Tasha L. Vaughn v. Carl Rowe

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1491-25 TASHA L. VAUGHN, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. CARL ROWE, Defendant-Respondent. _________________________ ATLANTIC COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, Appellant. _________________________ Submitted September 29, 2026 – Decided October 8, 2026 Before Judges Gummer and Paganelli. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Atlantic County, Docket No. FD-01-0412-05. Atlantic County Counsel, attorneys for appellant (John M. Eccles, Jr., Assistant County Counsel, on the brief). Respondents have not filed a brief. PER CURIAM In this Family Part matter, Atlantic County Department of Family and Community Development (the Department) appeals from an order discharging all child-support arrears owed by defendant Carl Rowe. Because that relief is contrary to applicable statutory law, we reverse the order and remand the case, directing the trial court to issue an order reinstating the arrears. I. This case involves defendant's latest effort to modify his child-support obligation. He and plaintiff Tasha L. Vaughn have a child who was born in 2004. Plaintiff applied for and received Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) benefits through the Work First New Jersey Program (WFNJP). "The signing of an application for benefits under the [WFNJP] . . . constitute[s] an assignment of any child support rights pursuant to [ 42 U.S.C.A. § 651 -669b] . . . to the county agency," N.J.S.A. 44:10-49(a), meaning "the county agency that was administering the aid to families with dependent children . . . [and] the [WFNJP] in that county," N.J.S.A. 44:10-44. Thus, by applying for TANF benefits, plaintiff assigned her child-support rights to the applicable county agency. The Department is the agency responsible for A-1491-25 2 administering WFNJP in Atlantic County and, thus, is the assignee of her child- support rights. See County Social Service Agencies, Div. of Fam. Dev., Dep't of Hum. Servs., https://www.nj.gov/humanservices/dfd/ counties/ (last visited Sep. 29, 2026). In 2012, defendant moved to reduce his $64 weekly child-support obligation. According to defendant, he was beginning a new job after having been incarcerated for seven years. The court denied the motion in a July 10, 2012 order. At that time, defendant owed $21,365 in child-support arrears. Less than a year later, defendant again moved to modify his child-support obligation. In a February 26, 2013 order, the court increased defendant's weekly child- support obligation and required defendant to pay $5 weekly towards his arrears. He moved again for modification in 2014. In an October 31, 2014 order, the court reduced his weekly child-support payment but increased to $20 his weekly payment towards his arrears. The court denied defendant's 2015 motion to reduce his child-support obligation in a June 11, 2015 order. In a September 20, 2016 order, the court awarded the parties joint custody of their child and designated defendant as the parent of primary residence. Less than two months later, defendant moved to "terminate" his arrears. In a December 1, 2016 order, the court denied the motion, finding "no basis" to A-1491-25 3 discharge the arrears. The court acknowledged the arrears had accumulated while defendant was incarcerated and that the case was "an arrears only matter as [defendant then] ha[d] custody of [the] child as of Aug[ust] 2016." (Capitalization modified). On the same day, defendant again moved to terminate his arrears. In a December 20, 2016 order, the court reduced to $10 his weekly arrears payment. His arrears at that time totaled $18,959.62. Nothing in the record indicates defendant appealed any of those orders to this court. Nearly nine years later, defendant moved to reduce his arrears. He contended that he had been "charged an amount impossible to pay while in prison." He asked the court to "adjust [his seven] years of prison with the $100 per month [he] was making in prison," and he offered to "pay anything that is left over after the right numbers are presented." He asserted he had "raised [the child] from [the sixth] grade basically by [him]self because her mother wasn't using her weekends" and had taken "out a loan for [the child's] college that was part of the child[-]support agreement." The court heard argument on the motion on December 4, 2025. The Department's counsel appeared in opposition to the motion. At that time, defendant owed $13,152.43 in arrears. After hearing argument, the court entered an order and placed a decision on the record completely discharging the arrears A-1491-25 4 and directing the Probation Child Support Enforcement Unit to "terminate . . . [its] monitoring, enforcement, collection and location services" and to "close the case." In its oral decision, the court cited its status as "a court of equity" and determined defendant was entitled to a full discharge of his arrears due to his efforts during and after incarceration, his subsequent care and support of the child, his financial assistance to plaintiff, and his current inability to work full- time. This appeal followed. II. "When reviewing decisions granting or denying applications to modify child support, we examine whether, given the facts, the trial judge abused his or her discretion." J.B. v. W.B., 215 N.J. 305, 325-26 (2013) (quoting Jacoby v. Jacoby, 427 N.J. Super. 109, 116 (App. Div. 2012)). We reverse a trial court's child-support decision if "it is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary, or clearly contrary to reason or to other evidence, or the result of whim or caprice." Id. at 326 (quoting Jacoby, 427 N.J. Super. at 116 ). We also reverse if the court "failed to consider all of the controlling legal principles" or issued a decision that was "unjustly distorted by a misconception of law." M.G. v. S.M., 457 N.J. Super. 286, 294 (App. Div. 2018) (first quoting Gonzalez-Posse v. Ricciardulli, 410 A-1491-25 5 N.J. Super. 340 , 354 (App. Div. 2009); and then quoting Perkins v. Perkins, 159 N.J. Super. 243, 247 (App. Div. 1978)); see also Pine Ridge Realty Assocs., LLC v. A.O., 483 N.J. Super. 487 , 492-93 (App. Div. 2026) ("If the [court] misconceives or misapplies the law, [its] discretion lacks a foundation and becomes an arbitrary act") (alterations in original) (quoting In re T.I.C.-C., 470 N.J. Super. 596 , 606 (App. Div. 2022)). "[W]e owe no deference to a trial court's interpretation of the law, and review issues of law de novo." Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. N.J. Dep't of Env't Prot., 447 N.J. Super. 