State of New Jersey v. Thomas Johnson

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1832-24 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. THOMAS JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant. _______________________ Argued September 14, 2026 – Decided October 14, 2026 Before Judges Sabatino, Berdote Byrne, and Torregrossa-O'Connor. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 23-06-1269. Richard G. Potter argued the cause for appellant (Galantucci & Patuto, attorneys; Richard G. Potter, of counsel and on the briefs). Thomas R. Clark, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney; Thomas R. Clark, of counsel and on the briefs). PER CURIAM At roughly 10:30 a.m. on November 2, 2021, Newark police, responding to reports of shots fired, discovered three men (the victims) had been accosted by two masked men while doing construction at a particular building on South 14th Street in Newark. One of the assailants, later alleged to be defendant, brandished a gun, assaulted one of the victims, and fired the gun repeatedly before fleeing the scene. A grand jury later returned a thirteen count indictment charging defendant with the following offenses: second-degree conspiracy to commit carjacking, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2(a)(1); first-degree carjacking, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2(a)(1); second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1); fourth-degree criminal mischief, N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3(a)(1); and three separate counts of second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a), first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1, and second-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12- 1(b)(1) (as to each victim).1 The jury convicted defendant of one count of the lesser-included, third- degree offense of aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(2); one count of second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1); and three counts of second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, 1 The carjacking charges were dismissed before trial. A-1832-24 2 N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(1).2 After merger, the court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of seven years' imprisonment subject to forty-two months of parole ineligibility under the Graves Act. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c). On appeal of his conviction, defendant argues: POINT I A. THE APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE INDICTMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED. B. BY NOT ADVISING THE GRAND JURORS THAT RICHARD BOULWARE HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN INDICTED, THE PROSECUTOR FAILED TO INSTRUCT THE GRAND JURY OF POSSIBLE DEFENSES. POINT II A. THE APPELLANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE THE TESTIMONY OF SPECIAL AGENT [JOHN] HAUGER SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED BECAUSE HIS REPORT CONCLUDED WITH A NET OPINION. B. SPECIAL AGENT HAUGER'S TESTIMONY SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED BECAUSE IT WAS A NET OPINION. 2 Defendant was tried alone, and the second masked individual, Richard Boulware, initially charged with the same offenses, testified against him before the grand jury and at trial, identifying defendant as the individual with the gun. A-1832-24 3 POINT III THE EVIDENCE REGARDING THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE APPELLANT'S CAR SHOULD HAVE BEEN BARRED. POINT IV THE APPELLANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONVICTED OF THREE COUNTS OF POSSESSION OF A WEAPON FOR UNLAWFUL PURPOSE IN VIOLATION OF N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4A(1) BECAUSE THESE ARE THREE CHARGES FOR A SINGLE ACT, AND THE APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED. Persuaded by the contentions raised in Point II, we reverse defendant's conviction and remand for a new trial because the trial court improperly admitted the State's expert's net opinion testimony concerning the cell tower ranges used to estimate defendant's location before and during the offense, which we conclude was not harmless error. In view of our disposition, we need not consider the remaining arguments. For completeness, however, should a retrial follow, we briefly address and reject defendant's challenge to the indictment raised in Point I, which lacks both procedural and substantive merit. A-1832-24 4 I. A. We derive the following pertinent facts and procedural history from the pre-trial and trial records. Beyond defendant's disputing his involvement, the events surrounding the crime are largely undisputed and, in significant part, captured on video. On the morning of November 2, 2021, the three victims (two uncles and their nephew) started their day at the Home Depot on Springfield Avenue in Newark, obtaining supplies before proceeding to a work site on South 14th Street to start a roofing project. As the victims unloaded their truck, one of the victims began to climb a ladder when two masked men arrived—one dressed in all black and the other in a distinctive light blue sweatshirt with a Captain America logo centered on the front. Because the assailants were masked, the victims could not see or later describe their faces. One of the two masked men kicked over the ladder one of the victims had used to climb onto the roof. The victims reported being threatened as the man in blue brandished a gun, grabbed the nephew, and struck him in the head with the firearm. The