of the trial courts[.]" Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 611 (1995). We also defer to the trial judge's decision whether to hold a plenary hearing. Jacoby v. Jacoby, 427 N.J. Super. 109, 123 (App. Div. 2012). In all such matters, the child's best interests remain the primary concern. See A.J. v. R.J., 461 N.J. Super. 173 , 181 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting Fantony v. Fantony, 21 N.J. 525, 536 (1956)). A party seeking to modify custody or parenting time bears the burden of showing changed circumstances and the existing arrangement no longer serves the child's best interests. Hand, 391 N.J. Super. at 105 . Plaintiff did not make A-0487-25 10 that showing here. The withdrawal of the supervising agency did not establish changed circumstances warranting a hearing or a modification. Care Plus withdrew because of circumstances tied to plaintiff's own conduct and S.J.'s refusal to participate, not because conditions had improved enough to justify less restrictive parenting time. Plaintiff next argues the court failed to follow the "roadmap" for reunification. He points to supervised visits, Care Plus reports, make-up parenting time, and his therapeutic compliance. But that framing overlooks the full set of conditions the court imposed in the amended judgment of divorce. They included not only therapy and treatment compliance, but also refraining from domestic-violence-related conduct and avoiding negative reports from supervisors. Plaintiff did not completely satisfy those conditions. His pending criminal matter and Care Plus's termination letter undercut his argument that he complied with the court's conditions. Plaintiff's assertion a plenary hearing was required to ascertain the veracity of the child to test if he was refusing to participate in visitation is not persuasive. "A plenary hearing is required when the submissions show there is a genuine and substantial factual dispute regarding the welfare of the child[], and the trial judge determines that a plenary hearing is necessary to resolve the A-0487-25 11 factual dispute." Hand, 391 N.J. Super. at 105 (citing Shaw v. Shaw, 138 N.J. Super. 436, 440 (App. Div. 1976)). Plaintiff did not raise such a dispute here. The motion record did not show changed circumstances sufficient to require a plenary hearing on the child's best interests. This case did not involve an initial denial of visitation. It involved plaintiff's request to modify an existing parenting-time arrangement. The August 2025 order did not terminate parenting time. Rather, it left supervision in place and implicitly required plaintiff to secure a supervisor before visits could resume. The court's grant of make-up parenting time reinforces that point. Finally, plaintiff's due process argument also lacks merit. He had an opportunity to be heard and chose to proceed without oral argument. The court considered his submissions and concluded he had not shown changed circumstances affecting the child's best interests. Plaintiff received due process. To the extent we have not addressed an argument raised on appeal, it is because it lacks sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Affirmed. A-0487-25 12