Justin Zimmerman, Etc. v. Margot Brown

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1854-24 JUSTIN ZIMMERMAN, COMMISSIONER, NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND INSURANCE Petitioner-Respondent, v. MARGOT BROWN, Respondent-Appellant. Argued September 22, 2026 – Decided October 13, 2026 Before Judges Gooden Brown and Vanek. On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance. Marshall D. Bilder argued the cause for appellant (Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott, LLC, attorneys; Marshall D. Bilder and Jason S. Feinstein, of counsel and on the briefs; Anthony P. D'Elia, on the briefs). Nicholas Kant, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney; Christopher Weber, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Nicholas Kant, on the brief). PER CURIAM Respondent Margot Brown appeals from a February 24, 2022 final decision of the Commissioner of the Department of Banking and Insurance (DOBI), revoking her insurance producer license and imposing monetary penalties for violations of the New Jersey Insurance Producer Licensing Act of 2001 (Producer Act), N.J.S.A. 17:22A-26 to -57, and the New Jersey Insurance Fraud Prevention Act (Fraud Act), N.J.S.A. 17:33A-1 to -30. Because the Commissioner's decision was supported by substantial credible evidence, we affirm. I. We recount the salient factual and procedural chronology from the record. Brown has been a licensed insurance producer since October 13, 1988. According to Brown, insurance producers fill out insurance applications for their clients, consult clients on insurance issues, and transmit client information to insurance carriers. From 1996 to 2016, Brown was insured under a Farmers' Insurance Company of Flemington homeowner's policy (the Farmers' policy). The Farmers' policy included a "jewelry rider" (the Farmers' rider), containing a list of additionally A-1854-24 2 covered items. In 2012, Brown asserted she lost a ring covered under the Farmers' rider and was paid approximately $7,500 for the loss. Beginning in 2014, Brown was also insured under a Lexington Insurance Company personal inland marine policy (the Lexington policy), containing a jewelry rider (the Lexington rider) including a ring valued at $47,500. On June 2, 2015, Brown submitted another claim to Farmers for a lost Cartier watch stating, "Watch was in vehicle to be repaired. Noticed that watch was no longer in vehicle. Car has been cleaned by carwash and vehicle was also parked by valet." Several days later, Farmers paid Brown $6,000 for loss of the watch. On May 2, 2016, Brown contacted Lexington and claimed she had lost the ring insured under the Lexington rider, stating she was: "Visiting a college in Providence with her daughter. [Brown]'s fingers were getting swollen and she took her engagement ring off and put it in her pocket. When she got home she could not find it and has been looking for the past three weeks and still has not found it." On May 10, 2016, Lexington sent Brown a notice entitled "NOTICE OF NONRENEWAL OF INSURANCE," because the ring was the only item insured on the Lexington rider and she had reported it lost. On May 18, 2016, Lexington denied Brown's claim for the ring's value because its policy did not "cover losses involving disappearance." Brown asserts she called Lexington to advise she found the ring A-1854-24 3 before she received Lexington's denial letter. Brown never sent Lexington any writing withdrawing her claim for the value of the ring. Over two years later, she sent an email confirming she had located the ring during the Lexington policy period. On May 25, 2016, a Farmers' representative sent Brown an email stating it had received an inquiry from another insurance carrier regarding a different, missing piece of jewelry. Farmers' advised that, based on the circumstances surrounding Farmers' two large claims and the loss reported to Lexington, Farmers would prefer to issue the upcoming renewal without jewelry coverage. Brown replied to Farmers' email the next day, stating she had decided to change her homeowner's policy and jewelry coverage to another carrier. She also asserted in the email the Lexington- insured ring "was recovered soon after its disappearance and that claim was closed with no payment." On June 29, 2016, Brown completed a Preferred Mutual Insurance Company (Preferred) application for homeowner's insurance that required disclosure of: "Any losses, whether or not paid by insurance during the last [three] years at this or any other location." Brown responded "N" and listed no losses on the lines below. Brown also answered "no" as to whether she had any coverage that had been cancelled or non-renewed. On July 1, 2016, Preferred issued a homeowners' policy to Brown predicated on the information she provided in her application. A-1854-24 4 On July 8, 