In the Matter of Stacey Williams, Roselle Police Department

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3750-24 IN THE MATTER OF STACEY WILLIAMS, ROSELLE POLICE DEPARTMENT. Argued September 16, 2026 – Decided October 9, 2026 Before Judges Currier and Puglisi. On appeal from the New Jersey Civil Service Commission, Docket Nos. 2025-91 and 2025-92. Debra R. Rydarowski argued the cause for appellant Roselle Police Department (Murphy Orlando LLC, attorneys; Tyler Newman and Debra R. Rydarowski, on the briefs). Patrick P. Toscano, Jr. argued the cause for respondent Stacey Williams (The Toscano Law Firm, LLC, attorneys; Patrick P. Toscano, Jr., of counsel and on the brief; Matthew J. Toscano, on the brief). Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney for respondent New Jersey Civil Service Commission (Gordon C. Estes, Deputy Attorney General, on the statement in lieu of brief). PER CURIAM The Borough of Roselle (Borough) appeals from the Civil Service Commission's (CSC) June 11, 2025 final decision which sustained charges against Roselle Police Department (RPD) Chief Stacey Williams and recommended imposing a thirty-day suspension. The CSC found Williams used the term "faggot" while speaking with police officers at the police department. An openly gay police officer overheard the conversation. The Borough had previously sustained the charges and terminated Williams. The CSC found Williams's conduct was "abhorrent," "inappropriate and offensive," and acknowledged he was held to a higher standard as the highest- ranking officer in the RPD. The CSC stated it intended to impose a "weighty penalty" to impress upon Williams the "gravity of his actions." Notwithstanding those statements, the CSC rejected the Borough's penalty of removal, imposed a thirty-day suspension, and reinstated Williams to his position with back pay, benefits, and seniority status. After careful review, we reverse the thirty-day suspension as arbitrary and capricious and lacking support in the record and reinstate the removal. I. A-3750-24 2 In March 2024, the RPD served Williams with a Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action (PNDA),1 which alleged Williams "us[ed] the term 'faggot' while relating a story about a close friend to other officers" while on duty. An openly gay officer, Lieutenant Delmonte Pryor, was present during the story telling. Afterwards, another officer, Captain Helder Freire, confronted Williams about the use of the word and relayed his observation that Pryor was visibly upset. The PNDA charged Williams with violating: • N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(6): Conduct Unbecoming a Public Employee; • N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(7): Neglect of Duty; • N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(9): Discrimination that affects equal opportunity (as defined in N.J.A.C. 4A:7-1.1), including sexual harassment; • N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.1 to -3.2: Prohibiting Discrimination in the Workplace; • N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(12): Other Sufficient Cause— Violations of various Borough and RPD Law Enforcement Manual policies: o 3:7.10(A) Use of Derogatory Terms; o 8:1.6(A) Neglect of Duty; o 8:1.6(G) Disorderly or Immoral Conduct; o 8:1.6(K) Conduct Unbecoming an Employee [in] Public Service; 1 Williams was also served with a second PNDA alleging performance charges . Those charges were not sustained during the hearing before the Office of Administrative Law (OAL). A-3750-24 3 o 8:1.17 Using Rude or Insulting Language of Conduct Offensive to the Public; o 8:1.22 Conduct Subversive of Good Order and the Discipline of the Department; o 3:1.1 Standards of Conduct; o 3:1.11 Standards of Conduct Towards Superior and Subordinate Officers and Associates; o 3:1.12 Obedience to Laws and Regulations. After the Union County Prosecutor's Office conducted an Internal Affairs investigation and sustained charges, the Borough issued a Final Notice of Disciplinary Action sustaining the charges and imposing the penalty of removal. Williams appealed to the CSC, which transmitted the matters to the OAL. During the subsequent hearing, the Borough presented six witnesses. In addition to himself, Williams produced a current Borough Councilwoman, and a former Council mayor. According to Freire, after he confronted Williams about his use of "faggot," Williams responded by saying if Pryor wanted to make a big deal about it, Williams would make a big deal about all the times Pryor talked about sucking dick. Freire also recalled an incident when Williams called Pryor into his office to congratulate him on coming out as gay. Williams advised he had seen a post on social media reflecting that. A-3750-24 4 Pryor corroborated that conversation, stating Williams also said he was