Wilfredo Crespo v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3638-24 WILFREDO CRESPO and KEILA CRESPO, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC., Defendant-Respondent. __________________________ Submitted September 15, 2026 ‒ Decided October 6, 2026. Before Judges Natali and Bishop-Thompson. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Camden County, Law Division, Docket No. L-0939-24. Kimmel & Silverman, PC, attorneys for appellants (Jacqueline Herritt, on the briefs). Earp Cohn PC, attorneys for respondent (Carol S. Harding and Charles P. Montgomery, on the brief). PER CURIAM Plaintiffs Wilfredo and Keila Crespo appeal from the June 19, 2025 order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (Honda) dismissing their two-count complaint asserting claims under the New Jersey New Car Motor Vehicle Warranty Act (New Car Lemon Law), N.J.S.A. 56:12-29 to -49, and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty–Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act (Magnuson-Moss Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–2312. Following our review of the record and applicable legal principles, we affirm in part and reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. We derive the following procedural history and relevant facts from the motion record, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs as the non-moving party. See R. 4:46-2(c); Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995). In December 2022, plaintiffs purchased a certified pre-owned 2022 Acura MDX (CPO vehicle) with 9,546 miles from an authorized Honda dealership in Maple Shade. The vehicle came with a transferred manufacturer's four-year/50,000-mile warranty, set to expire on July 18, 2026, and a certified pre-owned warranty. A-3638-24 2 The repairs orders show, from January 2023 to November 2024, plaintiffs brought the vehicle to the selling dealership and to a second dealership for the following service: • January 7, 2023, at 9,808 miles reported the key fob was inoperative. The multiplex control module was replaced. • January 18, 2023, at 10,109 miles reported a popping noise in the steering wheel when turning and a missing mud flap. The outer tire rod end was tightened and the clips were replaced. • April 13, 2023, at 13,407 miles reported off-center steering and a rattling sound from the driver's side front tire when driving over uneven roads. The brake pads were replaced due to uneven wear. • April 14, 2023, at 13,775 miles vehicle returned with complaint of continued rattling sound in car front and an airbag light flashing on and off. The issue could not be duplicated because noise could not be pinpointed and was not pronounced. The airbag was not on. The vehicle was held for five days, until April 19, 2023. • July 18, 2023, at 16,407 miles reported a rattling sound from the vehicle front on uneven roads, "sticking" left front brake, and a burning smell from the brakes. The vehicle was held for twenty-three days, until August 10, 2023. • September 6, 2023, at 17,015 miles returned to dealer with complaints of rattling noise. Vehicle taken for a test drive with a master technician on an uneven local road for a diagnosis. The left front lower control arm and stabilizer link were replaced due to premature A-3638-24 3 bushing wear; noise was not present during test drive. The vehicle was held for twelve days, until September 18, 2023. The rattling noise persisted; more serious and frequent from the right side. • September 27, 2023, at 17,282 miles reported a rattling, clunking metal-on-metal sound. The right front lower control arm and bushing were replaced due to a metal- on-metal noise. After a test drive, no noise was heard and all system operations were normal. The vehicle was held for six days, until October 3, 2023. • May 7, 2024, at 23,260 miles reported a rattling sound "worse than the first time," spring pushing through driver's seat cushion, and defective air conditioner vent. The dealer suggested an engineer may be needed to diagnose the noise, and the driver's seat and rear air conditioning vent were replaced. The vehicle was kept for two days, until May 19, 2024. • May 25, 2024, at 23,808 miles with complaint of dark oil despite a then-recent oil change and the oil change indicator had not been reset. • July 16, 2024, at 25,424 miles with complaint of multiple error lights on the dashboard. The vehicle's battery was replaced after multiple error lights appeared on the dashboard. The vehicle was kept for two days, until July 18, 2024. • November 9, 2024, at 29,005 miles reported a rattling noise over bumps and lower speeds and uneven tire wear. A different dealer could not duplicate the rattle. • November 20, 2024, at 29,621 miles returned to the second dealer with complaint of rattling noise. The dealer refused further work on the vehicle because of the pending litigation. A-3638-24 4 Plaintiffs initiated this action, alleging Honda, as the vehicle's manufacturer and warrantor, failed to remedy its chronic defects within a reasonable number of attempts and within a reasonable period of time, in violation of both the New Car Lemon Law and the Magnuson-Moss Act. Honda filed an answer. Following discovery, Honda moved for summary judgment, and plaintiffs opposed the motion. In support of their opposition, plaintiffs submitted the affidavit and report of their expert, Scot Turner, a master automobile technician certified by the automotive service excellence, certified professional estimator by Vale National, and a licensed Pennsylvania vehicle safety inspector, among other Pennsylvania-issued credentials. After considering the parties' oral argument on June 19, 2025, the motion court granted summary judgment in favor of Honda. In its oral decision, the court determined the vehicle had been purchased used as a CPO vehicle and therefore did not qualify under the New Car Lemon Law, even though it remained within the coverage period of the manufacturer's warranty. As to plaintiffs' Magnuson-Moss claim, the court relied on the standard articulated in Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Jankowitz, 216 N.J. Super. 