2018, Brown submitted a claim to Preferred, stating she had lost a diamond ring valued at $40,000 that was covered under its policy. On August 9, 2018, Brown advised Preferred in a voicemail the ring was located. The next day, Preferred sent Brown a letter acknowledging receipt of her voicemail and confirming her claim would be closed. A few months later, a Preferred investigator interviewed Brown and asked if her application accurately stated she had no losses in the last three years. Brown admitted she should have revealed the Lexington lost ring claim and stated she "didn't really properly read the question." Brown stated she "didn't know [Preferred] still wanted the claim that was not paid." Brown also asserted during the interview she "didn't remember" the $6,000 claim she filed with Farmers for the lost Cartier watch when she filled out the Preferred insurance application but recognized she "should have read the whole thing and understood it." Based on the results of its investigation, Preferred referred the matter to the DOBI for potential insurance fraud and the DOBI opened its own investigation. On May 13, 2020, the DOBI filed a two-count Order to Show Cause (OTSC) against Brown, alleging she violated the Producer Act at N.J.S.A. 17:22A-40(a)(2), (8), and (16) and the Fraud Act at N.J.S.A. 17:33A-4(a)(4)(b) by providing false information on the Preferred homeowners insurance application in 2016. After Brown denied A-1854-24 5 the allegations and requested a hearing, the DOBI transmitted the matter to the State of New Jersey, Office of Administrative Law (OAL) as a contested case. Brown moved for summary decision, which the DOBI opposed. The DOBI cross-moved for summary decision in its favor. Brown submitted a certification in support of her motion, stating she "realized that [her] 2015 Cartier watch loss required disclosure and [she] should have checked the 'loss' box [']yes['] instead of 'no'" but her representation she had "no" losses was an honest and totally unintentional mistake. She also asserted that she did not consider her "withdrawn" 2016 ring claim to be a "loss" based on her interpretation of the question on the Preferred application. The record before the ALJ included a certification from the Preferred Mutual Underwriting Manager stating that, had Brown disclosed her losses within the last three years, Preferred would not have accepted the risk and would have denied her insurance application. In a December 6, 2021 order, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied Brown's summary decision motion, granted partial summary decision to the DOBI on liability and declined to enter penalties without a hearing. On May 21, 2024, the ALJ conducted a penalty hearing. After the hearing proofs closed, the ALJ considered the factors set forth in Kimmelman v. Henckel & A-1854-24 6 McCoy, 108 N.J. 123 (1987), and found Brown acted in bad faith, possessed the ability to pay the penalty sought, and injured the public by her actions. After weighing those factors against her lack of prior violations, the ALJ fined Brown $5,000 for the Producer Act violations and imposed Fraud Act penalties of $5,000, a $1,000 surcharge, $15,000 in attorneys' fees and $350 for investigative costs. The ALJ also recommended revocation of Brown's insurance producer license under the Producer Act. The ALJ entered an initial decision on November 22, 2024 again confirming the DOBI's summary decision motion had been granted in part, reasoning that "[b]ecause the watch and ring clearly are 'losses' that both occurred within the past three years, there is no genuine dispute of fact regarding whether the watch and more importantly, the ring, constitute losses." The ALJ found Brown violated the Producer Act, specifically N.J.S.A. 17:22A-40(a)(2), (8), and (16), because: Here, the fact that Brown incorrectly checked "No" on an insurance application in response to an objective question about her previous losses is seemingly enough to establish fraud under the Producer Act. Brown attempts to frame her "forgetfulness" regarding the watch as an "isolated mistake" that is insufficient to prove insurance fraud. But it is irrelevant whether Brown intended to deceive Preferred Mutual into thinking she had no prior losses, or whether Brown truly experienced a "momentary and isolated mistake." In her [r]eply brief, Brown admits, in reference to the watch claim, that the "circumstances might be different A-1854-24 7 if Brown had, as the [DOBI] alleges, also failed to disclose a second 'loss' that allegedly occurred in 2016 (the '2016 ring claim')." As discussed above, Brown's ring claim certainly constitutes a second loss that she failed to disclose. Additionally, the ALJ determined Brown's knowingly false and material statement on the Preferred insurance application constituted a violation of the Fraud Act at