same man shot the gun repeatedly, hitting the victims' truck. The victims' accounts varied as to some details, but all agreed the man with the gun attacked the nephew and shot A-1832-24 5 the weapon. One of the victims recalled both assailants being armed and indicated one of them demanded money or the keys to the truck before the shooting started. Surveillance cameras at and near the construction site captured video of the two masked men dressed as described—one in all black, and the other wearing a light blue sweatshirt with a Captain America logo on the front. The footage depicted the man in blue holding a gun and grabbing the nephew. The video also showed a silver SUV driven by the man in black, which police then matched to Boulware. The police also located spent shell casings at the scene. Police arrested and interviewed Boulware. At that time, Boulware identified himself as the man wearing all black depicted in the video footage, and black clothing found in his home matched that on the video. Boulware claimed he did not know the identity of the man in the blue Captain America sweatshirt. He told police the shooter and he were coincidentally at the construction site at the same time, but had not acted together. Months later, while in detention on charges arising from the incident, Boulware was reinterviewed and identified defendant as the man in blue with the gun. He explained he and defendant went to the construction site to collect a debt owed to him by the victims, when defendant unexpectedly pulled a gun, A-1832-24 6 attacked one of the victims, and fired shots at the scene. Boulware told detectives defendant called him from the Springfield Avenue Home Depot the morning of the incident to inform him the victims were also at the store and advised Boulware this presented an opportunity to collect the money owed to him. Boulware again disputed advanced knowledge defendant possessed a gun or intended to assault any of the victims. At trial, Boulware confirmed defendant called him from the Home Depot to report seeing the victims, causing Boulware to first drive to the Home Depot and then follow the victims to the work site. He testified he assumed the man in blue with the gun was defendant, but could not be 100% certain as he never saw him without the mask while at the scene. He confirmed the man in blue fired the gun at the truck and was "beating on one of the guys." He recalled seeing a Captain America logo on the shooter's clothing. Police also obtained video from the Home Depot from the morning of and prior to the crime, which showed a person wearing what appeared to be the same distinctive clothing, including the blue Captain America sweatshirt, get into a black Volkswagen SUV. A records check showed defendant leased a 2020 black Volkswagen Atlas SUV. A-1832-24 7 Detectives also obtained cell phone records from both defendant's and Boulware's phones (the target phones) and determined calls were made between the two prior to the crime. The State requested the FBI Cellular Analysis Survey Team (CAST) further analyze the phone records and cellular site data to determine the target phones' locations at relevant times on the day of the crime. B. The State provided to defendant in discovery the CAST report, drafted by FBI Special Agent John Hauger, describing the nature of the analysis and including "historical cell site analysis maps" purporting to depict the approximate location of the target phones at specific time intervals. The report summarized the methodology used in plotting the respective cell phone locations as follows: An analysis was performed on the call detail records obtained for the target cell phones. The call detail records documented the network interaction to and from the target cell phones. Additionally, the records documented the cell tower and cell sector ("cell site") which served the cell phones during this activity. Used in conjunction, the call detail records and a list of cell site locations illustrate an approximate location of the target cell phones when they initiated contact with the network. The maps marked the towers accessed by each target phone at corresponding times. Specifically, the three maps depicted cell activity for A-1832-24 8 Boulware's and defendant's phones, represented in green and red respectively, for three separate time intervals: 8:42 a.m. to 9:50 a.m.; 9:58 a.m. to 10:28 a.m.; and 10:29 a.m. to 11:24 a.m. Each listed incoming and outgoing calls from each phone, demonstrating when calls were made to or from each other. The maps also plotted the location of cell towers in the vicinity of both the Home Depot and the construction site, identifying the towers by color to indicate which phone allegedly connected to which specific tower and in what time period. Each cell site tower to which a target phone connected was accompanied by an open wedge graphic depicting the specific cell "sector," with arms angled in the direction of the target cell phone's supposed location. The report explained the map illustration showed "shaded areas inside the sector arms/circle demonstrat[ing] the direction the antennas are oriented for the sector." It stated, "These symbols illustrate the cell site and sector selected by the cellular phone at the times listed and illustrate the general area the cellular telephone was located." The map for the earliest time frame marked in green the towers utilized by Boulware's phone and marked in red a tower used by defendant's phone, with a sector wedge placing defendant's phone in the direction of the Home Depot. The next map depicted both target phones