Jamie Garduno v. Shaimaa Moustafa

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1039-25 JAMIE GARDUNO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. SHAIMAA MOUSTAFA, Defendant-Appellant. _______________________ Submitted September 21, 2026 – Decided October 15, 2026 Before Judges Berdote Byrne and Torregrossa- O'Connor. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Cumberland County, Docket No. SC-000300- 25. Shaimaa Moustafa, self-represented appellant. Respondent has not filed a brief. PER CURIAM Defendant Shaimaa Moustafa appeals from the November 19, 2025 Special Civil Part judgment entered after a bench trial in favor of plaintiff Jamie Garduno in the amount of $2,000 and dismissing defendant's counterclaims. Plaintiff filed suit as a co-owner of Garduno Landscape and Hardscape (the company), demanding compensation for tools plaintiff alleged defendant failed to return after plaintiff's husband, Raymundo Garduno, commenced, but did not complete, repair work at defendant's property. Defendant filed a counterclaim, alleging, in part, that the company was unlicensed in violation of the Contractors' Business Registration Act (CBRA), N.J.S.A. 56:8-138(a), rendering the parties' oral agreement for the work unenforceable. Defendant further alleged plaintiff's misrepresentations violated the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to -20. She sought return of her deposit paid to secure the work, and other alleged damages. Defendant now argues the trial court erred in: (1) dismissing her counterclaims without first addressing her CFA and CBRA claims, (2) awarding $2,000 to plaintiff without substantial and credible evidence supporting that determination, (3) exhibiting bias against her, and (4) ignoring evidence of misrepresentation. Although we conclude the trial court properly found defendant was responsible for the cost of the missing tools, we are unable to assess the basis upon which the court valued the loss amount. Similarly, in the absence of A-1039-25 2 adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law as to defendant's counterclaims, we cannot fairly review the propriety of the "no cause" finding and dismissal of those claims. Accordingly, although we affirm the court's finding in favor of plaintiff regarding theft of the tools, we are constrained to vacate the $2,000 award to plaintiff and the dismissal of defendant's counterclaims, and to remand for further proceedings in accordance with this decision. I. Plaintiff's complaint alleged defendant hired the company to do repair work and later "refused to give back [plaintiff's] tools because [Raymundo] refused to do extra work." Plaintiff sought $3,500 to compensate for the loss and itemized the missing tools in her complaint. Defendant's counterclaim sought "judgment in the amount of $2,300, itemized as [follows]: $1,000 [for] refund of payment; $500 for lost time and inconvenience; $500 for stress and harassment; and $300 for use and wear of [her] personal tools," plus costs. Defendant alleged she verbally agreed with Raymundo to pay $1,000 in cash as a deposit for work at her home, including replacing a roof for her shed, rebuilding exterior stairs, and installing a patio door. Defendant asserted that Raymundo began but then stopped work, and he "demanded that [defendant] supply or rent his tools." She also claimed he "missed scheduled days, and A-1039-25 3 ultimately abandoned the project." Defendant further alleged plaintiff and Raymundo misrepresented their company was properly licensed and insured when it was not, in violation of the CBRA and CFA. At trial, the court heard testimony from plaintiff, Raymundo, and defendant. Text messages and photos were presented to the court. Although the court intermittently read from certain messages, the items were not identified with any specificity or expressly admitted into evidence, rendering unclear on review of the record the scope or nature of exhibits presented, viewed, or admitted during trial. Plaintiff testified she and Raymundo are co-owners of their company, which is "registered." Plaintiff explained that the company had performed landscaping for defendant, and they were later asked to do some additional work, including rebuilding the outdoor stairs, installing a patio door, and replacing the roof of the shed. The parties negotiated a price of $2,000 for the work. Before the work began, the parties met at a supply store so defendant could utilize plaintiff's contractor's discount to purchase the materials for the project. Raymundo testified defendant provided a $500 deposit before he started working. A-1039-25 4 Raymundo began work on October 14, 2025, but after a dispute arose over the necessary tools, he did not complete most of the project. He testified he framed the stairs and removed plywood and shingles from the existing shed before stopping work. Plaintiff apparently presented photos and text messages, and the court read several texts, purportedly between Raymundo and defendant, discussing the terms of agreement and the materials needed. Plaintiff testified defendant banned Raymundo from returning after the two disagreed about which of them was obligated to provide the tools required to complete the project. Again, text messages were presented but not preserved, nor were the photos referenced by plaintiff. The court read an exchange in which Raymundo insisted defendant was to provide the tools and expressed this was the last job he would do for defendant and, in response, defendant advised, "I'm filing a restraining order against you, and now if you step a foot on my property, I'll have you arrested." Plaintiff valued the tools at $3,500 and presented receipts, but none were formally admitted on the record. Raymundo testified the tools he left behind included a "framing gun, a drill, . . . [various] drill bits, a circular