State of New Jersey v. Roderick Edwards

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3615-24 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. RODERICK EDWARDS, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________ Argued September 24, 2026 – Decided October 8, 2026 Before Judges Mawla and Chase. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County, Indictment No. 22-10-1282. Alyssa Aiello, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney; Alyssa Aiello, of counsel and on the briefs). Thomas R. Clark, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney; Thomas R. Clark, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM After the trial court denied defendant Roderick Edwards' motion to suppress and his motion for reconsideration, defendant pleaded guilty to second - degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1). The court sentenced him to five years' imprisonment, with one year of parole ineligibility under the Graves Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6. Defendant appeals from the orders denying suppression and reconsideration. He raises the following points: POINT I [DEFENDANT] WAS "SEIZED" WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT WHEN HE WAS "ESCORTED" OUT OF HIS HOME, "SANDWICHED" BETWEEN TWO UNIFORMED POLICE OFFICERS. BECAUSE A POLICE OFFICER HAS NO LEGAL AUTHORITY TO REMOVE FROM THEIR HOME A PERSON BELIEVED TO BE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF DRUGS, BUT WHO IS OTHERWISE FUNCTIONING AND PEACEFUL, THE SEIZURE OF [DEFENDANTS'] PERSON WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. POINT II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING RECONSIDERATION OF ITS SUPPRESSION RULING BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT SUFFICIENT, CREDIBLE EVIDENCE TO REBUT THE PRESUMPTION THAT EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE WAS DESTROYED. BECAUSE THE PRESUMPTION, IF PROPERLY A-3615-24 2 APPLIED, FATALLY CUTS AGAINST THE STATE'S CLAIM THAT THE GUN DROPPED FROM [DEFENDANTS'] PERSON AS HE VOLUNTARILY LEFT THE APARTMENT, THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER DENYING SUPPRESSION MUST BE REVERSED. Having reviewed the record and the parties' arguments, we affirm. I. We derive the following facts from the evidentiary hearing on defendant's suppression motion and the later reconsideration hearing. The State presented Jersey City Police Officers Hipolito Aldea, Jr. and Bernard Chester as witnesses. No one testified on behalf of defendant. On November 24, 2021, Officers Aldea and Chester were on routine patrol in Jersey City's South District. Both wore body-worn cameras (BWCs). Near the end of their shift, at about 10:46 p.m., Officer Aldea received a call on his personal phone asking for help. The caller, a friend of Officer Aldea's mother, asked the officers to come to her apartment because she believed her adult son was under the influence and needed assistance. When the officers arrived, defendant's mother answered the door. Officer Aldea described her as elderly, wheelchair-bound, and using an oxygen tank. She appeared to be crying and invited the officers inside. A-3615-24 3 The officers found defendant in the kitchen making dinner. Officer Aldea testified defendant appeared to be under the influence because he moved very slowly, did not answer Officer Aldea's questions, and smelled of phencyclidine (PCP), which Officer Aldea described as smelling "like a Sharpie marker." Officer Chester testified defendant slurred his words and "growl[ed]" in response to Officer Aldea's conversational questions. Officer Aldea told defendant the officers wanted to get him help and they had called an ambulance. Defendant then walked with the officers out of the apartment toward the elevator so they could take him down to the ambulance. As officers approached the elevator, defendant dropped a water bottle. When he bent down to pick it up, a gun fell to the floor. Officers Aldea's and Chester's testimony differed slightly about what happened next. Officer Chester testified neither defendant nor Officer Aldea initially noticed the gun because Officer Aldea was focused on calling dispatch. Officer Chester said he saw the gun, picked it up from behind defendant, alerted Officer Aldea, and placed the gun farther down the hallway so defendant could not reach it before defendant noticed it had fallen. Officer Aldea testified both he and Officer Chester saw the gun slide from defendant's jacket as he bent over. A-3615-24 4 Both officers testified they then arrested defendant, handcuffed him, and searched him incident to arrest. They recovered a purple taser and four glass vials containing what they believed to be PCP from his pockets. The officers then escorted defendant to the ambulance, and Officer Aldea rode with him to the hospital. The officers testified their BWCs were activated throughout the incident. At the end of his shift, Officer Chester placed his BWC in a drop-off box with the district desk assistant. Officer Chester admitted he failed to tag his footage. He explained the BWC policy was new, and many other officers had developed a bad habit of not tagging recordings. Officer Aldea also forgot to tag his footage, so it was not saved. Defendant was subsequently indicted by a Hudson County Grand Jury with: second-degree unlawful possession of a firearm without a permit, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1); third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1); fourth-degree possession of a weapon by certain persons not to have weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(a); fourth-degree possession of a stun gun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(h); and first-degree possession of a firearm by certain persons not to have weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(j). A-3615-24 5 Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized without a warrant. See R. 3:5-7. After hearing testimony on two dates, the trial court denied the motion on June 14, 2024, and issued a written opinion. The court found both officers credible and concluded: (1) defendant's mother validly consented to the officers' entry into the apartment; (2) the officers lawfully seized the handgun under the plain-view exception; and (3) the officers lawfully seized the taser and PCP under the search-incident-to-arrest exception. The court also recognized defendant would be entitled to a rebuttable presumption arising from the lost BWC footage at trial. Defendant then moved for reconsideration, arguing the rebuttable presumption also applied at the suppression hearing. On August 28, 2024, the court agreed the presumption applied at the suppression stage, but it found the State had rebutted any negative inference arising from the missing footage. The court also found the officers had responded to help defendant because of his apparent intoxication, not to search for a weapon. Therefore, the court refused to change its decision denying the motion to suppress. II. Our review of a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress evidence is circumscribed. See State v. Fenimore, 261 N.J. 364 , 372-73 (2025); State v. A-3615-24 6 Amang, 481 N.J. Super. 355 , 374 (App. Div. 2025) (quoting State v. Nyema, 249 N.J. 509 , 526 (2022)) ("The 'standard of review on a motion to suppress is deferential.'"). In general, appellate courts must "'uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.''" Nyema, 249 N.J. at 526 (quoting State v. Ahmad, 246 N.J. 592 , 609 (2021) (internal quotation marks omitted)). "[F]indings should be disturbed only if they are so clearly mistaken 'that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction.'" State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964)). After a testimonial hearing, we "defer to the trial court's factual findings because the trial court has the 'opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the 'feel' of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy.'" State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 374 (2017) (quoting Elders, 192 N.J. at 244 ); see also State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999) (recognizing deference is afforded because a court's "credibility findings are often influenced by matters such as observations of the character and demeanor of witnesses and common human experience that are not transmitted by the record") (citations omitted). Therefore, we "must defer to the factual findings of the trial court on a motion to suppress so long as its findings are supported by sufficient credible A-3615-24 7 evidence in the record[.]" State v. Erazo, 254 N.J. 277 , 297 (2023) (citing State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 262 (2015)). "A trial court's legal conclusions, 'however, and the consequences that flow from established facts,' are reviewed de novo." State v. Bullock, 253 N.J. 512 , 532 (2023) (quoting Hubbard, 222 N.J. at 263 ). A. Defendant argues the officers unlawfully seized him when they escorted him from his mother's apartment to the ambulance. He contends he did not need emergency aid and posed no imminent danger to himself or others, and so the officers should have left rather than guide him from the apartment. We are not persuaded. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution guarantee the right to be free from unreasonable searches by requiring warrants issued upon probable cause. Nyema, 249 N.J. at 527. Under both constitutions, "searches and seizures conducted without warrants issued upon probable cause are presumptively unreasonable and therefore invalid." State v. Goldsmith, 251 N.J. 384 , 398 (2022) (quoting Elders, 192 N.J. at 246 ). To overcome this presumption, "the State must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the search falls within A-3615-24 8 one of the well-recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement." State v. Smart, 253 N.J. 156 , 165 (2023) (citing State v. Manning, 240 N.J. 308 , 329 (2020)). But "[n]ot all police-citizen encounters constitute searches or seizures for purposes of the warrant requirement." State v. Rosario, 229 N.J. 263, 271 (2017) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Rodriguez, 172 N.J. 117, 125 (2002)). A field inquiry, for example, is "essentially a voluntary encounter," in which an individual is not compelled to answer, or even listen to, police questions. Ibid. Such encounters need not be proceeded by any "particular suspicion of criminal activity," but are valid only if the defendant, "under all of the attendant circumstances, reasonably believed he could walk away without answering." Id. at 272 (first citing Elders, 192 N.J. at 246 ; and then quoting State v. Maryland, 167 N.J. 471, 483 (2001)). Unlike a field inquiry, an investigative detention occurs "when 'an objectively reasonable person' would feel 'that [their] right to move has been restricted.'" Ibid. (quoting Rodriguez, 172 N.J. at 126 ); see also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (finding that a person is under investigatory detention when, "in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to A-3615-24 9 leave"). "Because an