connecting to towers, first in the A-1832-24 9 vicinity of the Home Depot, and subsequently a tower located in the radius of the crime scene at or around the time of the incident. The map indicates calls were made from Boulware's phone to defendant's phone during this time frame. The map for the last time frame indicates Boulware's phone made calls or linked to several towers but gives no indication defendant's phone accessed towers at that time. Defendant moved pretrial to bar both Special Agent Hauger's report and his testimony at trial concerning the cell site analysis, contending the report provided insufficient methodology or explanation for calculating the respective range of each cell site at issue and any conclusions by the expert concerning the location of the target cell phones amounted to a net opinion. Hauger did not testify at the brief motion hearing. Instead, the trial court heard arguments before denying the motion in its entirety. Defendant argued the report was "deficient" and failed to address vital information concerning methodology and the area of coverage for each tower . Specifically, citing the Supreme Court's decision in State v. Burney, 255 N.J. 1 (2023), defendant emphasized the report reflected no specific "test[ing] to determine the actual footprint of the towers" or "the [e]ffect of terrain or other factors that could cause the switching of cell towers." Comparing the proffered A-1832-24 10 location estimates to those deemed inadmissible in Burney, defendant argued that, without specific methodology or testing concerning the cell tower ranges at issue, Hauger's opinions were based on the same "rule of thumb" assumptions the Court deemed an improper net opinion in Burney. In denying defendant's motion, the trial court first found the report sufficient and admissible at trial, stating "an expert doesn't even have to prepare a report. You just have to have an idea of what the agent or the expert is expected to testify to." The court then added it was "very acquainted with Agent H[au]ger's report because he has testified in this court on a prior trial this year as an expert utilizing, essentially, the same report." The court added that Hauger had been "qualified as an expert in numerous courts," and it regarded the agent as "the state's leading expert on . . . cell tower analysis." Defendant then clarified he was not challenging Agent Hauger's qualifications. The court noted cell site analysis "doesn't say that [defendant] was at a specific location; just that the phone was in the area." It added that cross- examination would be available to "delve into any of the issues that that pertains to." The court reiterated that Agent Hauger "can't pinpoint any location" and indicated the expert's "purpose" was to "show[] what the cell towers do as far as A-1832-24 11 when phones hit a particular area and the signal transmits to a particular cell tower within a geographic location." C. At trial, the State presented testimony from the three victims, and each recounted the incident consistent with what they had told police. The investigating detectives testified, as did Boulware. The State also presented portions of the surveillance videos from the Home Depot and the construction site before, during, and after the incident, along with ballistic evidence of shell casings and police photographs from the crime scene. Defendant presented several witnesses who testified to his peaceful character. Agent Hauger also testified, and his report and maps were admitted into evidence. Although undisputed as an expert in the field of historical cell site analysis, the agent detailed his extensive experience. Trained every year by the cell phone "providers themselves," Hauger explained he teaches "basic classes" in historical cell site analysis, has conducted "[t]housands" of historical cell site analyses, and has testified as an expert in cell site data analysis 165 times nationwide. Hauger summarized cell site analysis as involving gathering "records from a particular phone or phones, plural, and locating where that phone was, relative to an event." He added, "It's important to note that I can't A-1832-24 12 tell you the exact spot of where a phone is . . . . But I could still tell you the general area of where a phone was and when it did something, relative to an event." Hauger described cell phones as "radio[s]" that operate by receiving "radio frequenc[ies]" from "millions" of cell towers from various phone service providers. He explained phones generally search to connect to the strongest available signal or the "signal that it sees the best." Regarding a phone's proximity in relation to a cell tower, Hauger explained: [A] tower is divided into three sides, providing coverage all the way around it. So your phone only connects to one, the best one, the strongest leg. So if one tower, or sector of a tower is facing due north, and your phone connects to that tower, then you can say, well, the phone is somewhere to the north of that particular tower, not much further than the next closest tower. Hauger continued, So when you're in a populated area, like Newark, the towers are very close to each other, a few blocks away. There's no, like, set distance, but they're very close. As you get further out, they get further apart. So when you're in the city, you can say, well, yeah, that phone is probably, you know, within at least a half-a-mile of that particular tower. But as I mentioned before, you can't tell the exact spot. It's very -- down to the neighborhood, or down to the area, not the spot. A-1832-24 13 When questioned