saw," blades, chargers, and batteries. Plaintiff and Raymundo called the police and returned with police to defendant's home to retrieve the tools. Raymundo testified the A-1039-25 5 police were unable to locate the tools and concluded defendant must have hidden them. Raymundo told the court he wanted an answer from defendant, stating: "after I sent her the message saying this is the last time I work for you and I lent you all of my tools, then, you know, everything disappears and I'm not getting my tools back. Where are my tools?" Defendant testified Raymundo represented to her that the company was "licensed and insured" to perform home repair work when, in fact, it was not. She claimed she paid a $1,000 deposit for the work that was never completed. Citing text messages in which Raymundo demanded defendant supply the tools for the project, defendant claimed Raymundo never used or left his own tools behind. She maintained that the only work Raymundo performed was the framing of the stairs, that he used defendant's tools for that work, and that he told her she was paying only for his labor, not the use of his tools. After testimony concluded, the court rendered its oral decision, first noting disputes often arise when parties proceed without written contracts or receipts, and then observing defendant was "trying to get th[is] work done as cheaply as possible." The court then found plaintiff and Raymundo credible as to their claims of leaving the tools behind, crediting their seeking police A-1039-25 6 assistance as corroborating their claims that defendant retained their tools. The court accepted their claims, finding defendant "was angry and she hid the tools." The court stated it did not find defendant's "testimony to be credible," and concluded she was "trying to get away with taking [the] tools." The court, however, determined that defendant paid $1,000 to plaintiff as a deposit. The court also stated it did "not believe [the tools were] worth $3500" as they were not brand new and found $2,000 was the replacement value of the tools. Regarding defendant's counterclaims, the court found the company's licensing or lack thereof was not "really an issue within this case" because "it's all landscaping work, it's not anything that requires a home improvement contractor['s] license." Without citing law, the court stated the CBRA might apply "maybe if he did the other work that they said they were going to agree upon, that license would be necessary." The court then found the CBRA was not applicable in this case, and even if it was, defendant could not recover her deposit because plaintiff completed at least $500 worth of improvements. It thus denied her claim for return of the $1,000 deposit, stating only: Looking at all the work [Raymundo] did do, it's certainly worth at least $500, probably substantially more, given that he had to tear everything out and started rebuilding the steps, you know, certainly a good amount of work that he did do before these parties had the dispute. A-1039-25 7 The court then disposed of defendant's remaining counterclaims, finding that defendant cannot "sue for lost time, inconvenience, stress and harassment," or for use of her tools, as those are not bases "for a civil suit of this kind." II. "Our review of a judgment following a bench trial is limited." Accounteks.Net, Inc. v. CKR Law, LLP, 475 N.J. Super. 493 , 503 (App. Div. 2023) (citing Seidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 205 N.J. 150, 169 (2011)). "[W]e do not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless we are convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice[.]" Seidman, 205 N.J. at 169 (second alteration in original) (quoting In re Trust Created by Agreement Dated Dec. 20, 1961, ex rel. Johnson, 194 N.J. 276, 284 (2008)). We give deference to a trial court's factual findings "when the evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility." Sipko v. Koger, Inc., 214 N.J. 364, 376 (2013) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998)). A trial "'court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts,' however, 'are not entitled to any special deference.'" Accounteks.Net, Inc., 475 N.J. Super. at 503 A-1039-25 8 (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)). Here, we are satisfied the court's determination that defendant retained plaintiff's tools was sufficiently anchored in the record. The court correctly confined plaintiff's claim to the alleged theft of the tools and addressed that allegation separately from defendant's claims of CFA and CBRA violations. The court credited testimony from plaintiff and Raymundo who claimed they left their tools behind at defendant's residence when she banned them from returning. The court accepted plaintiff called police who then searched but could not find the tools at defendant's home. Having observed the parties as they testified, the court made sufficient credibility and factual findings that we will not disturb. That, however, is the extent of our ability to resolve the issues on the record before us. Critically, this court's ability to assess an appeal is largely dependent upon the trial court's compliance with its obligation to state its findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Rule 1:7-4. To comply, the trial court must articulate "factual findings and correlate them" with the principles of law. Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 570 (1980). Rule 1:7-4(a) requires a court to issue a decision either orally or in writing which "find[s] the A-1039-25 9 facts and state[s] its conclusions of law thereon in all actions tried without a jury." Romero v. Gold Star Distrib., LLC, 468 N.J. Super. 274 , 304 (App. Div. 2021). A trial court's legal conclusions are essential "so that parties and the appellate courts [are] informed of the rationale underlying th[ose] conclusion[s]." Avelino-Catabran v. Catabran, 445 N.J. Super. 