Sheyla M. Ojeda v. Board of Review, Etc.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3717-24 SHEYLA M. OJEDA, Appellant, v. BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT and PLAINFIELD BOARD OF EDUCATION, Respondents. ___________________________ Submitted September 29, 2026 – Decided October 9, 2026 Before Judges Gilson and Gummer. On appeal from the Board of Review, Division of Unemployment Insurance, Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Docket No. 353132. Sheyla M. Ojeda, self-represented appellant. Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review (Deborah E. Wassel, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Sadia Ahsanuddin, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). PER CURIAM Claimant Sheyla M. Ojeda appeals from a final agency decision of the Board of Review (Board), affirming a decision of the Appeal Tribunal (Tribunal) disqualifying her from receiving unemployment benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). The Board and Tribunal concluded claimant had voluntarily left work without good cause attributable to the work. Having considered the evidence presented, the parties' arguments, and the applicable legal principles, we affirm. I. Claimant began working for the Plainfield Board of Education (BOE) as a "teacher assistant" at Plainfield High School on December 16, 2020. She worked under contract as a ten-month employee, meaning she worked ten months during the school year. The BOE expected claimant to report to school for the 2023-2024 school year on September 1, 2023. Claimant did not return to work and did not provide the BOE with notice of or an explanation for her failure to appear. Consequently, the BOE understood claimant had abandoned her employment as of September 1, 2023. Claimant filed a claim for unemployment benefits on September 17, 2023. Neither party included a copy of her claim in their appendices. In an October A-3717-24 2 31, 2023 Notice of Determination, a deputy for the director of Unemployment Insurance determined claimant was eligible for unemployment benefits from September 21, 2023, stating: You left your job because you were unable to work the new hours assigned to you by your employer. Your new hours of work represented a substantial change from your previous schedule and were not covered under the existing employment agreement. The change in hours constitutes an offer of new work. The new hours were not compatible with your work history and would create a personal hardship for you. Therefore, the work is considered unsuitable for you. You are eligible for benefits. The BOE administratively appealed that determination to the Board. On June 24, 2024, the Tribunal mailed a notice scheduling a hearing to take place by telephone on July 9, 2024, and asking the parties to register for the hearing and confirm their attendance. Claimant did not register for the hearing or confirm her attendance, and she ultimately failed to appear. Divina Valentin, who worked for the BOE as a human resources data specialist, appeared at the hearing on the BOE's behalf. She testified about claimant's employment history with the BOE, stating claimant had worked Monday through Friday from 7:50 a.m. to 3:30 p.m., consistent with the high school's schedule. She characterized as "inaccurate" the statements claimant had made in her claim form about her hours and the A-3717-24 3 deputy's conclusion that claimant's hours had changed. According to Valentin, the BOE automatically renewed the employment of employees who were not fired or otherwise notified at the end of a school year and expected them to return in September for the new school year. Valentin testified claimant was aware she was expected to return on September 1, 2023, but neither returned nor contacted the BOE to explain her absence. According to Valentin, had claimant returned that day, the BOE "[a]bsolutely" would have had work for her. Valentin testified claimant had abandoned her job as of September 1, 2023. In a July 9, 2024 decision, the Tribunal reversed the deputy's determination. The Tribunal found that claimant's schedule had not changed and she had failed to return for the 2023-2024 school year. The Tribunal concluded claimant had "not provide[d] the employer with an explanation for failing to return to work" and had submitted "no evidence to indicate that [she] had good cause for leaving attributable to the work." Accordingly, the Tribunal found she had "left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work" and deemed her disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). Claimant appealed that decision to the Board. Claimant did not include in her appendix her submission to the Board. The Board found "no valid ground A-3717-24 4 for a further hearing" because the Tribunal had given claimant an "opportunity to participate in" its hearing and she had not presented "good cause for failing to register or request an adjournment." The Board affirmed the Tribunal's decision that claimant was "disqualified for benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a)" because she had "left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work." The Board modified the decision on other unrelated grounds concerning benefit charges to the BOE's experience rating account for unemployment benefits. This appeal followed. II. "[A]n 'agency's determination . . . will be sustained unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record.'" Friends of Team Charter Schs., Inc. v. Bd. of Educ. of Newark, 483 N.J. Super. 495 , 504 (App. Div. 2026) (quoting Saccone v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 219 N.J. 369, 380 (2014)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "The burden to make that showing 'rests upon the [party] challenging the administrative action.'" In re Protest Filed by El Sol Contracting & Constr. Corp., 260 N.J. 362 , 373 (2025) (alteration in original) (quoting Lavezzi v. State, 219 N.J. 163, 171 (2014)). Mere disagreement with an agency's A-3717-24 5 determination "does not make it arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable." In re Att'y Gen. Law Enf't Directive Nos. 2020-5 & 2020-6, 246 N.J. 462 , 495 (2021). In determining whether an agency's decision was arbitrary or capricious, we consider: (1) whether the agency's action violates express or implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency follow the law; (2) whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its action; and (3) whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors. [Lavezzi, 219 N.J. at 171 (quoting In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011)).] We review "an agency's interpretation of a statute or case law" de novo. H.F. v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 483 N.J. Super. 