Dcpp v. M.W.G., Jr., in the Matter of G.G.

RECORD IMPOUNDED NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0713-24 NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. M.W.G., JR.,1 Defendant-Appellant. ________________________ IN THE MATTER OF G.G., a minor. ________________________ Argued September 14, 2026 – Decided October 16, 2026 Before Judges Berdote Byrne and Perez Friscia. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Burlington County, Docket No. FN-03-0103-24. 1 We use initials and fictitious names to protect the privacy interests and confidentiality of the record. See R. 1:38-3(d)(12). Meghan K. Gulczynski, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney; Meghan K. Gulczynski, of counsel and on the briefs). Jessica A. Prentice, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney; Sookie Bae-Park, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Jessica A. Prentice, on the brief). Melissa R. Vance, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for minor G.G. (Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney; Meredith Alexis Pollock, Deputy Public Defender, of counsel; Melissa R. Vance, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM Defendant M.W.G., Jr. ("Mark") appeals from the September 30, 2024 Family Part order dismissing plaintiff the New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency's ("Division") complaint for the care and custody of his daughter, G.G. ("Gina"), pursuant to Title 9, N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 to -8.73, and Title 30, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-11 to -15.4 ("FN litigation"). Mark asserts the trial court erred in dismissing the FN litigation at the Division's request without affording a plenary hearing to address custody and parenting time with Gina. Having reviewed the record, parties' arguments, and applicable law , we affirm. I. We summarize the pertinent facts and procedural history from the record. A-0713-24 2 Mark is Gina's father, and she was born in 2012. Gina began residing with Mark after her mother, L.P. ("Lori"), passed away in August 2021. Prior to Lori's passing, the Division had received several referrals concerning Gina's welfare based on alleged domestic violence between Mark and Lori and Lori's substance abuse. The Division's investigations did not establish or substantiate an abuse or neglect finding. In October 2023, the Division received a referral concerning Gina's welfare based on allegations that Mark was experiencing delusions and paranoia. After the police were dispatched to investigate an incident at their residence, Mark was involuntarily committed to a medical facility. The Division thereafter placed Gina in the care of paternal relatives. After Mark was discharged, the Division received another referral regarding his statements to a neighbor that "the government wanted to kill [the neighbor] but [Mark] and [Gina] would be fine and go to heaven." Mark had removed Gina from school to allegedly provide homeschooling. In November 2023, the Division closed the investigation. In December 2023, the Division received another referral concerning Gina because Mark was commenting about "[G]od, religion[,] and redemption," and A-0713-24 3 Gina "smelled like marijuana." The Division met with Mark, but he "refused to participate in mental health treatment or medication management." In February 2024, police officers responded to Mark's residence after receiving a call about an "unknown male screaming at passing cars with a bullhorn." Neighbors reported that Gina was "gesturing and signaling for help" from a window and it was unknown when she had last left the residence. Mark allegedly stated that "the Central Intelligence Agency . . . was following [them]" and a "neighbor was the devil." "The police . . . observed [Gina] inside the house," "[s]he appeared extremely nervous and scared," she "signal[ed,] 'Help me,'" and "Bible verses [were blasting] out [of] the window." Gina reported her father "made comments about 'sacrificing her to God.'" Mark told police officers that "he was from a chosen bloodline[,]" "was being stalked by the [p]rosecutor and the [f]reemasons[,]" and "someone had a contract on his soul." Mark "denied any mental health diagnoses and [that] he was taking any medications." A Division caseworker responded to the residence and met with Gina. Gina advised the caseworker she was not permitted to attend school, no one was checking her homeschooling work, and she missed school because she "had a lot of friends." Gina described that Mark would yell on a bullhorn, he exhibited other concerning behavior, and she was scared. After Gina's maternal aunt, T.P. A-0713-24 4 ("Tina"), arrived, the caseworker learned Tina believed Mark's mental health had been declining over time. The caseworker advised Mark that the Division was conducting an emergency removal due to his mental health and need for a medical evaluation. He responded that the "Division was trying to 'kill [his] seed' and 'harvest [Gina's] soul.'" On February 27, 2024, the Division filed a verified complaint and order to show cause ("OTSC") seeking care, custody, and supervision of Gina pursuant to Title 9 and Title 30. The trial court ("first court") held a hearing the same day, which Mark could not attend because he was hospitalized. The first court granted the Division custody of Gina, resulting in her placement with her maternal grandmother, M.P. ("Marie"). Because Mark had prevented Gina from attending school, the court ordered Marie to enroll Gina in school immediately. Mark was granted supervised parenting time with Gina and ordered to comply with "psychiatric and substance abuse evaluations." Marie thereafter filed an OTSC under an FD complaint docket before a different court ("second court") seeking legal custody of Gina, permission to take Gina to a pediatrician, and authorization to enroll Gina in school. On March 15, 2024, the second court awarded Marie "temporary sole, legal[,] and residential custody of [Gina]." It specifically ordered that Marie was permitted A-0713-24 5 to enroll Gina in Marie's local school district and to make all necessary medical decisions. The second court scheduled the return of the OTSC "FD application" for a hearing and required the Division to provide "a status update." On March 19, 2024, the first court presided over the return of the FD OTSC and FN litigation. The Division, Gina's Law Guardian, Marie, and Mark appeared represented by counsel. Marie's attorney advised the first court that the FD action was filed before the second court as Marie was having issues enrolling Gina in school, trouble communicating with the Division caseworkers involved, and difficulty making Gina's medical appointments. Marie requested continued custody of Gina because Mark's mental health issue was not an "isolated" incident and there were "substantial . . . concerns." While Marie sought to maintain custody, she did not seek any monetary support from Mark. The Division agreed Marie should retain "custody of [Gina]." The Division explained it requested Mark "comply with the recommendations" of his inpatient psychiatric evaluation, would not request he undergo further evaluations, and that once the FD order addressed Mark's parenting time, it would move to "dismiss[] the [FN] litigation." The Division requested the court specify in the FD order that Mark's parenting time be supervised. A-0713-24 6 Gina's Law Guardian represented that Gina supported Marie's FD custody application as she wanted to reside with Marie. The Law Guardian explained that Marie was "in the process of putting [Gina] back in school," Gina had lived with Marie in the past, had her own bedroom, and had a strong relationship with Marie. The Law Guardian further requested Mark's parenting time remain supervised and "at [Gina's] discretion." Mark advised the first court that he was: released the prior day from an inpatient treatment program; going to be evicted from his residence; "no longer . . . employed"; and "unable to take care of" Gina. Mark, through his attorney, stipulated he was not opposing Marie's "custody application" and Gina's "placement." He acknowledged requiring "treatment" to at "some point . . . regain custody of his child" and requested the first court not dismiss the FN litigation as he was seeking additional services from the Division. Mark also represented his mother agreed to supervise parenting time with Gina. Based on Mark's agreement that Marie would retain custody of Gina, the first court determined that the FD custody application was resolved by consent. The first court specifically memorialized that Mark did not oppose Marie "having sole custody of [Gina]" and an amended FD order would be entered stating that parenting time "remain" supervised and "at [Gina's] discretion." The A-0713-24 7 first court explained it would enter a companion FN order referencing the amended FD order's consent provisions and including that parenting time with Gina was at her "discretion" and "under the sight and sound supervision of [the Division]." The first court also noted Marie, as Gina's custodian, had to be joined in the FN litigation. On March 22, 2024, the Division filed an amended complaint, Marie was added as a defendant, and the Division requested to continue the "care and supervision" of Gina pursuant to Title 9 and Title 30. On May 14, 2024, the first court held a case management conference. The Division moved to dismiss the FN litigation, which Gina's Law Guardian joined. The Division argued dismissal was appropriate as there was an "FD order in place," awarding Marie custody and "requir[ing] . . . contact between" Gina and Mark "be supervised and . . . at the discretion of" Gina. The Division further argued that dismissal of its complaint was appropriate because it agreed with Marie "getting custody of [Gina]," it had no "concerns" for either Mark or Gina, and Mark and Gina were not "receiving any services through the Division." The Division advised the first court that Mark was "engaged with Reservoir Health where he [was] getting . . . medical and mental health treatment," which were A-0713-24 8 services the Division did not provide. Further, the Division explained Gina was no longer