Steven Testa v. Deborah Testa

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0784-25 STEVEN TESTA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DEBORAH TESTA, Defendant-Respondent. ________________________ Submitted September 14, 2026 – Decided October 15, 2026 Before Judges Perez Friscia and Torregrossa- O'Connor. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Morris County, Docket No. FM-14-1163-10. Berse Law, LLC, attorney for appellant (Samuel J. Berse, on the brief). Respondent has not filed a brief. PER CURIAM Plaintiff Steven Testa appeals from the October 7, 2025 Family Part amended order granting defendant Deborah Testa's 1 post-judgment motion to find plaintiff in violation of litigants' rights, enforce his payment of arrears, and impose sanctions. Plaintiff also appeals the court's denial of his cross-motion to modify the amount of established arrears and receive a credit for college contributions on behalf of their children. Following our review of the record, plaintiff's arguments, and applicable law, we affirm in part and vacate in part, remanding for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. The parties married in July 1998. In November 2013, they divorced and entered into a property settlement agreement ("PSA"), which was incorporated into their final judgment of divorce. Pursuant to the PSA, defendant was the parent of primary residence of the parties' two minor children. She resided with their children in the marital residence ("the property") in Denville. Regarding spousal support, the PSA established plaintiff had a "gross yearly income of $330,000" and defendant had an imputed gross yearly income of $20,000. In lieu of providing defendant with direct alimony payments, plaintiff, pursuant to paragraph nine of the PSA, was to pay on defendant's 1 Defendant did not participate in this appeal. A-0784-25 2 behalf the mortgages on the property, the utility bills, her health insurance premiums, and her remaining vehicle loan payments of approximately $13,000. The PSA further provided: if plaintiff "defaults on the foregoing payments or . . . [his] efforts to modify the loan are unsuccessful[,] he shall be required to pay . . . [defendant] direct non-taxable net support in the sum of $6,200 through probation via wage garnishment." At the time the parties entered into the PSA, they were in the process of obtaining loan modifications for the property. The property at the time was valued at $500,000. The PSA contained conditions as to when the property would be listed for sale, which was dependent on the status of their children's college education, and explicitly provided the sale was to occur no later than March 2024. Regarding child support, the parties had agreed plaintiff was to pay defendant monthly payments of $2,600 through the probation department via wage garnishment. He was also responsible for the cost of their daughters' extracurricular activities. The parties' PSA included an attorney's fees provision, which stated that "[i]f either party defaults in the performance of any provisions[,]" "and the other party . . . institutes and prevail[s] in legal proceedings[,]" "then the defaulting A-0784-25 3 party shall pay to the other party[] the necessary and reasonable court costs and attorney's fees incurred by the prevailing party." After plaintiff defaulted on his required spousal support payments under the PSA, defendant moved before the court to enforce litigants' rights. Plaintiff cross-moved to reduce his spousal support obligation. On May 10, 2022, the court granted defendant's motion and ordered plaintiff to pay $6,200 per month via wage garnishment to satisfy his "outstanding alimony arrears totaling $302,400[,]" which consisted of "$287,400 in alimony arrears plus $15,000 . . . representing plaintiff's" 401(k) interest. The court found plaintiff's conduct was sanctionable, ordering plaintiff to pay defendant $4,412.50 in attorney's fees in connection with filing the enforcement motion. Regarding defendant's request to impose other sanctions against plaintiff to encourage his payment of arrears, the court denied the relief, finding "[t]he proposed sanctions would only harm plaintiff's ability to earn income which would have the opposite effect of coercing him to pay support." The court denied plaintiff's motion to recalculate and reduce his alimony payments to defendant because he failed to show a warranted change of circumstances. Thereafter, Morris County Probation moved to modify the court's May 10, 2022 order because it was "unable to process [plaintiff's] equitable distribution A-0784-25 4 arrears through the [p]robation account." On August 26, 2022, the court modified its prior order to reflect that plaintiff's alimony arrears of $287,400 had to be paid through