In the Matter of the Seizure of Weapons Belonging to K.G.

RECORD IMPOUNDED NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2196-24 IN THE MATTER OF THE SEIZURE OF WEAPONS BELONGING TO K.G. _______________________ Argued September 15, 2026 – Decided September 25, 2026 Before Judges Rose and Natali. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Union County, Docket No. FO-20-0573-02. Robert B. Bell argued the cause for appellant K.G. (Evan F. Nappen Attorney at Law PC, attorneys; Robert B. Bell, of counsel and on the brief). Meredith L. Balo, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent State of New Jersey (William A. Daniel, Union County Prosecutor, attorney; Meredith L. Balo, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM Petitioner K.G. appeals from a February 10, 2025 Family Part order, denying reconsideration of a September 16, 2024 order, denying his motion to vacate a June 7, 2002 order, forfeiting his firearms and revoking his firearm purchaser identification card (FPIC) and related handgun permits. Because we conclude K.G. failed to proffer a reasonable explanation for filing his motion more than two decades after the June 7, 2002 order was issued, we affirm. I. We summarize the pertinent facts from the limited record provided on appeal. On May 29, 2002, police seized firearms and an FPIC from K.G. following issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) against K.G. under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991 (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35.1 That same day, K.G. was arrested and charged with simple assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(a), possession of large capacity magazines, N.J.S.A. 2C:39- 3(j), possession of hollow point bullets, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(f), and possession of five assault firearms, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(f). On June 7, 2002, a Family Part judge issued the forfeiture and revocation order at issue. According to a handwritten notation on the order, K.G. agreed to sell the firearms seized pursuant to his May 29 arrest. The order also revoked all FPICs, "and any other licenses, permits or authorization for the use, possession, or ownership of weapons/firearms issued to" K.G. 1 The TRO and domestic violence complaint, and forfeiture petition referenced in the ensuing June 7, 2002 order, were not provided on appeal. However, defendant does not dispute police seized his firearms and FPIC card. A-2196-24 2 On August 29, 2002, K.G. was admitted into the pretrial intervention (PTI) program. Pursuant to the postponement order, all charges arising from K.G.'s May 29 arrest were subject to dismissal after twelve months provided K.G. complied with the conditions of his PTI supervision. Relevant here, K.G. expressly agreed to "forfeit assault firearms and sell handguns and dumdum bullets." The PTI order did not reference revocation of K.G.'s FPIC or permits. Following K.G.'s successful completion of the PTI program, on May 16, 2003, an order was issued dismissing the May 29, 2002 charges. On January 18, 2005, the Criminal Division presiding judge granted K.G.'s application to expunge all records regarding his May 29, 2002 arrest. Twenty-two years later, on May 6, 2024, K.G. moved to vacate the June 7, 2002 forfeiture and revocation order pursuant to Rule 4:50-1. During oral argument before the motion judge, K.G. challenged the restriction embodied in N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(8), permanently disqualifying individuals whose weapons were seized under the PDVA. K.G. also cited the United States Supreme Court's then-recent decision in U.S. v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), in support of his argument that the restraints were not intended to be permanent. The State countered K.G.'s deprivation of rights was "based on his deal to get into PTI," that is, K.G. agreed to permanent revocation of his firearm rights A-2196-24 3 in lieu of prosecution for the assault and weapons offenses charged. The State argued it would be unduly prejudiced if the order were vacated. Toward that end, the State argued K.G.'s sworn statement in his certification in support of the motion that he had no criminal convictions was true "only because the State agreed to allow him into PTI on the basis that he would permanently forfeit [his firearm] rights." Immediately following arguments, the judge rendered a preliminary oral decision denying K.G.'s motion. Shortly thereafter, on September 16, 2024, the judge issued a written statement of reasons and memorializing order expounding upon her reasons. The