receiving services as she had concluded therapy. Gina's Law Guardian requested the Division's complaint be dismissed because Gina was "happy and healthy in [Marie's] home." Mark objected to dismissal of the complaint because he wanted the first court to continue the proceedings, hold a fact-finding hearing, and provide "an adjudication that this family is either in need of services or that [Gina] is a[n] abused or neglected child." He asserted he intended to seek reunification with Gina in the future and dismissing the case was "in practical effect a termination of parental rights ." Mark acknowledged being unemployed, receiving services, and residing in a room for housing. Mark explained he did "not have the [financial] means to reopen the case in order to get custody of [Gina] back." The Division responded that dismissal was warranted because it made a finding that abuse or neglect was "unfounded" and had no concerns for Mark or Gina; therefore, it did not believe Mark's arguments were sufficient to require the FN litigation be kept open. The Division argued Marie had obtained the FD order awarding her custody of Gina, pursuant to the "custody agreement" with Mark. It maintained that custody of Gina "did[ not] switch on . . . behalf of the A-0713-24 9 Division." The Division further explained that because it determined abuse or neglect was unfounded, there was no necessity for a fact-finding hearing. Gina's Law Guardian argued against a fact-finding hearing because "the Division did not request that change in custody," asserting rather that the second court changed custody because Marie filed the FD application and at "the FD application [hearing,] . . . [Mark] did not oppose" Marie obtaining sole custody. Based on the "unusual circumstance" that Mark was "seeking to keep the case open and the Law Guardian and Division [we]re seeking to close it," the first court issued an order adjourning the FN litigation to "research . . . and determine . . . what [wa]s appropriate," recognizing the FN matter "may be dismissed" at a later time. On June 27, 2024, the first court heard from the Division and Mark's counsel that in exchange for the Division "not putting on [a] Title 9" case, Mark would waive his right to a Title 9 fact-finding hearing, and the first court would enter an "established" administrative finding of abuse or neglect, which he would not appeal. Mark was questioned regarding the waiver of his rights, and he admitted that he was "hospital[ized] for [twenty-two] days," unable "to parent [his] daughter," and had failed to take prescribed medication, resulting in her placement "in the care of others." A-0713-24 10 Gina's Law Guardian moved for termination of the FN litigation, arguing Mark "stipulated" to an administrative "established finding," Gina was in Marie's custody, and the Division was not providing further services to Gina and Mark. The Division explained it was "fine with the [FN] matter staying open for another cycle" but made no objection to Gina's Law Guardian's request. Mark argued against dismissing the FN litigation because it would violate the spirit of New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency v. J.C., 257 N.J. 451 (2024), as Mark believed he could not adequately "represent [himself] when . . . seek[ing] to get custody . . . or [parenting time]" with Gina. The first court issued an order accompanied by an oral decision denying Gina's Law Guardian's request to dismiss the FN litigation, finding it was in Gina's best interests to "continue under the care and supervision of the Division." The first court requested the Division "explore additional mental health services" for Mark and offer "support groups" to Gina. It reasoned that "Mark would be restricted from seeing Gina if . . . [it] close[d] the case under the current posture." A-0713-24 11 On September 30, 2024, the court held another status review.2 The Division moved to dismiss the FN litigation, highlighting that Gina's Law Guardian requested the matter be closed, Mark and Gina were still not receiving services through the Division, and there was no valid "reason to keep the litigation open anymore." After the last status review, the Division provided resources to Mark, which he utilized, and services to Gina. The Division argued dismissal was warranted because it was not requiring Mark to have supervised parenting time, it did not object to removing the FD order's provision that Mark's parenting time had to "be under the sight and sound supervision of [the Division,]" and he could seek custody of Gina "through the FD process." The Division highlighted that it placed no restrictions on Mark and the FD custody order conditioned Mark's parenting time to Gina's discretion. The Division again emphasized dismissal was supported and it "should not be straddled [with] the litigation" as it was not providing any "services for assistance to any of the parties." Gina's Law Guardian emphasized it was "the third time that [Gina] ha[d] requested that the litigation be terminated." 