about the data and methodology used to conduct the analysis and prepare the report and maps, Hauger testified he used "call detail records" from the respective providers for defendant's and Boulware's phone numbers. Hauger explained he had not conducted any testing of the actual ranges of the various cell towers in this case and admitted the range would be unknowable without testing. He specifically confirmed he did not conduct a "drive test," which would have entailed his using a "scanner" and driving the road around the towers in the particular area and determining the actual cell tower ranges. Nor did he obtain a "propagation map," which is "a computer- generated map that the carriers use to . . . optimize their network," or an "RTT," which "is an engineering report that Verizon puts out that you get the tower and sector, but you also get an estimated distance that the phone was from the tower." Upon specific inquiry about the maximum range of any tower "in this case," Agent Hauger responded: I mean, you're going to be in a very populated area, not much farther than a mile, but there's no dial out there that says, you know, they're all a mile today and they're all a half-mile tomorrow. It depends on the terrain of the area, and the next closest tower really. Again indicating he had not performed any testing, the agent agreed "the max[imum] is going to be about a mile." A-1832-24 14 Hauger then testified utilizing the maps, summarizing the relative locations of Boulware's and defendant's phones during the three time ranges. For the period between 8:42 a.m. and 9:50 a.m., he placed Boulware's phone "at or near" a location in East Orange, and defendant's phone in the "radius" or "general area . . . facing the Home Depot [on] Springfield Ave in Newark. So, again, we don't know exactly where either phone was, but that's the general area that the phones were." Using the map plotting the general location of the target phones between 9:58 a.m. and 10:28 a.m., Hauger testified that by reviewing the tower sector to which defendant's phone connected, the phone moved in that period from the east side of the cell tower by the Home Depot, to the west side of the tower, closer to and within range of the crime scene. The map depicted that Boulware's phone also connected first in the area of the Home Depot and eventually near the crime scene. Hauger explained defendant's phone was likely off or not in use during the last depicted time period between 10:29 a.m. and 11:24 a.m., as no connection was indicated to any of the towers. He explained the phone could also have been in an area of no coverage. He explained Boulware's phone connected to nearby towers and then moved to the East Orange area. A-1832-24 15 Agent Hauger explained the wedges, as depicted on the map, did not represent any concrete measure of distance, but rather represented the directional "sector" of the cell tower signaling the phone in question. However, he again agreed the range "can go up to a mile." Referencing the plotted towers on the map, he identified the "general area" in which the target phones were located. He explained this meant the phones were within the "general area of what the coverage is. So this -- again, this is probably about a half-a-mile to that tower and that one. And that one may be a little bit further. So three-quarters of a mile I would say." On cross examination, the following exchange occurred: Q: You're saying it looks like about half-a-mile? A: For this particular case. You know, again, I don't know for sure, but it's about a half-mile to the next grouping of towers. It's, you know, it's kind of common sense. It's not going to pick one that it's right next to. It's going to pick one that it's right next to as opposed to the one that's half-mile away. Q: Is that always true? A: Sure. In closing argument, defendant claimed Hauger's testimony was misleading and unreliable. The State, however, argued that video surveillance from the Home Depot and records of defendant's phone call history, A-1832-24 16 corroborated Hauger's testimony concerning the general location of defendant's phone before and during the incident. After denying defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal, the court sentenced defendant, and this appeal followed. II. A. We first address defendant's argument that the trial court erred in denying his motion to bar at trial Agent Hauger's testimony, report, and maps concerning defendant's cell phone location. Defendant does not contest the reliability of historical cell site analysis, which is well established. See Burney, 255 N.J. at 21-22. Nor does he challenge Hauger's qualifications as an expert in the field. Instead, he contends both the report and testimony were based on impermissible net opinions and their placement before the jury mandates reversal of his conviction. He specifically contends the report was insufficient under Rule 3:13- 3(b)(1)(I) and N.J.R.E. 703, which he argues requires a summary of the expert's opinions and the grounds for each. Defendant further asserts Hauger's testimony—conceding he did not test the ranges of the particular cell towers at issue yet opining as to their likely reach without identifying any other foundation A-1832-24 17 for that estimation—conveyed to the jury an improper net opinion. According to defendant, Hauger utilized a personal "rule of thumb," which the Supreme Court in Burney deemed improper if not accompanied by a scientific basis for the range approximation. Burney, 255 N.J. at 21-25. Guided by Burney, we are persuaded. We review a trial court's evidentiary