313, 335 (App. Div. 1987), whether a reasonable person in a buyer's position would consider A-3638-24 5 the rattling noise a defect. Finally, the court determined Turner's report constituted a net opinion because he did not identify a specific defect with the vehicle, explain how he concluded the problem was caused solely by defect in Honda's materials or workmanship, or establish he had expertise in vehicle valuation. II. On appeal, plaintiffs argue the court erred in granting in summary judgment and dismissing their complaint in its entirety. First, they contend the court misapplied the New Car Lemon Law by concluding the transfer of the manufacturer's warranty did not extend coverage to consumers who purchased CPO vehicles. Accordingly, they assert that they established a valid claim under the New Car Lemon Law. Plaintiffs further contend Turner's report does not constitute a net opinion, and he therefore should be permitted to testify at trial. Finally, they argue the record contains substantial evidence Honda failed to fulfill its warranty obligations in a timely manner, thereby supporting their Magnuson-Moss claim. We review the trial court's grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo. Christakos v. Boyadjis, 262 N.J. 447 , 462 (2026). Under this standard, we "determine whether 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories A-3638-24 6 and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law.'" Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567 , 582 (2021) (quoting R. 4:46-2(c)). In doing so, we give the non-moving party "'the benefit of the most favorable evidence and most favorable inferences drawn from that evidence.'" Est. of Narleski v. Gomes, 244 N.J. 199 , 205 (2020) (quoting Gormley v. Wood- El, 218 N.J. 72, 86 (2014)); Brill, 142 N.J. at 540 . Thus, "[s]ummary judgment should be granted . . . 'against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.'" Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J. 449 , 472 (2020) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). "When no issue of fact exists, and only a question of law remains, this Court affords no special deference to the legal determinations of the trial court." Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016). A. New Car Lemon Law Statutory interpretation presents a legal question, which is subject to de novo review. Matter of H.D., 241 N.J. 412 , 418 (2020). The overriding goal A-3638-24 7 for the court is "to determine as best [it] can the intent of the Legislature, and to give effect to that intent." State v. Robinson, 217 N.J. 594, 604 (2014) (quoting State v. Hudson, 209 N.J. 513, 529 (2012)). "To ascertain legislative intent, we begin with the statute's plain language and give terms their ordinary meaning." State v. S.B., 230 N.J. 62, 68 (2017). The New Car Lemon Law provides remedies for consumers who purchase a "new motor vehicle" that contains a defect or nonconformity which substantially impairs its use, value, or safety and is not repaired after a reasonable number of attempts. The Legislature expressly declared "[i]t is the intent of this act to require the manufacturer of a new motor vehicle, . . . , to correct defects originally covered under warranty which are identified and reported within a specified period." N.J.S.A. 56:12-29. In construing that legislative purpose, we have explained "[t]he expressed intent of the [New Car] Lemon Law is to protect the new car consumer." Casal v. Hyundai Motor America, 436 N.J. Super. 296, 302 (App. Div. 2014). We likewise have emphasized the statute "protect[s] new car purchasers from enduring unacceptable burdens caused by manufacturing defects." Hogan v. Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., 480 N.J. Super. 296 , 300 (App. Div. 2024) (emphasis added). A-3638-24 8 The statute's definition of a "consumer" includes "a person to whom a motor vehicle is transferred during the duration of a warranty applicable to the motor vehicle; or any other person entitled by the terms of the warranty to enforce the obligations of the warranty." N.J.S.A. 56:12-30(a). To obtain relief under the statute, the consumer must report the nonconformity "during the first 24,000 miles of operation or during the period of two years following the date of original delivery to the consumer, whichever is earlier" and the manufacturer is then obligated to "make, within a reasonable time, all repairs necessary to correct the nonconformity." N.J.S.A. 56:12-31. If the manufacturer fails to correct the nonconformity within a reasonable time, it must provide a refund or replacement, less a reasonable allowance for use. N.J.S.A. 56:12-32. The New Car