2 We recognize different terms for the court's review are used by the parties. We use "status review" pursuant to the Directive #08-25 promulgated by the Administrative Office of the Courts. Admin. Off. of the Cts., Admin. Directive #08-25, Family – Children in Court – Change in Terminology: Renaming "Compliance Review" to "Status Review" (Dec. 5, 2025). A-0713-24 12 Mark objected to dismissal of the FN litigation, acknowledging Marie had moved for custody under the FD docket "simultaneously" with the Division's involvement based on his declining mental health. He argued the Division filed a complaint under the FN docket because it had concerns. If the Division's complaint was dismissed, Mark maintained he would be unable to effectively "proceed without counsel" in the FD matter, which his "disability" made complicated, and he further requested to "get[] the help that he need[s]." He asserted that a dismissal would "effectively . . . terminate . . . his parental rights." The first court issued an order granting the Division's and Law Guardian's requests to dismiss the FN litigation. The first court explained in its accompanying oral decision the "case ha[d] been open since March [2024] . . . without any movement" and that keeping the matter open did not "result[] in any coming together of the family." In determining to dismiss the FN litigation, the first court was "satisfied that the best interests of [Gina] require[d] entry of [the] order" and that pursuant to the FD order "legal custody of [Gina]" would continue with Marie. On appeal, Mark contends the court erroneously dismissed the FN litigation while he remained under the continued restraint of parenting time at Gina's discretion. He further argues that the dismissal of the Division's A-0713-24 13 complaint has wrongly deprived him of counsel and foreclosed his right to a plenary hearing on parenting time with Gina. II. "Appellate courts defer to a trial court's factual findings when they are 'supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence.'" N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. B.P., 257 N.J. 361 , 373 (2024) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998)). The afforded "deference is . . . tempered when the trial court did not hear testimony[] or make credibility determinations based on the demeanor of witnesses." N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. S.K., 456 N.J. Super. 245, 262 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. J.D., 447 N.J. Super. 337, 350 (App. Div. 2016)). Further, we review a court's interpretation of legal issues de novo. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. J.R.-R., 248 N.J. 353 , 368 (2021). When the Department of Children and Families receives an abuse or neglect referral, the Division conducts an "investigation . . . designed to assess and assure a child's health and safety" and "gathers evidence regarding the child's condition, obtains statements from the child, interviews alleged perpetrators or other witnesses, requests available police reports, and consults with medical and educational professionals." N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & A-0713-24 14 Permanency v. V.E., 448 N.J. Super. 374, 386 (App. Div. 2017). "[T]he Division usually pleads Title 9 and Title 30 claims concurrently in order to facilitate the efficient processing of assistance to the family, particularly to the child who is the focus of the inquiry." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. I.S., 214 N.J. 8, 31 (2013); see also id. at 37 (recognizing circumstances that Title 9 and Title 30 "operate independently from one another"). "[A] child's safety is the pervasive concern prompting the initiation of a Title 9 action." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. J.D., 417 N.J. Super. 1, 21 (App. Div. 2010); see also N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.11 (describing the Division's responsibility to investigate allegations and take immediate action as "necessary to insure the safety of the child"); N.J.A.C. 3A:10-2.3, -3.1 to -3.3. After the Division has removed a "child from an offending parent charged with abuse or neglect, which may be confirmed or rejected following a fact-finding hearing, any dispositional review must consider" "whether the offending parent has abated the harm previously posed" and "whether other parties have asserted the child's best interest[s] demands that custody rest elsewhere." J.D., 417 N.J. Super. at 22 . We have held "the same Family Part judge must preside over . . . third-party [custody] actions that are inextricably intertwined with the Division's case." Ibid. A-0713-24 15 After the "receipt of a referral indicating parental unfitness or equivalent concerns, 'the Division can seek a court order [under Title 30] to intervene and require a [parent] to undergo treatment, or seek other relief, if the best interests of the child so require.'" I.S., 214 N.J. at 33 (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. A.L., 213 N.J. 1, 31-32 (2013)); see also N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12. Title 30 provides an "additional tool afforded [to] the Division to discern the most appropriate course of action for a child and his or her family in need of the Division's assistance." Ibid. (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. J.C., 423 N.J. Super. 