judge found the motion was not filed within a reasonable time under Rule 4:50-2, noting K.G. waited twenty-two years after entry of the June 7, 2002 order and did not seek relief even after the January 18, 2005 expungement order was issued. Emphasizing the significant passage of time, the judge was persuaded granting relief would unduly prejudice the State. The judge further found K.G. suffered no "extreme" or "unexpected" hardship under Rule 4:50-1 because the effect of the order remained the same—namely, the "permanent forfeiture of [his] weapons, FPIC and any other license, permit or authorization for the use, possession or ownership" of firearms. The judge also noted K.G. A-2196-24 4 agreed to forfeiture as a condition of PTI. Having decided the matter on procedural grounds, the judge declined to address the PDVA's constitutionality under Rahimi, "especially since [K.G.] consented to the forfeiture of the FPIC and took full availability of the PTI process and the expungement process." On K.G.'s ensuing motion for reconsideration, the judge rejected K.G.'s contention she erroneously interpreted the term "revoked" as used in the June 7, 2002 order. The judge maintained, pursuant to its plain meaning, "revoked" meant the "permanent revocation of [K.G.'s FPIC] and any other licenses, permits or authorization" for firearms issued to him. The judge again noted the June 7 order was issued with K.G.'s consent. During oral argument before us, K.G. clarified, in his trial court motion, he sought relief under all six subsections of Rule 4:50-1. Acknowledging the one-year time limitation under subsections (a), (b), and (c), K.G. now limits his contentions to subsections (e) and (f). K.G. maintains the motion judge erroneously determined he agreed to a lifetime bar to possess firearms, FPICs, and related permits. K.G. does not dispute he consented to the forfeiture of firearms seized when he was arrested in May 2002, and revocation of the FPIC and permits then in his possession. Instead, he contends, when he signed the A-2196-24 5 June 7, 2002 order, the law did not mandate the permanent disability now embodied in N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(8) and N.J.S.A. 2C:25-21(d)(1)(b).2 II. Well-established principles guide our review. Generally, absent an abuse of discretion, appellate courts will not disturb a trial court's order on a motion for reconsideration. See Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567 , 582 (2021). Similarly, "[t]he decision granting or denying an application to open a judgment will be left undisturbed unless it represents a clear abuse of discretion." Hous. Auth. of Morristown v. Little, 135 N.J. 274, 283 (1994); see also U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012) (stating a trial court's determination under Rule 4:50-1 "warrants substantial deference[] and should not be reversed unless it results in a clear abuse of discretion"). Rule 4:50-1 is "designed to reconcile the strong interests in finality of judgments and judicial efficiency with the equitable notion that courts should have authority to avoid an unjust result in any given case." Mancini v. EDS, 132 N.J. 330, 334 (1993) (quoting Baumann v. Marinaro, 95 N.J. 380 , 392 2 On appeal, K.G. abandons his challenge to New Jersey's firearm laws under Rahimi and N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). We therefore deem the issue waived. See Gormley v. Wood-El, 218 N.J. 72 , 95 n.8 (2014); Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 5 on R. 2:6-2 (2027). A-2196-24 6 (1984)). "Courts should use Rule 4:50-1 sparingly, in exceptional situations." Little, 135 N.J. at 289 . That is because "the [r]ule is designed to provide relief from judgments in situations in which, were it not applied, a grave injustice would occur." Ibid. "The rule does not distinguish between consent judgments and those issued after trial. So long as the judgment is final, the rule is applicable." DEG, LLC v. Twp. of Fairfield, 198 N.J. 242, 261 (2009). "Indeed, a consent judgment 'is an agreement that the parties desire and expect will be reflected in, and be enforceable as, a judicial decree that is subject to the rules generally applicable to other judgments and decrees.'" Ibid. (quoting Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378 (1992)). Significantly, Rule 4:50-1 is not an opportunity for parties to a consent judgment to change their minds; nor is it a pathway to reopen litigation because a party either views his settlement as less advantageous than it had previously appeared, or rethinks the effectiveness of his original legal strategy. Rather, the rule is a carefully