Lemon Law does not apply here because plaintiffs purchased the vehicle used, as a CPO vehicle, rather than as a "new motor vehicle" within the meaning of the statute. Although the statute defines "consumer" to include a person to whom a vehicle is transferred during the duration of a manufacturer's warranty, that definition does not expand the statute's separate and narrower requirement the vehicle itself qualify as a new motor vehicle. The Act's text and legislative purpose are aimed at "new motor vehicle" transactions, and nothing in the Act converts a later used-car purchase A-3638-24 9 into the purchase of a new motor vehicle merely because the manufacturer's warranty remains in place. Nor does the statutory or regulatory scheme recognize a CPO vehicle as a distinct statutory or regulatory category within the New Car Lemon Law coverage. See N.J.S.A. 56:8-67; see also N.J.S.A. 39:10- 2. Plaintiffs' contention is inconsistent with the text, purpose, and legislative intent of the New Car Lemon Law. Because plaintiffs failed to establish the requisite proofs, and no genuine issue of material fact exists, the court properly granted summary judgment. We, therefore, affirm that portion of the order. B. Net Opinion Plaintiffs contend Turner is qualified to offer expert opinions based on his forty-four years of experience in the automotive industry, including thirty-one years as an automotive consultant, performing technical vehicle inspections, evaluations, and reports, as set forth in his affidavit, although his curriculum vitae was not attached. They further emphasize Turner is a certified professional estimator and note Honda did not challenge either his experience in the automotive industry or his qualifications to render an opinion on valuation. Plaintiffs assert Turner's report opined, to a reasonable degree of certainty, the alleged defects substantially impaired the vehicle's use and diminished its value by approximately $7,303. They maintain his opinions are sufficiently supported A-3638-24 10 by facts and data contained in the record and of the type reasonably relied on by experts in the field. Expert testimony is admissible only if the expert is qualified by "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education," and the testimony is based on a reliable methodology and supported by a factual foundation. N.J.R.E. 702; State v. McGuigan, 478 N.J. Super. 284 , 299, 306-07 (App. Div. 2024). The trial judge acts as gatekeeper, determining whether the expert is qualified and whether the testimony is admissible; only if these requirements are met does the jury evaluate the credibility and weight of the expert's opinion. Lanzo v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., 467 N.J. Super. 476 , 505-06 (App. Div. 2021). Therefore, "[t]he admission or exclusion of expert testimony is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court." Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 52 (2015). We therefore review the court's evidential ruling for abuse of discretion. Id. at 53 . We are also guided by N.J.R.E. 702 and N.J.R.E. 703. N.J.R.E. 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony and requires the expert to be qualified in the relevant field. N.J.R.E. 703 requires an "expert opinion be grounded in 'facts or data derived from (1) the expert's personal observations, or (2) evidence admitted at the trial, or (3) data relied upon by the expert which is A-3638-24 11 not necessarily admissible in evidence but which is the type of data normally relied upon by experts.'" Townsend, 221 N.J. at 53 (quoting Polzo v. Cnty. of Essex, 196 N.J. 569, 583 (2008)). The net opinion doctrine bars expert testimony that consists of "bare conclusions, unsupported by factual evidence." Buckelew v. Grossbard, 87 N.J. 512, 524 (1981); Funtown Pier Amusements, Inc. v. Biscayne Ice Cream, 477 N.J. Super. 499 , 517 (App. Div. 2024). Experts must provide the "why and wherefore" of their opinion, identifying the factual bases, explaining the methodology, and demonstrating the reliability of both. Jimenez v. GNOC, Corp., 286 N.J. Super. 533, 540 (App. Div. 1996); Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 410 (2014). In view of these principles, we conclude the motion court mistakenly exercised its discretion in barring Turner's testimony and report. Turner based his opinion on a physical inspection of the vehicle, its repair history, technical bulletins, and accepted valuation sources of the type relied on in the industry and by government agencies, including the Kelley Blue Book. Despite the omitted curriculum vitae, the affidavit reflected Turner's forty-four years of experience in the automotive industry, with relevant credentials, and qualification as a valuation expert in more than 1,000 arbitrations and trials in A-3638-24 12 New Jersey and Pennsylvania. See State v. Townsend, 186 N.J. 473, 495 (2006) (allowing opinion testimony based on the expert's "education, training, and most importantly, her experience "). We are satisfied Turner's expert report identified the basis for his conclusion. Kemp ex rel. Wright v. State, 174 N.J. 412, 427 (2002). The court erred in finding Turner possessed no expertise "other than the average person on the street." Any challenge to the weight or credibility of Turner's opinion is for the jury, not a basis for exclusion. See Lanzo, 467 N.J. Super. at 505-06 ("It is not for a trial court to bless new 'inspired' science theory; the goal is to permit the jury to hear reliable science to support the expert's opinion."). Plaintiffs were entitled to offer Turner's opinion to prove damages, and the trial court's exclusion of this testimony was an abuse of discretion. See Townsend, 221 N.J. at 53 . We, therefore, reverse this provision of the order. C. Magnuson-Moss Act The Magnuson-Moss Act establishes federal standards governing written and implied warranties on consumer products and provides remedies when a warrantor fails to honor its warranty obligations. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 . Under the Act, a "written warranty" includes any "written affirmation of fact or promise made in connection with the sale of a consumer product" that guarantees A-3638-24 13 "defect-free" material or workmanship or promises "a specified level of performance" for a stated period. 15 U.S.C. § 2301 (6)(A). The Act also requires warrantors to satisfy minimum federal warranty standards, including providing, without charge, remedies such as repair, replacement, or refund for defects or malfunctions. 15 U.S.C. § 2304 . To establish a breach of warranty claim under the Magnuson-Moss Act, a plaintiff must establish: (1) the existence of a written or implied warranty arising from the sale of a consumer product; (2) that the product failed to conform to the warranty; (3) that the warrantor was afforded a reasonable opportunity to cure the nonconformity, where required; and (4) resulting damages. Ryan v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 186 N.J. 431, 433-34 (2006); Jankowitz, 216 N.J. Super. at 329-30 ; see also 15 U.S.C. § 2310 (d). Here, we are satisfied the motion record contains competent evidence that established a genuine question of material fact with respect to plaintiffs' Magnuson-Moss Act claim. For purposes of this motion, plaintiffs are deemed consumers because they satisfy two of three statutory definitions of that term. Specifically, they are persons "to whom such product is transferred during the duration of an implied or written warranty," and a person "who is entitled by the terms of such warranty . . . or under applicable State law to enforce against the A-3638-24 14 warrantor . . . the obligations of the warranty." 15 U.S.C.A. § 2301 (3). Plaintiffs further allege their CPO vehicle was sold with the manufacturer's warranty still in effect at the time of purchase, and Honda failed to comply with its warranty obligations because repeated repair attempts did not correct the vehicle's persistent defects. Relying on Christelles v. Nissan Motor Corp., 305 N.J. Super. 222 (App. Div. 1997), plaintiffs further argue expert testimony is not required to prove their claim. In light of our conclusion regarding the admissibility of Turner's testimony, we find it unnecessary to address plaintiffs' claims under Christelles. As noted, Turner's testimony remains relevant and admissible because it provides additional support concerning the nature and extent of the alleged defects and workmanship, as well as the vehicle's diminished value and the substantial impairment of its use and safety without resort to speculation. We also add that while the Magnuson-Moss Act creates an independent federal cause of action for violations of a service contract or written warranties, it also often relies on state warranty law. See 15 U.S.C. § 2310 (d)(1). We have concluded under New Jersey law, a claim brought under the Magnuson-Moss Act is substantively equivalent to a breach-of-warranty claim under the New Jersey Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). Poli v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 349 A-3638-24 15 N.J. Super. 169, 181 (App. Div. 2002). Where a federal statute relies on substantive state law, courts apply "the state cause of action most closely analogous to the federal action." Ibid. Consequently, "an action for breach of an implied or expressed warranty under the UCC is a cause of action under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act." Jankowitz, 216 N.J. Super. at 331 . In any event, plaintiffs' complaint alleged that plaintiffs have suffered damages under the Magnuson-Moss Act and the UCC. Therefore, a Magnuson-Moss Act claim may be based on the obligations in a written warranty, and it does not automatically fail where a plaintiff did not separately plead or prove a UCC claim. Ryan, 186 N.J. at 433, 436 (although the complaint did not plead a UCC claim, the Supreme Court held the plaintiff, as a lessee, was entitled to pursue a warranty claim under the Magnuson-Moss Act). We discern no basis to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint under the circumstances when they can easily amend the pleading to include specifically a UCC claim under our liberal pleading standards. Having reviewed the record from the viewpoint of the plaintiffs as buyers and objectively for what a reasonable person in the plaintiffs' position would have believed, we conclude there is sufficient evidence in the record to support plaintiffs' claim Honda breached an express warranty. Jankowitz, 216 N.J. A-3638-24 16 Super. at 335. The portion of the order granting summary judgment to Honda on plaintiffs' Magnuson-Moss Act claim is reversed and remanded to the trial court. Affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. We do not retain jurisdiction. A-3638-24 17