rulings under the abuse of discretion standard, State v. Medina, 242 N.J. 397 , 411-12 (2020), and will not "substitute [our] own judgment for that of the trial court" unless there was a "'clear error of judgment.'" State v. Perry, 225 N.J. 222, 233 (2016) (quoting State v. Brown, 170 N.J. 138, 147 (2001)). The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by N.J.R.E. 702 and 703. N.J.R.E. 702 ensures that a proposed expert is qualified "by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education" and that the expert's testimony will assist the jury "to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." N.J.R.E. 703 requires the expert's opinion be grounded in the expert's observations or upon facts or data "made known to the expert," but only if "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject." The net opinion rule is "a corollary of [N.J.R.E. 703] . . . which forbids the admission into evidence of an expert's conclusions that are not supported by A-1832-24 18 factual evidence or other data." Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 53-54 (2015) (alteration and omission in original) (quoting Polzo v. Cnty. of Essex, 196 N.J. 569, 583 (2008)). The rule requires the expert to "give the why and wherefore" of their opinion "rather than a mere conclusion." Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 372 (2011) (quoting Polzo, 196 N.J. at 583 ). Generally, this means an expert's opinion will be excluded when that opinion is based on subjective "personal" standards rather than objective facts. Id. at 373. Rule 3:13-3(b)(1)(I) provides the prosecutor must provide in discovery all expert witnesses, their qualifications, and the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, a copy of the report, if any, of such expert witness, or if no report is prepared, a statement of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for each opinion. [(Emphasis added).] Although a drastic remedy, failure to comply with this discovery obligation may result in the witness "be[ing] barred from testifying at trial." R. 3:13-3(b)(1)(I). We briefly review and compare the expert's testimony in Burney, which largely parallels Hauger's here. As Hauger did here, the expert agent in Burney conducted cell site analysis of the defendant's phone to generally estimate his approximate location at the time of the crime. Burney, 255 N.J. at 11-12. The A-1832-24 19 agent used phone records of the dates and times of calls and the cell tower locations of those to which the defendant's phone connected at relevant times to "create[] maps depicting the towers pinged by [the] defendant's phone." Ibid. The agent in Burney testified "the towers likely had this one-mile range based on a 'rule of thumb' for towers in the area." Id. at 12. Explaining the basis for that "rule of thumb," the agent explained: So just based on my training and experience, one mile is a good estimate of the tower range for Sprint in this area. It's also further kind of supported by the location of the adjacent towers. We can infer, based on how the network is laid out and the fact that Sprint has designed this to avoid coverage gaps, that the tower needs to extend out to a certain distance that obviously doesn't cross over other towers, but that provides enough overlap between adjacent sectors so that there's no drops, no call drops, no dead zones in between. So just using a one-mile approximation, which has been a good approximation in my experience in this area. [Ibid. (emphasis added).] Like Hauger in this case, the agent in Burney explained he did not conduct any testing of the towers at issue, such as a drive test. The agent in Burney also conceded that without such testing he could not determine the precise range of the relevant towers and clarified he could not pinpoint the defendant's location with precision. See id. at 11-12. The agent nonetheless approximated the distance by his own training and experience and A-1832-24 20 never testified the approximated range was "common practice in cell tower analysis" or used as a standard measure accepted by other experts. Id. at 24. After this court affirmed the trial court's decision admitting the agent's testimony over defendant's objection, see State v. Burney, 471 N.J. Super. 297 , 304-05 (App. Div. 2022), rev'd, 255 N.J. 1 (2023), the Supreme Court reversed, concluding the agent's testimony as to the tower's range based on a "rule of thumb" derived from the expert's training and experience "constitute[d] an improper net opinion because it was unsupported by any factual evidence or other data." Burney, 255 N.J. at 25. The court observed the expert admitted he did not review the height of the . . . [t]ower, did not review its rated power, did not calculate the estimated absorption of radio energy by nearby buildings or hills, did not review the specific angle of the tower's antenna, and did not review any diagnostic data from the tower on [the date of the offense.] [Id. at 24-25.] The Court clarified it was not "suggest[ing] that, to be admissible, expert testimony must consider all of the factors" it listed, but concluded such testimony must be based on a foundation other than the agent's personal "training and experience." Id. at 24-25. We discern no material distinction between Agent Hauger's testimony and that deemed an improper net opinion in Burney. No matter how undisputedly A-1832-24 21 qualified Hauger clearly is in the field of historical cell site analysis, his testimony regarding the specific towers' ranges in this case, based solely on his training, experience, and "common