going to treat Pryor like everybody else, which Pryor took as a threat. RPD Captain William Lord also testified at the hearing. He recounted Williams referring to several officers as "a bunch of fags" when they felt ill at the sight of a badly decomposing body. Lord said he felt "very uncomfortable" about the conversation and left the area. Lord also testified he had worked with Pryor for a number of years, was aware Pryor was gay and had never heard Pryor discuss his sex life at work. Williams called Borough Councilwoman Cynthia Johnson who testified she had never heard William call anyone a faggot. She also testified that she did not believe the term faggot was a homophobic slur. Johnson, who is Black, also stated she did not believe the word "nigger" was a racist slur. She said she has a gay niece and has called her a dyke. Johnson also advised she has been censored by the Borough Mayor and Council and is not permitted to sit on committees or have conversations "with any type of employer that's connected with the Borough . . . ." The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found this witness credible. During Williams's testimony he was asked if it was "possible [he] used the term 'faggot[]'" in front of officers in the workplace. He responded: "It's A-3750-24 5 possible, absolutely," but added he did not think Pryor was in the area when he said it. He did not deny using it directed at officers at the scene or to refer to them afterwards, to describe their response to the viewing of a decomposed body, which he thought occurred "approximately ten years ago." Williams's attorney asked him what he meant when he used the word "faggot." Williams responded, "It's a laugh. It's a joke." "It's not intended at any homosexual manner. It isn't intended to be harmful." "It's in the office. You went on your day." Williams disputed Freire's version of events regarding the "sucking dick" conversation. He also testified the Borough's witnesses all lied in their testimony before the internal affairs investigator and the ALJ. Williams said he did not apologize to Pryor about the slur. He admitted congratulating Pryor when he came out as gay on social media and telling Pryor he intended to treat him like anyone else. A. In its initial decision, the ALJ found Williams credible. The ALJ noted Williams did not deny using the term "faggot," but rather testified he did not recall saying it, although Williams conceded it was certainly possible that he did. In addition, the ALJ stated Williams admitted "jokingly" using the word A-3750-24 6 "faggot" years earlier regarding police officers' reaction to a badly decomposing body. The ALJ found Williams used the "derogatory term" when "referring to a friend while telling a story to subordinate officers which Lieutenant Pryor, an openly gay officer, overheard." However, the ALJ found Williams's use of the word "was neither discriminatory nor targeted toward another officer or other specific individual in such a manner exhibiting homophobia or disapproval of those who identify as homosexual." The ALJ sustained the following violations: N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(6) Conduct unbecoming a public employee, stating "[u]se of the word 'faggot,' even in the context used when relating a story about a friend in front of other officers rises to conduct unbecoming"; N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(12) Other Sufficient Cause as in violation of the RPD Rules and Regulations, 3:7.10 (A) Use of Derogatory Terms. The ALJ found the remainder of the charges unsustained. The ALJ concluded the appropriate discipline for the sustained charges was a thirty-day suspension. B. The CSC found there was no "material substantive dispute about" Williams's misconduct. In its de novo review of the penalty, the CSC stated: A-3750-24 7 [W]hile abhorrent, [Williams's] inappropriate and offensive language, given the context, is not so egregious to warrant removal from employment absent an application of progressive discipline. In this matter, as indicated by the ALJ, [Williams] had a long career without a significant disciplinary history. Further, while [Williams's] actions, as a Police Chief, are clearly inappropriate, the Commission cannot find that, given his long tenure and lack of a significant disciplinary history, removal is warranted, even acknowledging that Police Officers, and in this case, the highest ranking officer, are held to a higher standing. However, the Commission emphasizes that its modification of the penalty is in no way condoning [Williams's] misconduct. Indeed, the 30-working day suspension imposed, a weighty penalty, should serve to impress upon [Williams] the gravity of his actions as well as serve as a clear warning that any further inappropriate conduct may lead to more severe disciplinary action, up to removal from employment. The CSC ordered that Williams be immediately reinstated as Chief of Police. II. On appeal, the Borough contends the CSC2 erred in dismissing the workplace discrimination charge, N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.1, and acted arbitrarily and unreasonably in imposing the thirty-day suspension penalty. 