N.J.S.A. 17:33A-4(a)(4)(b). The ALJ found that, even if Brown carelessly reviewed the questions on the Preferred application, the record established incompetence in violation of N.J.S.A. 17:22A-40(a)(8), applicable to a licensees' personal business as well as their professional conduct. Accordingly, the ALJ found the DOBI had established by the preponderance of the credible evidence that Brown provided an untruthful answer to a question on the Preferred insurance application, which constituted incompetence, a fraudulent act and violated insurance law under N.J.S.A. 17:22A-40(a)(2), (8) and (16). Brown's subsequent reconsideration motion was denied. Both the Commissioner and this court denied Brown's motions for a stay pending appeal. Brown filed exceptions to the ALJ's initial decision. On February 19, 2025, the Commissioner issued a final decision and order adopting the ALJ's initial decision, modifying the monetary penalties in part. The Commissioner found Brown committed the statutory violations the DOBI alleged in both counts of the OTSC and A-1854-24 8 adopted the ALJ's recommendation to revoke Brown's license but reduced the monetary penalties to $2,500 for the Producer Act violation, and $2,500 for the Fraud Act violation, affirming the $1,000 Fraud Act surcharge, $350 in investigation costs, and $15,000 in attorneys' fees consistent with the parties' stipulation as to reasonable costs and attorneys' fees. The Commissioner reviewed the Kimmelman factors to determine the appropriate monetary penalty and found Brown acted in bad faith, could pay the penalty sought, and injured the public through her actions. The Commissioner found the lower monetary penalty was appropriate in light of the absence of other violations during Brown's extensive license history and the short duration of the conduct at issue. The Commissioner set forth the following rationale for revoking Brown's license: I find that revocation of Brown's insurance producer license is warranted. Brown filled out the Application and omitted material information. Brown's excuses that she had forgotten she had made a claim for the Cartier watch and did not believe the Lexington Ring claim was a "loss" do not mitigate against revoking her license. As an insurance producer, Brown is held to a high standard and is expected to present truthful information on applications for insurance. Brown did not meet this standard, and instead obfuscated her history of losses of jewelry. Withholding material information from [Preferred] constituted fraud under the Fraud Act. The public is harmed by insurance fraud. There is a strong public policy in New Jersey to curb and deter insurance A-1854-24 9 fraud to reduce premiums. Selective Ins. Co. of America v. Hudson East Pain Management Osteopathic Medicine and Physical Therapy, 416 N.J. Super. 418, 432 (App. Div. 2010). Revoking Brown's insurance producer license will deter other producers from repeating her conduct. On appeal, Brown argues she acted in good faith when completing her insurance application, maintaining she did not consider the ring she had reported as lost in 2016—but subsequently found and reported as recovered—to be a "loss" at the time she filled out the Preferred application. She further contends her failure to disclose the prior claim for the lost Cartier watch was the result of genuine forgetfulness, not an intent to mislead or deceive the insurer. Brown asserts there is no evidence in the record demonstrating she knowingly provided false information or acted with fraudulent intent. Rather, she claims her responses were based on an honest and reasonable understanding of the term "loss" in the application question. Brown also contends the administrative process was fundamentally unfair because both the ALJ and the Commissioner revoked her license without a hearing and the ALJ's failure to consider her evidence led to an erroneous decision. The DOBI argues both the ALJ and the Commissioner's decisions are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record. We review the parties' arguments, in turn. II. A-1854-24 10 Our review of a final agency decision is limited. See DiBlasi v. Bd. of Trs., 315 N.J. Super. 298, 301 (App. Div. 1998); In re Dennis, 385 N.J. Super. 369, 375 (App. Div. 2006). When an agency's final determination is based on an ALJ's findings of fact and credibility, we will customarily defer to those determinations. See Burlington Bd. of Soc. v. G.W., 425 N.J. Super. 42, 47 (App. Div. 2012). We do not ordinarily "disturb an administrative agency's determinations or findings unless there is a clear showing that (1) the agency did not follow the law; (2) the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; or (3) the decision was not supported by substantial evidence." In re Virtua-West Jersey Hosp. Voorhees for a Certificate of Need, 194 N.J. 413, 422 (2008). An agency decision is arbitrary and capricious if it is unconstitutional, violates legislative policies, is not supported by substantial evidence in the record, or could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors. A.B. v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 407 N.J. Super. 