In the Matter of the Estate of Olga Parris

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-4162-24 IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF OLGA PARRIS, deceased. _________________________ Submitted September 17, 2026 – Decided October 8, 2026 Before Judges DeAlmeida and Augostini. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Hudson County, Docket No. C- 327104-23. Mederos and Associates, LLC, attorneys for appellant Yvonne C. Bolt (Ciro A. Mederos, on the briefs). Norris McLaughlin, PA, attorneys for respondent Jessica Walters (Nicholas A. Duston, of counsel; Michael C. Townsend, on the brief). PER CURIAM In this probate matter, defendant Yvonne C. Bolt appeals from a July 11, 2025 order denying her motion to vacate default judgment entered on February 28, 2025. We affirm. I. Defendant was employed as decedent Olga Parris's caregiver during her terminal illness. Shortly before decedent's death, defendant, acting as her attorney-in-fact, wrote two checks to herself from decedent's Chase Bank account transferring approximately $200,000: (1) check 1090 dated July 19, 2023, and (2) check 1092 dated July 28, 2023. Decedent died intestate on August 5, 2023. Plaintiff Jessica Walters is decedent's goddaughter and the payable-on-death (POD) beneficiary of decedent's two bank accounts. On December 18, 2023, plaintiff filed a verified complaint against defendant alleging she improperly transferred monies from decedent's bank accounts to herself in the weeks prior to decedent's death, thus depriving plaintiff of those funds. Plaintiff sought verification of defendant's purported authority under power of attorney, as well as an accounting of her actions while acting in that capacity. On December 22, 2023, the court issued an order to show cause with temporary restraints, preventing further transfers pending verification of defendant's status as attorney-in-fact. In January 2024, in lieu of filing an answer, defendant moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint. She argued plaintiff lacked standing to bring the claims in A-4162-24 2 this action, relying on N.J.S.A. 46:2B-8.13. On February 23, 2024, the Chancery Division denied defendant's motion to dismiss, finding plaintiff made a prima facie showing of her status as a POD beneficiary. Defendant acknowledges she did not file an answer to the complaint, which was due on March 4, 2024. On October 24, 2024, plaintiff filed an amended verified complaint, expanding the claims against defendant to include conversion, waste, intentional interference, unjust enrichment, self-dealing, and fraudulent concealment. Defendant's answer to the complaint was due on December 9, 2024. She again did not file an answer or any type of response. 1 On December 13, 2024, plaintiff moved to enforce litigant's rights and for entry of default judgment, or, alternatively, for summary judgment. During oral argument on February 21, 2025, defendant's counsel acknowledged the court did not have a filed answer but represented he had filed a cross-motion for leave to file a late answer. No such cross-motion, however, had been served on opposing counsel, nor did the court have a copy. The court declined to grant summary judgment noting it was "premature" so long as the question of whether defendant had filed an answer remained. On February 28, 2025, after confirming no cross- 1 Defendant's appendix contains an unfiled draft answer to the complaint, which was not formally filed. A-4162-24 3 motion or proposed answer had been filed, the court entered default judgment against defendant in the amount of $109,600. The order also prohibited defendant from opposing plaintiff's claims relating to checks 1090 and 1092 written by defendant from decedent's Chase Bank accounts. Defendant did not appeal from the February 28, 2025 entry of default judgment or any prior interlocutory orders. On April 2, 2025, plaintiff served defendant with an information subpoena. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff submitted writs of execution to the Hudson County Sheriff directing execution on defendant's bank accounts. On May 6, 2025, after collection efforts had begun, defendant filed a motion to vacate the default judgment. On July 11, 2025, the court denied the motion finding it untimely under Rule 4:50-2, and that defendant had not established excusable neglect nor a meritorious defense. The court found defendant's standing arguments had already been addressed in connection with the February 2024 motion to dismiss. On appeal, defendant reiterates the arguments she unsuccessfully advanced before the court. She contends the court erred by finding plaintiff had standing to recover the pre-death funds withdrawn from the POD accounts because she was neither an heir nor the administrator of decedent's estate. A-4162-24 4 Defendant also asserts it erred by denying the motion to vacate default judgment because she had shown a meritorious defense based on this lack of standing. II. We address the only issue properly before us; namely, whether the court abused its discretion in denying the motion to vacate default judgment pursuant to Rule 4:50-1.2 "Rule 4:50-1 provides the mechanism by which a party may obtain relief from a final judgment or order . . . ." F.B. v. A.L.G., 176 N.J. 201, 207 (2003). The Rule identifies six categories upon which relief may be granted. Such relief is "granted sparingly." F.B., 176 N.J. at 207 (citing Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 1.1 on R. 4:50-1 (2003)). A court's decision under Rule 4:50-1 should be given "substantial deference," and will not be reversed unless shown to be "a clear abuse of discretion." U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012) (citing DEG, LLC v. Twp. of Fairfield, 198 N.J. 242, 261 (2009)). An abuse of discretion "arises when a decision is 'made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible 2 See R. 2:5-1(f)(2)(ii) (requiring the notice of appeal to designate the judgment or order being appealed); see also W.H. Indus. Inc. v. Fundicao Balancins, Ltda, 397 N.J. Super. 