probation via wage garnishment at "the rate of $6,200 per month." The court further provided plaintiff was to pay defendant directly the arrears amount of $15,000 owed for equitable distribution of the 401(k). Plaintiff's "outstanding child support arrears" were to "remain in place and . . . be paid together with the alimony arrears." On July 28, 2025, defendant filed an enforcement motion because plaintiff was not paying his alimony arrears, did not pay the $1,950.40 in "outstanding arrears for repairs, maintenance[,] and child[-]related" expenses (collectively "household expenses"), failed to demonstrate "proof on an annual basis" of life insurance, and did not pay previously awarded attorney's fees totaling $4,412.50. She requested the court sanction plaintiff as follows: a $10 0-per- day fine, commencing on September 1, 2025, if he failed to pay overdue alimony arrears of $140,313; 8% interest to be imposed on the overdue alimony arrears amount of $140,313; list the property for sale if he failed to pay the $140,313 in overdue alimony arrears by September 15, 2025, with defendant entitled to receive "the full $207,000 in remaining alimony arrears . . . from the sale proceeds"; a $100-per-day fine if he failed to pay the outstanding household A-0784-25 5 expenses; a $100-per-day fine if he failed to produce proof of life insurance; 8% interest to be imposed on the attorney's fees he owed of $4,412.50; and a $10,000 "bad faith" payment to be imposed "for his violation of litigant's rights." Plaintiff cross-moved for the court to hold a plenary hearing to address a modification of the amount of support he owed. 2 He opposed defendant's motion, arguing the prior August 26, 2022 order was entered in error. He asserted that the court's earlier finding that he owed "$302,400" and had to pay defendant "$6,200 per month" was erroneous because "the amount owed was paid in full with . . . defendant owing [him] a balance." Plaintiff stated he did "not have the funds" to pay defendant, had experienced financial setbacks due to contracting the COVID-19 virus in 2020, had paid the property's mortgages and was never in default, had paid college tuition for the parties' children, leaving him "no choice but to [not] pay" defendant, and had suffered various other financial losses. He also argued the PSA required mediation. Defendant opposed plaintiff's cross-motion for a plenary hearing and objected to the court revisiting the amounts awarded in the prior orders. She highlighted that the orders were from 2022, and plaintiff had never filed a 2 We note a different judge presided over the parties' post-judgment motions than had handled the prior matters. A-0784-25 6 motion for reconsideration or an appeal. She also pointed to plaintiff's inappropriate attempts to "assassinate [her] character" in his certification while he had "constantly ignor[ed] court orders." Regarding plaintiff's ability to pay, defendant argued that plaintiff was "the Regional Vice President" at his loan company, and his submitted documents illustrated an August 15, 2025 "year to date income . . . [of] $113,707.06," which "[a]nnualized, . . . equal[ed] $181,931.20." Further, she noted plaintiff acknowledged he was also "the [p]resident of" a food products company, Kariba Farms. Based on the prior court orders, she requested the court order plaintiff to satisfy the outstanding alimony arrears of "$140,313" and "the full $207,000 in remaining total alimony arrears." Defendant's attorney later submitted a certification of services. On September 12, 2025, during argument, defendant's attorney maintained that the probation account showed that plaintiff owed "$192,070.56 in remaining [arrears] due." Additionally, defendant's attorney argued plaintiff still owed defendant $15,000 in equitable distribution under the prior orders, which was to be paid directly to defendant and resulted in a total amount due of $207,070.56. In addressing the amount due as of July 2025, defendant's attorney claimed plaintiff owed approximately $140,000 and emphasized plaintiff had "failed to A-0784-25 7 pay one payment since October 29[,] 2024." Defendant's attorney also advised the court that the property was subject in foreclosure. Plaintiff's attorney countered that the parties were required under the PSA to attend mediation. Alternatively, plaintiff's attorney argued the prior court's orders awarding defendant certain arrears amounts were in error, and a plenary hearing was warranted based on plaintiff's contribution to his children's college costs. After the court raised that no legitimate proof of tuition payments was submitted, plaintiff's counsel acknowledged there was only an "abbreviated version" of payments provided. The court confirmed plaintiff never appealed the standing orders and