330, 339 (App. Div. 2009). "Substantial credible evidence" is "such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." In re Application of Howard Sav. Inst., 32 N.J. 29, 52 (1960). On matters of fact, the court gives "due regard to A-1854-24 11 the opportunity [of the factfinder] . . . to judge [the witnesses'] credibility." Close v. Kordulak Bros., 44 N.J. 589, 599 (1965). "Administrative disputes may be summarily decided when they do not involve disputed facts." In re Xanadu Project at Meadowlands Complex, 415 N.J. Super. 179 (App. Div. 2010) (citing Contini v. Bd. of Educ. Newark, 286 N.J. Super. 106, 121 (App. Div. 1995)). An evidentiary hearing is mandated under the Administrative Procedure Act, N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -31, only when the proposed administrative action is based on disputed material adjudicatory facts. Rooth v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps' Ret. Sys., 472 N.J. Super. 357 , 368 (App. Div. 2022) (citing In re Farmers' Mut. Fire Assurance Ass'n of N.J., 256 N.J. Super. 607 , 618 (App. Div. 1990)). A determination on a summary decision motion is reviewed substantially the same as review of summary judgment in civil litigation. L.A. v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Trenton, Mercer Cnty., 221 N.J. 192, 203-04 (2015). Under the Rules of Court, summary judgment should be denied only when the opposing party comes forward with evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact. R. 4:46-2; New Jersey Realtors v. Twp. of Berkeley, 479 N.J. Super. 379 , 391 (App. Div. 2024) (citing Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 529 (1995)). A-1854-24 12 "[A]ppellate review of an agency's choice of sanction is limited." Zahl, 186 N.J. at 353. Accordingly, we "alter a sanction imposed by an administrative agency only 'when necessary to bring the agency's action into conformity with its delegated authority. The Court has no power to act independently as an administrative tribunal or to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. '" Herrmann, 192 N.J. at 28 (quoting In re Polk, 90 N.J. 550, 578 (1982)). Because we defer to agency decisions, we consider "whether such punishment is 'so disproportionate to the offense, in light of all the circumstances, as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness.'" Polk, 90 N.J. at 578 (quoting Pell v. Bd. of Educ., Etc., 34 N.Y.2d 222 , 233 (1974)). III. We discern no error in the Commissioner's conclusion Brown violated both the Producer Act and the Fraud Act, as supported by the substantial, credible evidence in the summary disposition record. i. The Producer Act, in relevant part, provides: a. The [C]ommissioner may . . . revoke . . . an insurance producer's license or may levy a civil penalty in accordance with subsection [N.J.S.A. 17:22A-45] of this act or any combination of actions, for any one or more of the following causes: A-1854-24 13 (2) Violating any insurance laws, or violating any regulation, subpoena or order of the commissioner or of another state's insurance regulator; .... (8) Using fraudulent, coercive or dishonest practices, or demonstrating incompetence, untrustworthiness or financial irresponsibility in the conduct of insurance business in this State or elsewhere; .... (16) Committing any fraudulent act; [N.J.S.A. 17:22A-40(a)(2), (8), (16).] Here, the Commissioner determined Brown provided false information on her Preferred application by failing to disclose two prior losses—the $6,000 Cartier watch claim paid in 2015 and her claim for the value of a $47,500 ring in 2016— both submitted within the prior three-year period specified on the application. The Preferred policy application asked whether Brown had "[a]ny losses, whether or not paid by insurance during the last [three] years at this or any other location." The Commissioner determined Brown's omission of the two claims was not a mere technical error or oversight, but rather a violation of the Producer Act, specifically N.J.S.A. 17:22A-40(a)(2), (8), and (16), because she failed to provide accurate information required by both the insurance application and the law. A-1854-24 14 Rejecting Brown's defenses, the Commissioner concluded the Producer Act does not require proof of intent or bad faith to establish a violation. It was sufficient that Brown, as a licensed producer, both answered the Preferred insurance application question incorrectly and failed to disclose material information within her knowledge. We discern no error in the