455, 458-59 (App. Div. 2008) (finding a plaintiff was not "entitled to review of [an] earlier order" when appeal was taken only from order denying reconsideration). A-4162-24 5 basis.'" Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) (quoting Achacoso-Sanchez v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 779 F.2d 1260, 1265 (7th Cir. 1985)). Here, the court properly applied the Rule 4:50-1 standard, "which governs an applicant's motion for relief from default when the case has proceeded to judgment." Guillaume, 209 N.J. at 466 . Defendant, relying on Marder v. Realty Constr. Co., 84 N.J. Super. 313, 319 (App. Div. 1964), argues "courts liberally grant motions to vacate default judgments" and such motions are "viewed with great liberality, and every reasonable ground for indulgence is tolerated to the end that a just result is reached." While true, "[o]ur [Court] Rules prescribe a two-step default process, and there is a significant difference between the burdens imposed at each stage." Guillaume, 209 N.J. at 466 . As the Supreme Court in Guillaume pointed out: When nothing more than an entry of default pursuant to Rule 4:43-1 has occurred, relief from that default may be granted on a showing of good cause. Rule 4:43- 3; Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, [cmt.] on R. 4:43-3 (2012) (stating that "[t]he required good- cause showing for setting aside an entry of default pursuant to this rule is clearly a less stringent standard than that imposed by R. 4:50-1 for setting aside a default judgment"). When the matter has proceeded to the second stage and the court has entered a default judgment A-4162-24 6 pursuant to Rule 4:43-2, the party seeking to vacate the judgment must meet the standard of Rule 4:50-1[.] [Id. at 466-67 (second alteration in original).] Rule 4:50-1 is "designed to reconcile the strong interests in finality of judgments and judicial efficiency with the equitable notion that courts should have authority to avoid an unjust result in any given case." Id. at 467 (citing Mancini v. EDS, 132 N.J. 330, 334 (1993)). Rule 4:50-2 requires a motion brought under Rule 4:50-1(a) for excusable neglect to be filed within a "reasonable time . . . not more than one year after the judgment [or] order . . . was entered." The court determined defendant's motion to vacate was untimely. It explained what constitutes a reasonable time is fact-specific based on the totality of the circumstances. The court found defendant "made really no meaningful effort to challenge the default judgment until [plaintiff] pursued her post-judgment collection by way of levies and suggesting strategic delay." Defendant offered no significant explanation for this delay. We discern no abuse in the court's finding in this regard. Nonetheless, the court analyzed defendant's excusable neglect and meritorious defense arguments, rejecting both. Defendant minimizes any neglect, claiming her attorney "was actively engaged, filed multiple motions, appeared at hearings, attempted to defend, even drafted a motion supported by A-4162-24 7 a brief and other documents to amend the complaint out of time; however, counsel's paralegal filed the wrong document." Yet, as the court explained: [Defendant] received multiple warnings from the court staff, including communications from . . . chambers, [chambers administrative staff] and the staff attorney in the Surrogate's Office . . . warning her that her cross- motion was never properly filed. The [c]ourt scheduled a case management conference to address that and allow a correction to be made and no remedial action was taken after two court staff and then finally [a] judge told her what the problem was. The court concluded the lack of proper diligence in attending to filing deadlines does not equate with excusable neglect. Baumann, 95 N.J. at 394. Even assuming a filing mistake was made in January 2025, defendant does not explain the reasons for not responding timely to the amended complaint filed on October 24, 2024. The record supports defendant did not demonstrate excusable neglect. Even if defendant's failure to answer was excusable, the court properly concluded defendant's repeated standing arguments did not amount to a meritorious defense. Defendant admitted she cashed the checks totaling approximately $200,000 before decedent's death and offered "no defense to the unlawful gifting of funds in violation of [N.J.S.A.] 46:2B-8.13[(a)]." On February 23, 2024, the standing arguments were initially considered and adjudicated in the context of defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint, A-4162-24 8 the result of which she did not appeal. On February 21, 2025, defendant reiterated those arguments during oral argument, which led to the entry of default judgment. Other than the standing arguments, defendant offered no meritorious defense to plaintiff's claims. On this record, we see no basis to disturb the court's disposition of defendant's motion to vacate default judgment. Defendant's other claims are either not properly before us on appeal or lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11- 3(e)(1)(E). Affirmed. A-4162-24 9