2 In its brief, the Borough asserts its contentions of error as to the OAL. However, the appeal is from the CSC's final determination and, accordingly, our review is from that determination. A reading of the brief reflects the same errors are alleged as to the CSC's final determination. A-3750-24 8 Our review of a quasi-judicial agency determination is limited. Allstars Auto. Grp., Inc. v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 234 N.J. 150, 157 (2018) (citing Russo v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011)). We "review[] agency decisions under an arbitrary and capricious standard." Zimmerman v. Sussex Cnty. Educ. Servs. Comm'n, 237 N.J. 465, 475 (2019), "An administrative agency's final quasi-judicial decision will be sustained unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record." In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27-28 (2007). A. We begin with the Borough's contentions regarding the CSC's dismissal of the charge lodged under N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.1(a)(1). N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.1(a)(1) states "this policy applies to all employees and applicants for employment in State departments, commissions, State colleges or universities, agencies, and authorities (hereafter referred to in this section as 'State agencies' or 'State agency')." N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.1(b) states: It is a violation of this policy to use derogatory or demeaning references regarding a person's race, gender, age, religion, disability, affectional or sexual orientation, ethnic background, or any other protected A-3750-24 9 category set forth in (a) above. A violation of this policy can occur even if there was no intent on the part of an individual to harass or demean another. The CSC concluded that the State Policy explicitly only applies to State employees. Local government employees are not subject to the State Policy. As such, [Williams] should have been charged under N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.2(a)(9),[3] Discrimination that affects equal opportunity (as defined in N.J.A.C. 4A:7-1.1), including sexual harassment or under any other similar policy established by the appointing authority. See N.J.A.C. 4A:7-1.1(g). Regardless, even if properly charged, it is clear that [Williams's] comment, in the context described was not intended to effect equal employment opportunity or otherwise directed toward any specific employee. Moreover, even assuming arguendo, [Williams's] comment was found to be discriminatory, it was also found to be conduct unbecoming a public employee. Thus, such a finding would only be germane to the proper penalty to be imposed, which, for the reasons discussed below, the Commission agrees with the 30 day working day suspension recommended by the ALJ. [(Emphasis in original) (citation reformatted) (paragraph break added).] To interpret the meaning and applicability of N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.1, we rely on well-established principles of statutory construction. The goal is "to 3 The CSC misstated the applicable regulation. The correct citation is to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(9), which was charged in the PNDA. A-3750-24 10 determine and give effect to the Legislature's intent." State v. Lopez-Carrera, 245 N.J. 596 , 612 (2021) (quoting In re Matter of H.D., 241 N.J. 412 , 418 (2020)). We begin with the language of a statute, "which is typically the best indicator of intent." State v. McCray, 243 N.J. 196 , 208 (2020) (quoting In re T.B., 236 N.J. 262, 274 (2019)). When the text of a statute is clear, the court's job is over. Lopez-Carrera, 245 N.J. at 613. N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.1 explicitly states it only applies to state employees, not local government employees. Williams is hired and paid by the Borough and is not a state employee. Under the plain language of the regulation, we cannot conclude it is applicable to Williams. Nevertheless, the CSC sustained the charge of conduct unbecoming a public employee. As our Supreme Court has stated, "[t]he phrase is an elastic one." Karins v. City of Atl. City, 152 N.J. 532, 554 (1998) (quoting In re Emmons, 63 N.J. Super. 