Commissioner's conclusion that, as a matter of prevailing law, the question on the Preferred application was objective and required disclosure of any losses, whether paid by insurance or not. The Commissioner cited several prior decisions from the DOBI to establish the Producer Act "does not require proof of intent[,]" and Brown's incorrect answer to the question about her loss history warranted license revocation. We are unconvinced the Commissioner erred in determining the plain language of the Producer Act does not contain a state of mind requirement. See N.J.S.A. 17:22A-40(a)(2), (8), and (16). While other portions of the Producer Act do include a state of mind element,1 an intent requirement is absent from statutory subsections (2), (8), and (16). Therefore, Brown's unequivocally false statement to Preferred that she had no losses in the prior three years constituted substantial 1 See, e.g., N.J.S.A. 17:22A-40(a)(5), (12), (15), and (17) (prohibiting conduct found to be committed "intentionally" or "knowingly"). A-1854-24 15 credible evidence sufficient to sustain the Commissioner's decision she violated those subsections of the Producer Act. ii. We also discern no error in the Commissioner's determination Brown violated the Fraud Act at N.J.S.A. 17:33A-4(a)(4)(b) by knowingly making a false statement on her insurance application. A person violates the Fraud Act, if she: (4) Prepares or makes any written or oral statement, intended to be presented to any insurance company or producer for the purpose of obtaining: .... (b) an insurance policy, knowing that the statement contains any false or misleading information concerning any fact or thing material to an insurance application or contract[.] [N.J.S.A. 17:33A-4(a)(4)(b).] Based on application of prevailing law, we are unconvinced the Commissioner erred in finding Brown's failure to disclose the two prior claims within the relevant time period constituted a knowing submission of false information, as both events were within her knowledge and material to Preferred's risk assessment. Because New Jersey courts have addressed similar issues in the context of New Jersey's statutory authority, we need not look to the decisional law outside our jurisdiction cited by Brown. A-1854-24 16 We are unconvinced the Commissioner erred in relying on Open MRI of Morris & Essex. L.P. v. Frieri, 405 NJ. Super. 576, 583 (App. Div. 2009), to find proof of intent to deceive is not required to establish a violation of the Fraud Act and it is sufficient the false information was within the applicant's knowledge and was material. See also State v. Nasir, 355 N.J. Super. 96, 106 (App. Div. 2002) ("It is irrelevant whether defendant had the intent to deceive . . . ."). In Open MRI, we found the State was entitled to summary judgment on liability where the principal defendant had violated the Fraud Act by knowingly operating an MRI facility without a license, having been previously told on two occasions that the facility required such a license before commencing operations. Id. at 584-85. Similarly, in Nasir, we concluded a policyholder was found liable under the Fraud Act for knowingly providing false statements on an application for disability benefits and a subsequent claim form where they falsely answered "no" to the questions "(1) '[h]ave you had any physical, mental or emotional condition, injury, or sickness in the past 5 years?,' and (2) '[h]ave you consulted or been attended by a physician or practitioner for any cause during the past 5 years?'" Id. at 106. Where defendant had consulted with a physician two weeks prior to his submission of the application, we held those circumstances supported the finding of a "knowing" misstatement to the insurer. Id. at 106. A-1854-24 17 Likewise, in Ledley v. William Penn Life Ins. Co., 138 N.J. 627, 632 (1995), a beneficiary under a life insurance policy was denied payment because the decedent had materially misrepresented his health condition on a policy application. Although Ledley was not a Fraud Act case, the Supreme Court found particularly significant the insured gave false answers about "objective" statements of fact. Id. at 635-37 . Here, we are unpersuaded the Commissioner erred in concluding Brown should have responded "Yes" instead of "No" on the Preferred application's objective question: whether Brown had "[a]ny losses, whether or not paid by insurance during the last [three] years at this or any other location." Like the applicants in Ledley, Nasir, and Open MRI, Brown knew of the two losses she claimed within the three years prior to completing the Preferred application. Because Brown "provided a false answer to an objective question, [her] state of mind as to how to interpret the question [wa]s not material and [wa]s not relevant in determining its falsity." Nasir, 355 N.J. Super. at 106 . Brown's