State of New Jersey v. Steven R. Wilson

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1906-24 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. STEVEN R. WILSON, a/k/a STEVEN WILSON, STEVE WILSON, STIME WILSON, STEVEN K. WILSON, Defendant-Appellant. _______________________ Argued September 15, 2026 – Decided October 7, 2026 Before Judges Gilson, Gummer, and DeAngelis. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Warren County, Indictment No. 22-02-0075. Kevin S. Finckenauer, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney; Kevin S. Finckenauer, of counsel and on the briefs). David M. Galemba, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney; David M. Galemba, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM Defendant Steven Wilson pled guilty to second-degree eluding, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b), and was sentenced in the third-degree range to four years in prison. He appeals, arguing he is entitled to jail and gap-time credits for the time he was incarcerated in Pennsylvania for crimes he committed in Pennsylvania. We reject his contentions and affirm his sentence with the credits applied by the trial court. I. On May 7, 2021, a New Jersey State Police officer (trooper) observed a truck driven by defendant to be speeding at eighty miles per hour (MPH) in a fifty-MPH zone. The trooper pulled his police vehicle behind defendant's truck, activated his lights, and signaled defendant to pull over. Defendant did not stop; instead, he increased his speed. Another trooper joined in the attempt to stop defendant's truck, but defendant refused to stop and continued to speed away. When defendant's truck crossed the Delaware Water Gap Toll Bridge, the troopers ceased their pursuit and notified Pennsylvania State Police. Shortly after defendant crossed into Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania State Police attempted to stop his truck. One officer positioned his police vehicle in A-1906-24 2 front of defendant's truck, but defendant repeatedly rammed his truck into the police vehicle. The police officer fired several shots at defendant's truck, but defendant continued driving recklessly and at a high rate of speed. After pursuing defendant for some time, a Pennsylvania State Police vehicle rammed defendant's truck using a precision immobilization technique to disable the truck. After the truck rolled over and came to a stop, defendant resisted arrest and was taken into custody with the assistance of a police dog and a taser. The following day, on May 8, 2021, defendant was charged with several crimes in Pennsylvania, including aggravated assault of a police officer, fleeing and eluding, and recklessly endangering. Defendant was also charged with numerous motor-vehicle offenses, including driving while under the influence. That same day, defendant was separately charged in New Jersey with third- degree eluding. On November 2, 2021, defendant pled guilty in Pennsylvania to three offenses: assault, causing bodily injury to a police officer; fleeing and eluding; and driving while under the influence of alcohol. On January 25, 2022, defendant was sentenced to serve five years in Pennsylvania prison, with the requirement that he serve at least half of that time before being released. A-1906-24 3 Less than a month after defendant was sentenced in Pennsylvania, on February 9, 2022, a Warren County grand jury indicted defendant for second- degree eluding. The following day a letter was sent to a residential address directing defendant to appear in New Jersey state court in late February 2022. Defendant apparently did not get the letter because he was incarcerated in a Pennsylvania prison. When he did not appear in New Jersey, a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. On November 18, 2024, defendant was brought to New Jersey in accordance with a request made under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-1 to -15. The record does not include information on when defendant first learned he could make a request under the IAD, when the IAD request was made, or why it took over three years to bring defendant to New Jersey. Once defendant arrived in New Jersey, his case proceeded expeditiously. A public defender was assigned to represent defendant, he was arraigned on December 6, 2024, and he pled guilty to second-degree eluding and three motor- vehicle offenses on January 10, 2025. As part of the plea agreement, the State agreed to recommend that defendant be sentenced in the third-degree range to four years in prison and that his sentence run concurrently to his Pennsylvania A-1906-24 4 sentence. During the plea hearing, defendant did not request jail or gap-time credits for the time he had been incarcerated in Pennsylvania. On January 31, 2025, defendant was sentenced in New Jersey. At the sentencing hearing, defendant's counsel stated that defendant was not entitled to jail or gap-time credits for the time he was incarcerated in Pennsylvania but argued for a three-year sentence pointing out that defendant had been incarcerated in Pennsylvania for over three years. The sentencing court found three aggravating factors: three, the risk that defendant will commit another offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3); six, defendant's prior criminal record, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(6); and nine, the need for deterrence, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9). The court found one mitigating factor: four, there were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify defendant's conduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(4). The court then determined that the recommendation in the plea agreement was reasonable and sentenced defendant to four years