166 , 178, (App. Div. 2026) (quoting Russo v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011)). N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) disqualifies an individual from receiving unemployment benefits "[f]or the week in which the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work, and for each week thereafter until the individual becomes reemployed and works eight weeks in employment . . . ." "Good cause attributable to such work" is defined as "a A-3717-24 6 reason related directly to the individual's employment, which was so compelling as to give the individual no choice but to leave the employment." N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(b). An employee has left work "voluntarily" within the meaning of the statute "only if 'the decision whether to go or to stay lay at the time with the worker alone.'" Lord v. Bd. of Rev., 425 N.J. Super. 187, 191 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting Campbell Soup Co. v. Bd. of Rev., 13 N.J. 431, 435 (1953)). Accordingly, an employee who quits a job without a sufficient work-related reason is disqualified from receiving benefits. Self v. Bd. of Rev., 91 N.J. 453, 457 (1982); see also Cottman v. Bd. of Rev., 454 N.J. Super. 166, 169-70 (App. Div. 2018) (finding that "[w]ith few exceptions, leaving work for personal reasons unrelated to the work, no matter how reasonable, disqualifies an employee from receiving unemployment benefits."). "Claimants bear the burden of proof to establish their right to unemployment benefits." Brady v. Bd. of Rev., 152 N.J. 197, 218 (1997). In order to receive benefits, an employee who left work voluntarily must demonstrate he or she "did so with good cause attributable to work." Ibid. We agree with the Board's and Tribunal's conclusion that claimant failed to meet that burden. A-3717-24 7 On appeal, claimant contends she resigned because the BOE changed her hours. Thus, according to claimant, her resignation was not voluntary and she resigned for good cause attributable to work. In support of that argument, she states in her merits brief that the BOE changed her hours, which had been 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m., to 7:50 a.m. to 2:00 p.m., a schedule she was unable to accommodate due to her child-care responsibilities. She included in her appellate appendix a document she describes as "Resignation Email (Screenshot)," which is neither signed nor addressed to anyone; the screenshot appears to be dated September 6, 2023. In that document, claimant referenced a change in her hours to "8-2" but asserted she was resigning "due to a hostile work environment."1 She did not assert in that document that her child-care obligations prevented her from working the purported new schedule. Nothing in the record indicates claimant submitted that document to either the Tribunal or the Board or otherwise provided evidence regarding the purported change in schedule or her inability to work those hours. "[O]ur appellate courts will decline to consider questions or issues not properly 1 On appeal, claimant cites the purported change of hours as the sole reason for her resignation and does not assert she resigned due to a hostile-work environment. Accordingly, we deem that issue waived. See Morris v. T.D. Bank, 454 N.J. Super. 203 , 206 n.2 (App. Div. 2018) ("An issue not briefed is deemed waived on appeal."). A-3717-24 8 presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is available." J.K. v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 247 N.J. 120 , 138 n.6 (2021) (quoting State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 20 (2009)). Had claimant submitted evidence of a change of hours during the hearing, the Tribunal could have considered her claim under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(c)(2), which provides that unemployment benefits "shall not be denied . . . to any otherwise eligible individual for refusing to accept new work . . . [with] hours . . . substantially less favorable to the individual than those prevailing for similar work in the locality." But see N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(e) (stating "separation from employment" due to "[c]are of children or other relatives" constitutes "a voluntary leaving work issue"). She did not testify, present evidence, or otherwise participate in the hearing despite her opportunity to do so and, consequently, did not establish the applicability of N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(c)(2). Claimant does not dispute she received notice of the hearing. She contends in her merits brief that she missed the hearing "due to confusion about the instructions contained in the mailed notice." Claimant does not identify what about the instructions was confusing, and we perceive no basis for confusion. The Board's determination that a further hearing was unwarranted because A-3717-24 9 claimant had not presented "good cause for failing to register or request an adjournment" was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Because claimant did not submit any evidence at the hearing, her assertion that she resigned due to a change in schedule was wholly unsupported in the record. The Tribunal's finding that claimant's schedule had not changed was supported by Valentin's testimony, which was undisputed at the hearing. Thus, the Board's decision to affirm the Tribunal's determination that claimant was "disqualified for benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a)" because she had "left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work" was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Affirmed. A-3717-24 10