explained his request for college contributions was a "separate issue" requiring proof. In its oral decision, the court found plaintiff failed to demonstrate relief was warranted on his cross-motion. Regarding his request for mediation pursuant to the PSA, the court explained mediation was not appropriate as defendant moved to enforce multiple prior orders and it would cause unnecessary "further delay." The court stated that it was granting defendant's motion to enforce because it determined the "[$]192,000" in arrears was "significant." Specifically, it found the record established plaintiff was in "[w]illful violation" and "purposeful noncompliance." The court explained it A-0784-25 8 was setting a later date for plaintiff's payment of the arrears than defendant had requested to "give . . . [plaintiff] some time" to pay. As to defendant's attorney's fees, the court stated that it would grant a slightly "reduced . . . amount of" $7,920, which included "three hours of the anticipated time." On September 19, 2025, the court issued an order, which was later amended on October 7, 2025. The amended order provided that plaintiff: was in violation of litigant's rights; was required to pay defendant "all overdue alimony arrears payments totaling $140,313 no later than October 13, 2025" or he would be "sanctioned $100 per day commencing October 14, 2025"; had to pay "simple interest pursuant [Rule] 4:42-11 [and] [Rule] 5:7-5 on [the] $140,313 outstanding overdue alimony arrears from May 10, 2022 through July 28, 2025[,] totaling $12,603.60 within thirty (30) days"; had until October 13, 2025 to pay the alimony arrears totaling $140,313 or the property would be listed for sale and was obligated to pay defendant the $207,000 remaining in alimony from the sale proceeds; and was to make timely payments of $6,200 a month until the arrears were paid in full. The order further stated that plaintiff was to pay the $1,950.40 for the outstanding household expenses "within thirty . . . days" or be sanctioned $100 per day for each day after September 1, 2025 , and he would be sanctioned $100 per day if proof of life insurance was not provided A-0784-25 9 by October 1, 2025. Additionally, the court ordered plaintiff to pay the amount owed of $4,412.50 for defendant's attorney's fees with 8% interest within thirty days and the newly incurred attorney's fees of $7,920 that resulted from defendant having to file the motion to enforce. This appeal followed. On appeal, plaintiff argues the court's order granting defendant's requested relief should be reversed and the matter should be remanded for further proceedings because the court failed to make sufficient findings pursuant to Rule 1:7-4. Plaintiff further asserts that the court improperly denied his cross-motion. II. Our scope of review of Family Part orders is limited. See N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. S.K., 456 N.J. Super. 245, 261 (App. Div. 2018). "We accord deference to Family Part judges due to their 'special jurisdiction and expertise in family [law] matters.'" Gormley v. Gormley, 462 N.J. Super. 433 , 442 (App. Div. 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998)). We review the trial court's decision on a "motion under a deferential standard, giving 'due recognition to the wide discretion . . . our law rightly affords to the trial judges who deal with these matters.'" Cardali v. Cardali, 255 N.J. 85 , 107 (2023) (quoting Spangenberg v. Kolakowski, 442 N.J. Super. 529, 536 (App. Div. 2015)). The court's "findings are binding on appeal A-0784-25 10 so long as their determinations are 'supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence.'" Gormley, 462 N.J. Super. at 442 (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 411-12 ). However, "we do not pay special deference to its interpretation of the law." Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269, 283 (2016) (quoting D.W. v. R.W., 212 N.J. 232, 245 (2012)). III. We first consider plaintiff's arguments that the court erred in finding he violated the May 10 and August 26, 2022 orders and enforcing his payment of arrears owed to defendant. He challenges the sufficiency of the court's reasons for requiring him to pay $140,313 in alimony arrears, $1,950.40 in outstanding household expenses arrears, and $4,412.50 in attorney's fees owed. Plaintiff claims the court made deficient findings to support ordering the amounts allegedly owed and the sale of the property to fulfill his financial obligations . After our review of the evidence and the court's oral decision, we disagree. The record establishes plaintiff's long history of delinquency in paying defendant the support she is entitled to under their PSA. The court's finding that plaintiff owed defendant a "significant" amount of arrears