in prison, running the sentence concurrently to defendant's Pennsylvania sentence, thereby giving defendant gap-time credit as of the day of his sentence in New Jersey. Defendant appealed, arguing his sentence was excessive. His appeal was first considered on the Sentencing Oral Argument calendar on December 2, 2025. For the first time, defendant's counsel on appeal contended that he should A-1906-24 5 have been given jail and gap-time credits for the time that he was incarcerated in Pennsylvania from May 9, 2021, to January 30, 2025. The State countered that New Jersey Supreme Court precedent barred awarding jail or gap-time credits for out-of-state incarceration on non-New Jersey charges. On December 10, 2025, we issued an order affirming defendant's sentence without additional jail or gap-time credits. Defendant, thereafter, petitioned for review by the New Jersey Supreme Court. On March 24, 2026, the Court granted defendant's petition and remanded the matter to this court for consideration on a plenary calendar. Defendant and the State filed additional briefs and presented arguments during a plenary- calendar hearing. II. On this appeal, defendant makes one main argument, with related sub- arguments. In his own words, he contends: DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO RECEIVE JAIL CREDIT AND GAP-TIME CREDIT FOR HIS CONFINEMENT IN PENNSYLVANIA LEADING UP TO HIS NEW JERSEY SENTENCING. A challenge to an award or denial of jail or gap-time credits "constitutes an appeal of a sentence 'not imposed in accordance with law.'" State v. DiAngelo, 434 N.J. Super. 443, 451 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting State v. Rippy, A-1906-24 6 431 N.J. Super. 338, 347 (App. Div. 2013)). Accordingly, appellate courts review the denial of credits de novo. State v. Hernandez, 208 N.J. 24, 48-49 (2011). Credit for pre-sentence custody is commonly called "jail credit" and is governed by Rule 3:21-8. State v. Joe, 228 N.J. 125, 130 (2017) (citing State v. Rawls, 219 N.J. 185, 192 (2014)). Rule 3:21-8 states: The defendant shall receive credit on the term of a custodial sentence for any time served in custody in jail or in a state hospital between arrest and the imposition of sentence. Jail credits are "day-for-day credits" that are applied to the "front end" of a defendant's sentence, meaning that a defendant receives credit against the sentence for every day he or she was held in custody for that offense prior to sentencing. Hernandez, 208 N.J. at 37 (first citing Buncie v. Dep't of Corr., 382 N.J. Super. 214, 217 (App. Div. 2005); and then citing Booker v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 136 N.J. 257, 263, 265 (1994)). In effect, jail credits "reduce a[] [parole] ineligibility term as well as the sentence imposed." Ibid. (quoting State v. Mastapeter, 290 N.J. Super. 56, 64 (App. Div. 1996)). When Rule 3:21-8 applies, jail credits are "mandatory, not discretionary." Joe, 228 N.J. at 130 (quoting Hernandez, 208 N.J. at 37 ). A-1906-24 7 Gap-time credits provide "a defendant who is given two separate sentences on two different dates credit toward the second sentence for the time spent in custody since he or she began serving the first sentence." Hernandez, 208 N.J. at 38 . If, at the time of sentencing, a defendant is already serving a term of imprisonment for another unrelated offense, he or she may be entitled to gap-time credits in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(b). The primary purpose of gap-time credit is "to avoid the manipulation of trial dates to the disadvantage of defendants." Hernandez, 208 N.J. at 38 (quoting State v. Carreker, 172 N.J. 100, 105 (2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Gap-time credit may also "counteract any dilatory tactics of the prosecutor in pursuing a conviction for another offense after a defendant has been sentenced on the previous offense." Ibid. (quoting Carreker, 172 N.J. at 105 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). Jail and gap-time credits generally do not apply if a defendant is incarcerated in another state or jurisdiction on out-of-state or federal charges while awaiting sentencing in New Jersey. Carreker, 172 N.J. at 111 ; Joe, 228 N.J. at 135 . In Carreker, the defendant requested gap-time credits for time she had been incarcerated in New York until the date of her sentence in New Jersey. Carreker, 172 N.J. at 104 . The Court considered the language of the gap-time A-1906-24 8 statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(b)(2), its legislative history, and its purpose and held that "gap time does not apply to out-of-state sentences." Id. at 116 . In Joe, the Court considered whether a defendant was entitled to jail credits under Rule 3:21-8, for the time that he was held in custody in another state before sentencing. Joe, 228 N.J. at 126 . The defendant sought jail credits for the time he spent in pre-sentence custody in New York from the time of his arrest to the time of his sentence on the New York charges. Id. at 129 . The Court rejected that request and held that "defendants who are confined out of state on non-New Jersey charges are not entitled to jail credit for time spent in pre-sentence custody." Id. at 138 . The Court explained that "if a defendant is incarcerated out of state and the confinement is not due solely to New Jersey charges, jail credit does not apply." Id. at 135 . A. Whether Defendant Waived His Right to Request Credits. Initially, we address the State's argument that defendant waived his right to request jail and gap-time credits because he did not raise this issue before the trial court. Because jail and gap-time credits are mandatory when applicable, Joe, 220 N.J. at 130; Hernandez, 208 N.J. at 38 , we reject the State's