259, 267-68 (App. Div. 2011)). Our Supreme Court has recognized, "N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12 provides the means for the Division to effectuate services to children in need when a parent does not consent to the Division's supervision, care, or custody." Ibid. In "Title 30 actions, the court must be satisfied when entering temporary relief under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12 that the Division has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that it is in the best interests of the child to enter the relief requested." Id. at 38. "N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12 provides that any order entered by the court is effective for six months. If the Division believes services will be needed beyond that point, 'the Division may apply for an extension of that order, requesting a summary hearing and disposition on its request.'" J.C., 257 N.J. at 464 (quoting A-0713-24 16 I.S., 214 N.J. at 37 ); see also Admin. Off. of the Cts., Admin. Directive #07-26, Family – Children in Court – Title 30 Summary Hearing and Disposition Procedure (FN Docket) (Apr. 17, 2026). The court "may extend the order provided that it is satisfied, by the preponderance of the credible evidence, that the best interests of the child require continuation of that order." Ibid. (quoting I.S., 214 N.J. at 37-38 ). III. Mark contends the first court erred in dismissing the Division's complaint because he had "continuing restraints on . . . parenting time and custody with his daughter." He specifically argues that dismissal of the Division's complaint foreclosed his right to a plenary hearing on parenting time with Gina and "resulted in a de facto termination of . . . [his] parental rights." After a review of the record, we disagree. We begin by recognizing that Mark's consensual resolution of the FD litigation with Marie is relevant to his argument that the Division's FN litigation was improperly dismissed without affording a custody and parenting time hearing. On March 15, 2024, the second court granted Marie's FD OTSC for temporary custody of Gina, finding it was in Gina's best interests to reside with Marie because Mark was hospitalized and unable to care for Gina. On March A-0713-24 17 19, 2024, the first court presided over Marie's FD hearing for custody of Gina and held a case management conference on the Division's complaint. Under the FD matter, Mark, represented by counsel, explicitly agreed to Marie's "custody application," her having sole custody of Gina, and her registering Gina in Marie's school district. Mark acknowledged requiring continued mental health "treatment," having no suitable residence, and being unemployed. Regarding his consent to supervised parenting time with Gina, Mark asserted his mother agreed to act as a supervisor. In the FD custody order, the first court memorialized Mark's agreement to Marie's custody of Gina and included parenting time conditions, which the Division supported. The first court noted Mark did not oppose Marie's "having sole custody of [Gina]" in the FD matter and that the order would state Marie had "custody until further order of the [c]ourt." Mark at no point asserted an objection. The record demonstrates Mark agreed to the first court entering an order awarding Marie custody of Gina and he has not challenged that order based on a change in circumstances. In New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services v. W.F., we recognized that a parent may consent to a change of custody in an FD action while an FN litigation is pending. 434 N.J. Super. 288, 296 (App. Div. 2014). When a parent "consent[s] to [a] custody arrangement, and [has] not A-0713-24 18 challenge[d] the FD order embodying that arrangement, he[ or she] cannot raise the issue of the custody" thereafter in an appeal challenging the dismissal of the FN litigation under Title 9 and Title 30. Id. at 299 ; see also N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. S.D., 453 N.J. Super. 511, 523 (App. Div. 2018) (affirming the termination of FN litigation when the parent consented to custody in an FD proceeding and establishing that courts should hold "a combination FD/FN hearing [to] ensure the participation of defense counsel and the Law Guardian"). We have also explained that a parent who argues that a "custodial arrangement . . . agreed to . . . is no longer appropriate . . . may raise that issue in the [FD] docket, for example, by filing a motion to change custody alleging sufficient changed circumstances." W.F., 434 N.J. Super. at 299 ; see also N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. N.D., 417 N.J. Super. 96, 115 (App. Div. 2010) (recognizing that a parent may resolve "questions of custody and parenting time by agreement"); N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. M.D., 417 N.J. Super. 