subjective interpretation of the term "loss" did not create an issue of fact requiring a hearing when the question objectively required her to reveal the loss of the Cartier watch and the ring. We reject Brown's defenses of forgetfulness and good faith as they relate to the Fraud Act because these arguments are not legally sustainable justifications for her conduct under N.J.S.A. l7:33A- A-1854-24 18 4(a)(4)(b), primarily for the same reasons provided by the Commissioner in his final decision. The Commissioner did not mistakenly determine Brown's misrepresentation was material because the undisputed evidence in the summary decision record established Preferred would not have issued the policy had it known of her loss history. When an insurance company decides whether to insure a person and at what premium rate, it inherently judges the risk of an insured person making a claim. N.J.S.A. 17:29A-1; Perreira v. Rediger, 169 N.J. 399, 417 (2001) (discussing the "nature of insurance") (quoting Joseph DuBray, A Response to the Anti-Subrogation Argument: What Really Emerged From Pandora's Box, 41 S.D. L. Rev. 264 , 272 (1996)). Materiality is judged as of the time of the false statement. Longobardi v. Chubb Ins. Co. of N.J., 121 N.J. 530, 541 (1990). If Brown had disclosed her two recent losses to Preferred, the undisputed evidence in the summary decision record establishes the underwriter would not have offered her coverage. Accordingly, the Commissioner's conclusion that Brown's conduct satisfied all elements to establish a Fraud Act violation under N.J.S.A. l7:33A-4(a)(4)(b) was supported by substantial credible evidence in the record. Neither the Fraud Act nor the Producer Act mandate a hearing under these circumstances as there is no genuine issue of material fact. Thus, we affirm the A-1854-24 19 Commissioner's summary decision on Fraud Act liability because the DOBI established Brown, who was properly held to a higher standard because of her lengthy background in the insurance industry, provided materially false information "within h[er] knowledge." Ibid. iii. Under our deferential standard of review, we are convinced the Commissioner did not abuse his discretion in revoking Brown's insurance producer license under the plain language of the Producer's Act and imposing the reduced monetary penalties after consideration of the Kimmelman factors. The Commissioner has broad discretion in determining sanctions for violations of the laws they are charged with administering. In re Scioscia, 216 N.J. Super. 644, 660 (App. Div. 1987). The Producer Act provides the Commissioner may impose a penalty not exceeding $5000 for the first offense and not exceeding $10,000 for each subsequent offense. N.J.S.A. 17:22A-45. The Fraud Act provides for a penalty of not more than $5,000 for the first violation, $10,000 for the second violation, and $15,000 for each subsequent violation. N.J.S.A. 17:33-A-5b. "The Government is entitled to rough remedial justice, that is, it may demand compensation according to somewhat imprecise formulas such as reasonable liquidated damages . . . without being deemed to have imposed a second penalty for A-1854-24 20 the purpose of double jeopardy analysis." Merin v. Maglaki, 126 N.J. 430, 445 (1992) (citing United State v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989); United States ex rel Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 548-49 (1943)). Under Kimmelman, 108 N.J. at 137-39 , certain factors must be examined in assessing administrative monetary penalties: (1) the good faith or bad faith of the producer; (2) the producer's ability to pay; (3) the amount of profits obtained from the illegal activity; (4) injury to the public; (5) duration of the illegal activity or conspiracy; (6) existence of criminal actions; and (7) past violations. No sole Kimmelman factor is dispositive. See Kimmelman, 108 N.J. at 139 ("The weight to be given each of these factors by a trial court in determining . . . the amount of any penalty, will depend on the facts of each case."). Overall, the entirety of the sanctions were grounded in our jurisprudence and were not so disproportionate to Brown's actions to be deemed an abuse of discretion. We discern no abuse of discretion in the Commissioner's determination the Kimmelman factors weighed in favor of the reduced monetary penalty imposed. We decline to disturb the Commissioner's discretionary revocation of Brown's insurance producer license as authorized under N.J.S.A. 17:22A-40(a), in light of his expressed rationale which included Brown's statutory violations and the need to deter such instances of insurance fraud to protect the public. A-1854-24 21 To the extent we have not otherwise addressed arguments presented, we have determined they are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Affirmed. A-1854-24 22