blanket waiver argument. As we will discuss, however, we determine that defendant has waived any argument that New Jersey acted deliberately or indifferently in A-1906-24 9 bringing defendant to New Jersey to face the eluding charge. We deem that part of defendant's arguments waived because he did not raise the issue and thereby precluded the State and trial court from developing a record on why there was a delay. B. Defendant's Arguments. Defendant makes three related sub-arguments in seeking jail and gap-time credits. First, he tries to distinguish the facts and circumstances of his Pennsylvania confinement from the facts and holdings of Carreker and Joe. Second, he contends that New Jersey prosecutors caused "gross and unnecessary delay" in bringing him to New Jersey. Finally, he argues that fundamental fairness dictates that he be given jail and gap-time credits for the time that he was incarcerated in Pennsylvania. None of those arguments are supported by the record or the law. In seeking to distinguish Carreker and Joe, defendant claims that his incarceration in Pennsylvania was for "identical charge[s]" to the charge in New Jersey. The record clearly establishes that defendant's charges in Pennsylvania were for actions and offenses he committed in Pennsylvania. While in Pennsylvania, defendant repeatedly rammed his truck into a Pennsylvania police officer's vehicle, refused to stop, fled from Pennsylvania police in a high-speed A-1906-24 10 chase, and resisted arrest in Pennsylvania. The actions in Pennsylvania were separate and distinct from his conduct in New Jersey. So, when defendant was arrested in Pennsylvania he was being held on the charges in that state. In that regard, the New Jersey Supreme Court has made it clear that jail and gap-time credits do not apply when a defendant is held in another state on non-New Jersey charges. Carreker, 172 N.J. at 116 ; Joe, 228 N.J. at 138 . Defendant's second argument regarding the delay in his prosecution in New Jersey is based on speculation. Defendant wants to assume that New Jersey prosecutors deliberately or indifferently did not seek to bring defendant to New Jersey to face the New Jersey charge because he was incarcerated in Pennsylvania. Because defendant did not seek jail or gap-time credit before he was sentenced in New Jersey, however, we have no record explaining why there was a delay in bringing defendant to New Jersey. Under the IAD, New Jersey could have made a request for defendant's transfer. See N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-4. In that regard, the bench warrant issued in late February 2022 could have been treated as a detainer if it had been sent to Pennsylvania. See Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 719 (1985); N.J.A.C. 10A:9-1.3. The IAD also permits a defendant to make a request to be transferred. See N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-3. In this case, however, we do not know A-1906-24 11 when defendant knew of his right to make an IAD request to be brought to New Jersey, whether or when New Jersey made an IAD request to Pennsylvania, or whether there was any delay on the part of Pennsylvania authorities in acting on the request. Instead, the only thing that we know from this record is that defendant was arrested in Pennsylvania on May 7, 2021, he was sentenced in Pennsylvania in January 2022, and he was brought to New Jersey in November 2024. Finally, we reject defendant's fundamental fairness contentions. Fundamental fairness "serves to protect citizens generally against unjust and arbitrary governmental action, and specifically against government procedures that tend to operate arbitrarily." State v. Njango, 247 N.J. 533 , 548 (2021) (quoting Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 108 (1995)). This concept is applied "'sparingly' and only where the 'interests involved are especially compelling.'" Id. at 549 (quoting State v. Saavedra, 222 N.J. 39, 67 (2015)). In Joe, the Supreme Court recognized that jail credits are supported by considerations of "equal protection and fundamental fairness." 220 N.J. at 131. Nevertheless, the Court reasoned Joe "was not being deprived of" either equal protection or fundamental fairness for the time that he spent in pre-sentence A-1906-24 12 custody in New York because New Jersey was not responsible for his pre - sentence custody. Id. at 137. Like the defendant in Joe, defendant is not being deprived of fundamental fairness because he was incarcerated in Pennsylvania based on Pennsylvania charges and not on the eluding charge against him in New Jersey. Indeed, when considered objectively, defendant was treated fairly. His actions risked the safety of two New Jersey troopers, as well as any motorist driving on the roads of New Jersey during the high-speed chase. When defendant drove into Pennsylvania, his actions risked the safety of several Pennsylvania police officers and other motorists traveling in that state. Moreover, when defendant came to New Jersey, he was accorded consideration for the time he had spent in custody in Pennsylvania. The New Jersey prosecutor agreed to recommend that defendant be sentenced in the third- degree range for a second-degree crime. The prosecutor also agreed to recommend that defendant's New Jersey sentence run concurrent with his Pennsylvania sentence. The trial court followed those recommendations. In summary, we reject defendant's arguments for jail and gap-time credits because they are inconsistent with binding precedent from the New Jersey Supreme Court. Moreover, the record does not support defendant's arguments A-1906-24 13 that there was a deliberate or indifferent delay in bringing him to New Jersey, or that he has been deprived of fundamental fairness. Affirmed. A-1906-24 14