sense," was not supported with accompanying scientific or technical data. More was required to allow admission of that aspect of his opinion. See State v. Hannah, 263 N.J. 411 , 446- 47 (2026) (noting cell site location testimony, even when rendered by a qualified expert, is inadmissible if unsupported by "adequate data"). Although we recognize Hauger opined generally that the placement of the towers in a populated area like Newark would suggest the "phone is probably, you know, within at least a half-a-mile of that particular tower," he never anchored that estimation in technical data. Similar testimony was deemed insufficient in Burney. If such grounding existed for that opinion here, it was absent from both the report and the testimony, and we are satisfied both were improperly placed before the jury. Although the State argues any error was "easily" harmless, the trial record is replete with references to and reliance upon this evidence, and we cannot conclude its improper placement before the jury was not "clearly capable of producing an unjust result." R. 2:10-2. The prosecutor in summation repeatedly referenced defendant's proximity to the Home Depot shortly before the crime A-1832-24 22 and shortly thereafter to the work site at the time of the attack and shooting. Although the State correctly emphasizes Boulware testified against defendant, his credibility was at issue as he was impeached with prior statements that varied with each account of events. Despite the surveillance videos from the Home Depot and the crime scene, neither squarely depicted the second masked assailant's face. We do not view the remaining evidence as so overwhelming as to render harmless the admission of the testimony and maps placing defendant in the radius of the crime. B. As to defendant's challenge to the grand jury proceeding and the integrity of the indictment, we briefly address and reject his claim as devoid of merit. Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing the State withheld exculpatory evidence when it failed to inform the grand jury that Boulware had been charged and detained at the time he gave a statement implicating defendant. He claims this information was vital to the grand jury's understanding of Boulware's motivation to lie after initially claiming he did not know the identity of the shooter. Critically, defendant raises this claim while ignoring the curative impact of the petit jury's guilty verdict upon any arguable error in the grand jury A-1832-24 23 proceeding. Indeed, except in rare circumstances not present here, a petit jury's guilty verdict typically cures errors occurring in grand jury proceedings. State v. Cook, 330 N.J. Super. 395, 411 (App. Div. 2000) (recognizing a "finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by the petit jury would render harmless any failure to present the alleged exculpatory evidence to the grand jury"); see also United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 70 (1986) (noting that a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by a petit jury renders "any error in the grand jury proceeding . . . harmless beyond a reasonable doubt"). Here, the petit jury heard all the circumstances surrounding Boulware's progressively changing statements and found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault and the weapons offenses, curing any claimed error. Although we need not reach the substantive argument concerning the grand jury presentation, for completeness we note "[t]he grand jury's role is not to weigh evidence presented by each party, but rather to investigate potential defendants and decide whether a criminal proceeding should be commenced." State v. Hogan, 144 N.J. 216, 235 (1996). As for the State's role in such proceedings, its "sole evidential obligation is to present a prima facie case that the accused has committed a crime." Id. at 236 . Further, "the State must present proof of every element of an offense to the grand jury." State v. Campione, 462 A-1832-24 24 N.J. Super. 466, 491-92 (App. Div. 2020) (quoting State v. Dorn, 233 N.J. 81, 93-94 (2018)). Although the State is prohibited from deceiving the grand jury or presenting "half-truths," the State "need not impeach the credibility of the State's witnesses appearing before the grand jury by informing the grand jury of the witnesses' criminal records." Hogan, 144 N.J. at 236-37 . Further, the State need only disclose truly exculpatory evidence to a grand jury, which is evidence that "squarely refutes an element of the crime in question." Id. at 237 . Boulware's detention status at the time of each of his statements falls outside that category. Further, the grand jury heard ample testimony from Boulware and investigating officers revealing Boulware was also charged concerning the crime and did not implicate defendant when he was first arrested, but later gave a subsequent statement identifying defendant as the shooter. The grand jury record indeed reflects one of the grand jurors asked the testifying witness, "the defendant -- defendant Richard . . . [Boulware], he's -- initially said he didn't know man number -- defendant number two, correct? In his first testimony? Is that correct? That was in the audio." Thus, the grand jury knew of Boulware's shift, further undermining defendant's claim that the State improperly blinded the grand jury as to Boulware's potential interest in casting A-1832-24 25 blame upon defendant. Therefore, we affirm the denial of the motion to dismiss the indictment. Reversed and remanded for a new trial. We do not retain jurisdiction. A-1832-24 26