574, 594 (App. Div. 2016) (alteration in original) (quoting Monte v. Monte, 212 N.J. Super. 557, 565 (App. Div. 1986)). Without sufficient findings, a reviewing court does not know whether the judge's decision rests on applicable law or an impermissible basis. See Monte, 212 N.J. Super. at 565 . Although we have determined the court did not misuse its discretion in finding defendant responsible for the value of plaintiff's tools, we cannot discern its basis for the award amount of $2,000. Indeed, "[c]ompensatory damages are designed to compensate a plaintiff for an actual injury or loss." Nappe v. Anschelewitz, Barr, Ansell & Bonello, 97 N.J. 37, 48 (1984). To support an award of compensatory damages, the evidence must provide "some reasonable degree of certainty," Paolicelli v. Wojciechowski, 132 N.J. Super. 274, 278-79 (App. Div. 1975), "as opposed to speculati[on]." Cortez v. Gindhart, 435 N.J. Super. 589, 603 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting Grunwald v. Bronkesh, 131 N.J. 483 , A-1039-25 10 495 (1993)). On this record, we cannot conclude the court properly calculated the value of the tools. Without some specificity as to the court's calculation, and because evidence was not marked or expressly admitted during trial, we are unable to sufficiently decipher without improper speculation what evidence the court relied upon in making its determination or the accuracy of its award. In addition, without citing law or the basis for its conclusion, the court found the CBRA did not apply to defendant's counterclaims in this case. It specifically stated, without further explanation, the CBRA was inapplicable to landscaping, but simultaneously noted the CBRA might have applied here had the work been completed. Similarly, the court never addressed defendant's CFA claim that plaintiff misrepresented that the company was registered or whether any alleged failure to register rendered the contract unenforceable and warranted return of defendant's deposit. In the absence of required findings, we cannot discern what law the court applied to defendant's counterclaims or how it reached its conclusions. Accordingly, we vacate the dismissal of the counterclaims and the award amount and remand for the court to identify applicable law, make factual findings, and apply the facts to the law. A-1039-25 11 We note without deciding or suggesting the controlling law, several provisions of the CFA and CBRA are arguably implicated. Notably, the CBRA "created a framework within the CFA that regulates contractors who are engaged in the business of making or selling home improvements." Czar, Inc. v. Heath, 198 N.J. 195, 202 (2009). The CBRA mandates: "No contractor business shall offer to perform, or engage, or attempt to engage in the business of making or selling home improvements unless registered with the Division of Consumer Affairs." N.J.S.A. 56:8-138(a). The CBRA generally defines "home improvement" as "the remodeling, altering, renovating, repairing, restoring, modernizing, moving, demolishing, or otherwise improving or modifying of the whole or any part of any residential property." N.J.S.A. 56:8-137. The CBRA's implementing regulations, promulgated to "provid[e] procedures for the regulation of home improvement contractors and establish[] standards to facilitate enforcement of the requirements of the [CFA]," N.J.A.C. 13:45A-17.1(a), define "home improvement" broadly to explicitly include "landscaping." See N.J.A.C. 13:45A-17.2.1 1 N.J.A.C. 13:45A-17.2 defines "home improvement" as follows: A-1039-25 12 More generally, "the CFA sets forth three general categories of unlawful acts: (1) affirmative acts; (2) knowing omissions; and (3) regulatory violations." Thiedemann v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 183 N.J. 234, 245 (2005). Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 56:8-2, misrepresentation "of any material fact with the intent that others rely upon [such a statement] . . . is declared to be an unlawful practice." Agreements induced by unlawful acts under the CFA are generally unenforceable by the violator. See Data Informatics v. Amerisource Partners, 338 N.J. Super. 61, 78 (App. Div. 2001). the remodeling, altering, painting, repairing, renovating, restoring, moving, demolishing, or modernizing of residential or non-commercial property or the making of additions thereto, and includes, but is not limited to, the construction, installation, replacement, improvement, or repair of driveways, sidewalks, swimming pools, terraces, patios, landscaping, fences, porches, windows, doors, cabinets, kitchens, bathrooms, garages, basements and basement waterproofing, water softeners, heaters, and purifiers, solar heating or water systems, insulation installation, home elevation, siding, wall-to-wall carpeting or attached or inlaid floor coverings, and other changes, repairs, or improvements made in or on, attached to or forming a part of the residential or non-commercial property, but does not include the construction of a new residence. [(Emphasis added).] A-1039-25 13 Again, we do not suggest or imply the correct outcome on remand, we note only that the court should determine the terms of the parties' agreement, the applicability of the CBRA to the parties' agreement and to its enforceability, the implications under the CFA of misrepresentations, if any, by plaintiff or Raymundo, the actual value of the tools, and any offsets depending on the court's resolution of defendant's counterclaims. Finally, having reviewed and determined defendant's arguments concerning the trial court's alleged improper bias lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E), we perceive no reason to direct the case to a different judge on remand. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction. A-1039-25 14