investigative detention is a temporary seizure that restricts a person's movement, it must be based on an officer's 'reasonable and particularized suspicion . . . that an individual has just engaged in, or was about to engage in, criminal activity.'" Rosario, 229 N.J. at 272 (quoting State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 356 (2002)). Our Court has found a person feels as though their right to move has been constricted where officers utilize some degree of coercion or assert authority. See State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 498 (1986) (finding an investigative detention where an officer compelled cooperation by blocking an individual's path with a patrol car); and Rosario, 229 N.J. at 273 (finding an investigative detention where a person sitting in a parked car outside of her home "suddenly finds herself blocked in by a [marked] patrol car that shines a flood light into the vehicle" and an officer exits and walks directly toward her); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (finding a detention where an officer's displaying a firearm could be interpreted as signaling an intent to detain or compel cooperation). "An arrest—the most significant type of seizure by police—requires probable cause and generally is supported by an arrest warrant or by demonstration of grounds that would have justified one." Rosario, 229 N.J. at 272 . "For probable cause to arrest, there must be probable cause to believe that A-3615-24 10 a crime has been committed and 'that the person sought to be arrested committed the offense.'" State v. Chippero, 201 N.J. 14, 28 (2009) (quoting Schneider v. Simonini, 163 N.J. 336, 363 (2000)). In all events, reasonableness remains the touchstone. We assess police conduct in light of the circumstances confronting the officers, who often must make quick decisions in fluid situations. State v. Bard, 445 N.J. Super. 145, 157 (App. Div. 2016). We now apply this framework to the present facts with careful attention to the timing and chronology of events. Defendant's initial interaction with the officers resembled a field inquiry, not an unlawful seizure. Under the totality of the circumstances, an objectively reasonable person would not necessarily have felt compelled to go to the ambulance. Officer Chester described Officer Aldea's interaction with defendant as a "calm conversation" in which Officer Aldea "tr[ied] to be endearing" and urged defendant to "at least talk to the people in the ambulance." The record shows no protest by defendant beyond his statement he wanted to finish making his meal. Unlike the cases finding an investigatory detention, this record shows no coercion, physical restraint, show of force, or assertion of authority. See Rosario, 229 N.J. at 272 . The officers persuaded defendant to A-3615-24 11 accept medical attention, and defendant agreed and voluntarily walked with them. The officers then lawfully seized the gun under the plain view exception. "To establish a permissible warrantless search under the plain-view doctrine, the State must prove: (1) 'the officer [was] lawfully . . . in the area where he observed and seized the incriminating item or contraband'; and (2) 'it must be immediately apparent that the seized item is evidence of a crime.'" State v. Johnson, 476 N.J. Super. 1 , 20-21 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 101 (2016)). The second prong is satisfied when "the police 'did not know in advance the location of the evidence and intend to seize it, essentially relying on the plain-view doctrine only as a pretense.'" State v. Lane, 393 N.J. Super. 132, 146-47 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting State v. Johnson, 171 N.J. 192, 211 (2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The rationale of the doctrine is "a police officer lawfully in the viewing area" should not be required to "close his eyes to suspicious evidence in plain view." State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 237 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1030 (1984). The trial court, having specifically found the testimonies of both officers credible, correctly concluded the doctrine applied. First, the officers were lawfully present. Defendant's mother invited them into the apartment, and A-3615-24 12 defendant then voluntarily accompanied them into the hallway so they could go to the ambulance. Second, the gun came into view unexpectedly. Nothing in the record suggests the officers knew beforehand defendant had a gun or they used the plain-view doctrine as a pretext to seize one. On the contrary, the testimony showed the officers were focused on helping defendant obtain medical attention. Officer Chester's testimony underscored how unexpected the discovery was: he said he "kind of had a moment of disbelief" and was "shocked" when he saw the firearm. Once the gun fell to the floor in front of them, the officers were not required to ignore it. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. at 237 . After the gun fell into plain view, the officers had probable cause to arrest defendant and could search him incident to arrest. When an officer effectuates an arrest, they may search the "arrestee's person and the area 'within his immediate control'—construing that phrase to mean the area within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969); see also State v. Eckel, 185 N.J. 523, 535 (2006) ("New Jersey's traditional approach to [a] search incident to arrest [] parallels Chimel."). The officers therefore lawfully recovered the PCP and taser from defendant's pockets during the search incident to arrest. A-3615-24 13 Defendant next argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying reconsideration because the State did not present enough credible evidence to rebut the presumption arising from the destroyed BWC footage. We are not convinced. Reconsideration motions are governed by Rule 4:49-2, which provides "[t]he motion shall state with specificity the basis on which it is made, including a statement of the matters or controlling decisions that counsel believes the court has overlooked or as to which it has erred[.]" Such motions are "within the sound discretion of the [c]ourt, to be exercised in the interest of justice." Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 384 (App. Div. 1996) (citing D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990)). The motion will be granted only if the court is satisfied the judgment was based upon plainly incorrect reasoning, the court failed to consider material evidence, or the court should consider new information under the circumstances. See Town of Phillipsburg v. Block 1508, Lot 12, 380 N.J. Super. 159, 175 (App. Div. 2005); Cummings, 295 N.J. Super. at 384-85 . The trial court correctly recognized the rebuttable presumption in N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.5(q) applied at the suppression stage. Under N.J.S.A. 40A:14- 118.3(a), "every uniformed State, county, and municipal patrol law enforcement A-3615-24 14 officer shall wear a [BWC] that electronically records audio and video while acting in the performance of the officer's official duties, except" in certain limited circumstances. N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.5(q)(2) provides, in relevant part: If a law enforcement officer, employee, or agent fails to adhere to the recording or retention requirements contained in this act, or intentionally interferes with a body worn camera's ability to accurately capture audio or video recordings: .... (2) there shall be a rebuttable presumption that exculpatory evidence was destroyed or not captured in favor of a criminal defendant who reasonably asserts that exculpatory evidence was destroyed or not captured[.] In State v. Jones, we rejected a trial judge's determination the rebuttable presumption set forth in N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.5(q) is limited to trials and does not apply to suppression hearings. 475 N.J. Super. 520 , 531-32 (App. Div. 2023). Still, as we later explained in State v. Seligman, "nothing in the text of the statute, or in our interpretation of it in Jones, suggests that a violation of the BWC Directive, now incorporated by reference in N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.5, warrants automatic suppression of evidence otherwise lawfully seized under our State and federal constitutions." 480 N.J. Super. 509 , 523 (App. Div. 2025). "[T]he Legislature clearly knows how to prescribe the suppression remedy for A-3615-24 15 statutory violations, see, e.g., N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-21, but did not do so with respect to BWC violations." Ibid. The officers failed to tag their footage, and therefore the footage was lost triggering the rebuttable presumption. However, the presumption did not compel suppression. The trial court still had to determine whether the State rebutted it, and the court found the State had done so through credible testimony. There is ample evidence in the record to support that finding. The trial court conducted a full evidentiary hearing and found both officers credible. It explained: the testimony of [Officers] Aldea and . . . Chester sufficiently rebuts the presumption that the failure to preserve their BWC footage contained exculpatory material. The [c]ourt further finds that the intentions of the officers in responding to the call were to assist an individual who was reportedly intoxicated. The [c]ourt also finds that the call to EMS was made prior to the gun being recovered, officers detected the smell of PCP on the [d]efendant, and PCP was recovered on the [d]efendant's person, all lending credibility to the fact that the officers were trying to offer assistance as opposed to recovering or searching for any weapon. The [c]ourt consistently heard from both officers that the BWC protocol was relatively new at the time of this incident, and while both officers did not fully comply with the established procedures, their explanations were found to be truthful and credible. Therefore, this [c]ourt finds that while the [d]efendant correctly argues that the rebuttable presumption applies to the A-3615-24 16 suppression motion itself pursuant to . . . Jones, and having applied the presumption to the suppression application in this case, the presumption has been successfully rebutted in this case by the officers' credible testimony. Defendant correctly notes the officers' accounts differed slightly in describing the moments immediately after the gun fell. However, those minor inconsistencies do not undermine the trial court's ruling. On the dispositive points, the testimony aligned: defendant's mother invited the officers into the apartment, defendant voluntarily accompanied them toward the ambulance, and the gun fell into plain view. These facts taken together support the court's legal conclusions. In short, we have no basis upon which to substitute our judgment for the trial court's credibility determination, which was not "so clearly mistaken 'that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction.'" Goldsmith, 251 N.J. at 398 (quoting Elders, 192 N.J. at 244 ). Affirmed. A-3615-24 17