423, 438 (App. Div. 2016). Because the meaning of a statute is a question of law, we review a court's statutory interpretation de novo. Fuster v. Twp. of Chatham, 259 N.J. 533 , 546 (2025). In performing that review, courts are guided by the well-established principles of statutory construction. In re H.D., 241 N.J. 412 , 418 (2020). When interpreting a statute, courts "determine and give effect to the Legislature's intent." Ibid. (quoting N.J. Dep't of Child. & Fams., Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. A.L., 213 N.J. 1, 20 (2013)). "[S]tatutory construction begins with an examination of the plain language of the statute, 'ascrib[ing] to the . . . words their ordinary meaning and significance.'" State v. Higginbotham, 257 N.J. 260 , 280 (2024) (second alteration and omission in original) (quoting A-1491-25 6 DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)). "We 'may neither rewrite a plainly-written enactment of the Legislature nor presume that the Legislature intended something other than that expressed by way of the plain language.'" Ibid. (quoting O'Connell v. State, 171 N.J. 484, 488 (2002)). "[W]e 'strive for an interpretation that gives effect to all of the statutory provisions and does not render any language inoperative, superfluous, void or insignificant.'" Fuster, 259 N.J. at 547 (quoting G.S. v. Dep't of Hum. Servs., 157 N.J. 161, 172 (1999)). The legislative intent behind N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.23 is clear from the statute's plain language. N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.23(a) provides: No payment or installment of an order for child support . . . shall be retroactively modified by the court except with respect to the period during which there is a pending application for modification, but only from the date the notice of motion was mailed either directly or through the appropriate agent. [(Emphasis added).] Based on that clear statutory language, a court cannot discharge child-support arrears because doing so would constitute an improper retroactive modification of a prior child-support order, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.23. Given that unambiguous language, we do not need to consider the legislative history behind the statute, but that, too, supports the conclusion that courts cannot retroactively modify child-support orders by discharging arrears. A-1491-25 7 "Prior to the enactment of this statute, modification or extinguishment of child support arrears was addressed to the sound discretion of the court." Mallamo v. Mallamo, 280 N.J. Super. 8, 13 (App. Div. 1995). With the enactment of N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.23, "the Legislature . . . imposed certain restraints on the exercise of that discretion." Ibid. The Legislature did so "to comply with federal legislation," Mahoney v. Pennell, 285 N.J. Super. 638, 642 (App. Div. 1995), and "to insure that on-going support obligations that became due were paid," id. at 643 . [T]he Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, P.L. 99-509, 100 Stat. 1984 to 2078, codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 666 (a)(9)(C)[,] . . . provides that, as a condition of receiving federal funding for collection of child support arrearages, states must conform with various federal standards governing child support. Those requirements include that child support obligations may not be subject to retroactive modification on and after the date that they are due. [Id. at 642 (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 666 (a)(9)(C)).] "A change of circumstances, such as loss of a job, could, therefore, not be used as a basis to modify retroactively arrearages which already accrued under a child support order." Id. at 643 ; see also Ohlhoff v. Ohlhoff, 246 N.J. Super. 1, 8 (App. Div. 1991) (finding courts may not retroactively reduce or eliminate child A-1491-25 8 support payments based on changes in the custodial relationship that predate the modification request). Courts have recognized, however, that "[i]mplicit . . . in the judicial obligation to enforce the terms of a child support order is the underlying premise that a duty to support exists. Where there is no longer a duty of support by virtue of a judicial declaration of emancipation, no child support can become due." Mahoney, 285 N.J. Super. at 643 . Thus, a court may discharge child-support arrears incurred after a child's death or emancipation. Ibid.; see also Centanni v. Centanni, 408 N.J. Super. 78, 82 (Ch. Div. 2008) (finding N.J.S.A. 2A:17- 56.23(a) does not prohibit retroactive modification of child support to the date of a child's death). Those circumstances do not apply here. The trial court discharged child- support arrears defendant had incurred before he moved for modification, invoking its authority as a "court of equity." But a court's equitable authority is not boundless. "[I]n all cases, equity follows the law." W. Pleasant-CPGT, Inc. v. U.S. Home Corp., 243 N.J. 92 , 108 (2020) (quoting Berg v. Christie, 225 N.J. 245, 280 (2016)). "[E]quity follows the law" is an "equitable maxim . . . which instructs that as a rule a court of equity will follow the legislative and common - law regulation of rights[.]" Dunkin' Donuts of Am., Inc. v. Middletown Donut A-1491-25 9 Corp., 100 N.J. 166, 183 (1985); see also Natovitz v. Bay Head Realty Co., 142 N.J. Eq. 456, 463 (E. & A. 1948) (finding "[e]quity may not indulge in arbitrary action. The statute and the contract are binding alike upon courts of law and equity."); Impink ex rel. Baldi v. Reynes, 396 N.J. Super. 553, 561 (App. Div. 2007) (finding "it is well-established that 'equity follows the law,' particularly where a statute is involved"). Defendant argued before the trial court that the amount of child-support he had been ordered to pay while he was incarcerated over a decade ago was excessive. He had the opportunity, when the court entered the order imposing that child-support obligation, to timely move for reconsideration of the order or to appeal it under the applicable court rules. His latest motion to modify the already-incurred arrears based on his subjective belief about the purportedly excessive amount of child support required by the court all those years ago was without merit and legally unsupportable. Under N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.23, the court had neither the discretion nor the authority to discharge defendant's previously-incurred child-support arrears. Accordingly, we reverse the December 4, 2025 order and remand the case, with instructions the trial court issue an order reinstating the arrears and directing the A-1491-25 10 Probation Child Support Enforcement Unit to reopen the case and reinstate its "monitoring, enforcement, collection and location services." Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. A-1491-25 11