crafted vehicle intended to underscore the need for repose while achieving a just result. It thus denominates with specificity the narrow band of triggering events that will warrant relief from judgment if justice is to be served. Only the existence of one of those triggers will allow a party to challenge the substance of the judgment. [Id. at 261-62.] A-2196-24 7 Rule 4:50-1 establishes six alternative grounds for relief from a final judgment or order. Pertinent to K.G.'s reprised contentions on appeal, a court is permitted to vacate a final judgment or order when "it is no longer equitable that the judgment or order should have prospective application," R. 4:50-1(e), or for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment or order," R. 4:50-1(f). Relief under subsection (e) of Rule 4:50-1 "is rooted in changed circumstances that call the fairness of the judgment into question." DEG, 198 N.J. at 265-66 . "The party seeking relief bears the burden of proving that events have occurred subsequent to the entry of a judgment that, absent the relief requested, will result in 'extreme' and 'unexpected' hardship." Little, 135 N.J. at 285 -86 (quoting Mayberry v. Maroney, 558 F.2d 1159, 1163 (3d Cir. 1977)). Relief under subsection (f) is available only when "'truly exceptional circumstances are present.'" Id. at 286 (quoting Baumann, 95 N.J. at 395 ). "The movant must demonstrate the circumstances are exceptional and enforcement of the judgment or order would be unjust, oppressive or inequitable." Johnson v. Johnson, 320 N.J. Super. 371, 378 (App. Div. 1999). Whether exceptional circumstances exist requires a case-by-case analysis, premised on the specific facts presented. In re Guardianship of J.N.H., 172 N.J. 440, 474 (2002). A-2196-24 8 In determining whether the procedural rules should be relaxed to achieve fairness and justice under subsection (e), or exceptional circumstances exist to warrant relief under subsection (f), courts consider: the "extent of the delay in making the application for relief, the underlying reason or cause, fault or blamelessness of the litigant, and any prejudice that would accrue to the other party." Ibid. (quoting C.R. v. J.G., 306 N.J. Super. 214, 241 (Ch. Div. 1997)). By amendment effective January 14, 2004, when police have "probable cause to believe an act of domestic violence has been committed" they are required to: upon observing or learning that a weapon is present on the premises, seize any weapon that the officer reasonably believes would expose the victim to a risk of serious bodily injury. If a law enforcement officer seizes any firearm pursuant to this paragraph, the officer shall also seize any [FPIC] or permit to purchase a handgun issued to the person accused of the act of domestic violence. [N.J.S.A. 2C:25-21(d)(1)(b).] "Weapons seized in accordance with the [PDVA] shall be returned to the owner except upon order of the Superior Court." N.J.S.A. 2C:25-21(d)(3). The statute permits the prosecutor to petition the Family Part, on notice to the owner, "to obtain title to the seized weapons, or to revoke any and all permits, licenses and other authorizations for the use, possession, or ownership of such weapons " A-2196-24 9 or "object to the return of the weapons . . . on the grounds that the owner is unfit or . . . poses a threat to the public in general or a person or persons in particular." Ibid. Any such application requires a hearing. Ibid. Here, the need for a hearing was obviated by K.G.'s consent to forfeit his firearms and FPIC seized at the time of his May 29, 2002 arrest as set forth in the June 7, 2002 order. Having considered K.G.'s contentions in view of the record provided on appeal, we discern no basis to disturb the orders under review. We are satisfied, as was the motion judge, K.G. did not seek relief in a timely manner and no changed or exceptional circumstances since the entry of the June 7, 2002 order warrant relief under Rule 4:50-1(e) or (f). In particular, K.G.'s argument that the statutory provision mandating revocation of weapons, FPICs, and permits under the PDVA was not effective until January 2004—nearly two years after he executed the order—does not excuse his lengthy delay in seeking relief from the June 7, 2002 order's restraints. Moreover, K.G. received a valuable benefit under the ensuing PTI dismissal order. We therefore conclude continued enforcement of the order is not unjust, oppressive, or inequitable. To the extent not addressed, K.G.'s remaining contentions lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written decision. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Affirmed. A-2196-24 10