136, 140 (App. Div. 1960)). We consider whether the conduct and behavior: (1) "adversely affect[ed] the morale" of the RPD; (2) "ha[d] the tendency to destroy public respect for" or "public confidence in" the RPD; and (3) "clearly offend[ed] accepted standards of decency." Id. at 556-57. The CSC found Williams's use of the word "faggot" was conduct unbecoming. A-3750-24 11 In addition, in finding Williams violated the RPD's Rules and Regulations 3:7.10(A) Use of Derogatory Terms, the CSC sustained the charge of other sufficient cause, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(12). As a result, the dismissal of N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.1 should not have affected the CSC's consideration of the appropriate penalty. In imposing the thirty-day suspension, the ALJ seemed to consider whether Williams intended to offend anyone with the use of the offensive language. The ALJ stated: "It was not used as a pejorative term and was not directed at any individual. It was not used to demean anyone." The CSC quoted that language in its decision and stated it agreed "with the ALJ's assessment." However, whether Williams intended to offend Pryor or any other officer is of no import. The CSC found Williams violated RPD's regulations against the use of derogatory language and sustained the charge of conduct unbecoming a public employee. Therefore, the CSC had to determine in its de novo review, under those circumstances, what the appropriate penalty was. Williams's intent in using the derogatory language played no part in that analysis. B. We turn then to the imposed penalty. We give substantial deference to an agency's imposition of a disciplinary sanction, based on its "expertise and A-3750-24 12 superior knowledge of a particular field." In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. at 28 . "In light of the deference owed to such determinations, when reviewing administrative sanctions, 'the test . . . is "whether such punishment is so disproportionate to the offense, in light of all the circumstances, as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness."'" Id. at 28-29 (alteration in original) (quoting In re Polk, 90 N.J. 550, 578 (1982)). The CSC indicated its intent to impose a "weighty penalty" that would "impress upon [Williams] the gravity of his actions as well as serve a clear warning" regarding the possibility of more severe disciplinary action for any "further inappropriate conduct." The CSC concluded the penalty that would fulfill this intent was a thirty-day suspension. Here, the highest-ranking officer—Police Chief Williams—has used a derogatory slur on at least two occasions in the presence of other officers, one of whom is gay, without expressing any remorse for or understanding of the gravity of the misconduct. The CSC acknowledged our entrenched legal concepts that Williams was held to the highest standard as the Chief of Police. And that "some disciplinary infractions are so serious that removal is appropriate notwithstanding a largely unblemished prior record," citing to In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 484 (2007). The CSC also found "it was inappropriate for A-3750-24 13 the Chief of Police to use any offensive language, particularly while on duty and in police headquarters." Our Supreme Court has held progressive discipline is not a necessary consideration when the "misconduct is severe, when it is unbecoming to the employee's position or renders the employee unsuitable for continuation in the position, or when application of the principle would be contrary to the public interest." In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. at 33 . Some infractions are so serious that removal is appropriate despite an untarnished record. See Carter, 191 N.J. at 484 . The CSC stated the language used by Williams was "abhorrent" but not sufficiently egregious to warrant removal. We cannot discern the difference between abhorrent language and egregious misconduct to support the CSC's rejection of the Borough's penalty of termination other than it acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. We are not channeled by what another agency or court might have done but are instead directed by the CSC's findings and language and intent of its decision. In his actions, Williams discredited himself and the Borough and negatively impacted the public's respect and confidence in RPD. The reinstatement of Williams to his leadership position is contrary to the Borough's A-3750-24 14 and RPD's interest in maintaining safety, discipline, order and morale within RPD and in retaining the public's trust and confidence. Under all the circumstances, described by the CSC as "abhorrent" behavior, we are shocked by the imposition of a thirty-day suspension. As our Supreme Court stated in Matter of Hendrickson, 235 N.J. 145, 159 (2018), we are compelled to intervene due to the "patently unreasonable sanction" imposed by the CSC. We vacate the imposed penalty and reinstate Williams's removal. A-3750-24 15