for an extended period of time is substantially supported by the record. Relevantly, plaintiff neither moved for reconsideration nor appealed the 2022 orders, which set the amount A-0784-25 11 of spousal support arrears owed, awarded defendant attorney's fees, and prescribed the method of plaintiff's payments to defendant. Thus, the court properly enforced plaintiff's obligation to pay arrears. We also reject plaintiff's argument that the court failed to "adequately stat[e] any reasons" and "cited no case law" in ordering the sale of "his house." The court correctly noted that the 2022 "standing order[s]" are "enforceable by the [c]ourt" and found the record "clearly established" plaintiff was in "willful noncompliance." Regarding the credibility of plaintiff's financial assertions, the court noted plaintiff's certification alleged income of only "$115,000" despite his conflicting acknowledgement of "heavily [relying] on commission." We observe plaintiff's merits brief references no material facts disputing the arrears owed and history of noncompliance. Relevantly, Rule 5:3-7(b) provides that the court may order an "appropriate equitable remedy" after "finding that a party has violated an alimony" or "financial maintenance . . . order." We have long recognized that the Family Part "possesses broad equitable powers to accomplish substantial justice" allowing it to tailor an appropriate remedy for violation of its orders. Finger v. Zenn, 335 N.J. Super. 438, 447 (App. Div. 2000). Further, we review a court's formulation of equitable remedies to enforce one of its orders for an A-0784-25 12 abuse of discretion. Milne v. Goldenberg, 428 N.J. Super. 184, 197-98 (App. Div. 2012); see also Randazzo v. Randazzo, 184 N.J. 101, 102 (2005) (explaining that courts have the equitable power "to order such a sale [of real property prejudgment] and, if the circumstances warrant, to order the proceeds be distributed to serve the best interests of the parties"). While fo rcing the sale of a property is generally an extraordinary remedy, we discern no error by the court here based on plaintiff's established long-term purposeful noncompliance. We next turn to plaintiff's arguments that the court failed to provide sufficient reasoning to support ordering him to pay $7,920 in attorney's fees and costs and "three separate $100[-]per[-]day sanctions." Plaintiff asserts reversal is warranted because the court was required to conduct an "assessment of [his] finances or ability to pay" and consider that he was facing "a foreclosure action" as well as "numerous judgments." He also argues we should consider he "has made payments" since the court's October 7, 2025 order and that "an entirely fresh adjudication based upon a complete and updated record" is appropriate. We apply a deferential standard of review to a Family Part judge's award of attorney's fees. Bisbing v. Bisbing, 468 N.J. Super. 112 , 121 (App. Div. 2021). However, "[w]e will disturb a trial court's determination on [attorney's] fees" when there has been a "clear abuse of discretion." Strahan v. Strahan, 402 A-0784-25 13 N.J. Super. 298, 317 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 317 (1995)). We further note the court has discretion to employ a sanction upon a finding of a violation of a judgment or order. See Kohn's Bakery, Inc. v. Terracciano, 147 N.J. Super. 582, 584-85 (App. Div. 1977) ("There is no doubt at all of the right of a trial judge . . . to impose sanctions for . . . failures to obey the orders of the court."). "Rule 1:10-3 allows a court to enter an order to enforce litigant's rights commanding a disobedient party to comply with a prior order" or face sanctions. Milne, 428 N.J. Super. at 198 . After a review of the record, we are constrained to reverse the court's order awarding $7,920 for defendant's attorney's fees incurred for filing the enforcement motion, the daily $100 sanctions, and the 8% interest sanction on the $4,412.50 attorney's fee plaintiff previously owed pursuant to the May 10, 2022 order. While we recognize the court is authorized to assess such sanctions when faced with long-term noncompliance, the court here failed to provide findings of fact and conclusions of law to support these awards. "[A]ppellate review is impeded when a trial court fails to 'state its factual findings and conclusions of law on the record as required by Rule 1:7-4(a).'" Parke Bank v. Voorhees Diner Corp., 480 N.J. Super. 254 , 266 (App. Div. 2024) (quoting Lakhani v. Patel, 479 N.J. Super. 291 , 297-98 (App. Div. 2024)). A A-0784-25 14 "trial [court] is required to 'state clearly its factual findings and correlate them with the relevant legal conclusions.'" Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015) (quoting Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 570 (1980)). We have held "that 'an articulation of reasons is essential to the fair resolution of a case.'" Raspantini v. Arocho, 364 N.J. Super. 528, 532 (App. Div. 2003) (quoting Schwarz v. Schwarz, 328 N.J. Super. 275, 282 (App. Div. 2000)). In determining whether to award [attorney's] fees in a family matter, the court must consider: (1) the financial circumstances of the parties; (2) the ability of the parties to pay their own fees or to contribute to the fees of the other party; (3) the reasonableness and good faith of the positions advanced by the parties both during and prior to trial; (4) the extent of the fees incurred by both parties; (5) any fees previously awarded; (6) the amount of fees previously paid to counsel by each party; (7) the results obtained; (8) the degree to which fees were incurred to enforce existing orders or to compel discovery; and (9) any other factor bearing on the fairness of an award. [R. 5:3-5(c).] Further, Rule 4:42-9(b) provides that "all applications for the allowance of fees shall be supported by an affidavit of services addressing the factors enumerated by RPC 1.5(a)." Thus, in accordance with Rule 4:42-9 and Rule 5:3-5(c), the court was required to address the relevant factors and explain its award of $7,920 A-0784-25 15 for attorney's fees. On remand, the court is directed to make findings pursuant to RPC 1.5(a), including as to the amount of the fees charged, the attorney's time and work performed, the difficulty of the work performed, the reasonableness of the fees, and other relevant factors. Regarding the daily $100 sanctions and 8% interest, the court provided no reasons for ordering these penalties. See R. 5:3-7(c); R. 1:10-3. In awarding "relief to litigant's rights," the court was "obliged to balance the interests of the party for whose benefit the order issued against those of the party-obligor, without losing sight of the legal system's interest in the integrity of judicial orders." Innes v. Carrascosa, 391 N.J. Super. 453, 498-99 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting Anyanwu v. Anyanwu, 333 N.J. Super. 345, 352 (App. Div. 2000)). Regarding the increased interest on the $4,412.50 in attorney's fees owed, which was to be paid within thirty days, the court was required to explain its award pursuant to Rule 4:42-11(a). While the Rule allows a [court] "to depart" from its prescriptions, the court is required to provide its reasoning for the increased amount awarded. Johnson v. Johnson, 390 N.J. Super. 269, 276 (App. Div. 2007). We therefore vacate these sanctions and direct the court on remand to provide detailed reasons for imposing such penalties after balancing the parties' A-0784-25 16 interests. See R. 1:7-4(a). Our remand is limited for the court to address these sanction issues. We next address plaintiff's contention that the court erred in denying his cross-motion to modify the 2022 orders and for a plenary hearing to address credits for alleged college tuition payments. We disagree. "The modification of alimony is best left to the sound discretion of the trial court." Innes v. Innes, 117 N.J. 496, 504 (1990). It is well recognized that in considering a modification motion, the court must first determine whether the moving party has made a prima facie showing of changed circumstances. R.K. v. F.K., 437 N.J. Super. 58, 62 (App. Div. 2014). A spouse's obligations "are always subject to review and modification on a showing of 'changed circumstances.'" Crews v. Crews, 164 N.J. 11, 28 (2000) (quoting Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 146 (1980)). "The movant 'must meet the threshold standard of changed circumstances' to be entitled to discovery and an evidentiary hearing or trial." R.K., 437 N.J. Super. at 62 (quoting J.B. v. W.B., 215 N.J. 305, 327 (2013)). Regarding plaintiff's alleged entitlement to a credit for college payments, the record demonstrates plaintiff offered no material evidence showing the parties had reached an agreement as to college costs nor did he sufficiently A-0784-25 17 demonstrate payments for college expenses. We agree with the court that plaintiff had the burden of making a prima facie showing of both to support the court's ordering discovery and a hearing regarding his application for a credit against his arrears owed to defendant. For these reasons, we are convinced the court correctly denied plaintiff's cross-motion finding he failed to demonstrate a change in circumstances warranting discovery and a plenary hearing. To the extent that we have not addressed plaintiff's remaining arguments, it is because they lack sufficient merit to be discussed in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and the issuance of a remand decision within ninety days. We do not retain jurisdiction. A-0784-25 18