583, 621 (App. Div. 2011) (acknowledging that while an FN litigation is pending, parents may enter an "agreement that include[s] terms regarding [their] children's custody"). Here, the first court appropriately presided over the FD and FN matters as trial courts that "handle FN and FD dockets may choose to A-0713-24 19 handle the matters separately or at the same time." B.C. v. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency, 450 N.J. Super. 197, 205 (App. Div. 2017). Further relevant to our review, Mark does not dispute being represented by counsel at the March 19, 2024 FD/FN hearing and consenting to the custody terms memorialized in the FD order. Nor does he refute that he may seek a change of the custody and parenting time provisions based on a change in circumstances. The Division appropriately moved to dismiss its complaint because it was no longer providing Mark or Gina services and did not object to the custody and parenting time agreement Mark entered with Marie, which the Law Guardian supported in Gina's best interests. Mark undisputedly is not precluded from seeking a change of custody in the FD action. Our Supreme Court has explained that a Title 30 action should be dismissed "when the court determines that neither services nor supervision are required to ensure the child's health and safety." J.C., 257 N.J. at 466. We are therefore convinced the first court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the Division's complaint. We also note procedurally that the Division filed its complaint in February 2024. The court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12 was permitted to enter the order "that the child requires care and supervision by the [D]ivision." "[H]owever, . . . such order shall not be effective beyond a period of six months from the date of A-0713-24 20 entry unless the court, upon application by the [D]ivision, at a summary hearing held upon notice . . . , extends the time of the order." I.S., 214 N.J. at 35 (quoting N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12). In the present case, the Division requested dismissal multiple times because it determined there was no reason to extend its care and supervision of Gina, as it was satisfied with the custody agreement Mark had entered. While the first court continued the FN litigation to ensure Mark was provided Title 30 services, it thereafter correctly dismissed the Division's complaint in September 2024 as all the services were completed, which occurred approximately six months after the original order was entered. For completeness, we next address Mark's contention that the first court's dismissal of the FN litigation wrongly deprived him of the assistance of appointed counsel under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.4(c) and inhibited his ability to seek a modification of the FD order's custody and parenting time provisions. Stated another way, the crux of his argument is that the first court's dismissal of the FN litigation was erroneous because he will not be appointed counsel for an FD application and does not believe he can adequately proceed self-represented. It is clear that "for abuse and neglect charges under Title 9, indigent parents facing either temporary loss of custody or permanent termination of their parental rights have a right to appointed counsel in Title 30 proceedings 'in light of the A-0713-24 21 magnitude of the consequences involved.'" J.C., 257 N.J. at 465 (quoting Crist v. N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs., 135 N.J. Super. 573, 575 (App. Div. 1975)). However, "when a Title 30 action is terminated, . . . so too is the right to the appointment of counsel." Id. at 466. Because the first court correctly dismissed the FN litigation, Mark was not wrongly deprived of counsel. Finally, we reject Mark's argument that the first court should not have dismissed the FN litigation because the Division maintained restrictions on his parenting time. A review of the record reveals otherwise. The Division withdrew its request for supervised parenting time and expressed no concerns with the FD custody and parenting time agreement entered. Notably, Mark cites to no existing Division restriction and only references the custody and parenting time terms he and Marie agreed to, which were placed on the record at the March 19, 2024 hearing. Thus, Mark's reliance on the Supreme Court's holding in J.C. is misplaced. The Supreme Court in J.C. held a parent had the right to counsel for further proceedings when the Division had maintained restraints, which resulted in "continued involvement with the family without the requisite judicial oversight." Id. at 465-66. The first court here removed the Division's requirement that "[a]ll contact between [Gina] and [Mark] . . . be under the sight and sound supervision of [the Division]." Unlike in J.C., the Division placed no A-0713-24 22 restraints on Mark and there was no continued oversight. For these reasons, we are convinced Mark's argument that the FN litigation was erroneously dismissed lacks merit. To the extent that we have not addressed the parties' remaining contentions, it is because they lack sufficient merit to be discussed in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Affirmed. A-0713-24 23