L.A. v. C.A.F.

RECORD IMPOUNDED NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1269-25 L.A.,1 Plaintiff-Respondent, v. C.A.F., Defendant-Appellant. ________________________ Submitted October 1, 2026 – Decided October 16, 2026 Before Judges DeAlmeida and Chase. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Camden County, Docket No. FV-04-0579-26. David T. Garnes, LLC, attorney for appellant (David T. Garnes, on the brief). L.A., self-represented respondent. PER CURIAM 1 We use initials in accordance with Rule 1:38-3(d)(10). Defendant C.A.F. appeals from a November 3, 2025 final restraining order (FRO) entered in favor of plaintiff L.A., pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. Because the trial court did not comply with Rule 1:7-4, we vacate the FRO, reinstate the temporary restraining order (TRO), and remand for a new trial before a different judge. I. We set forth, in some detail, the history between the parties from the record to give context. L.A. and C.A.F. have known each other since high school. They began a romantic relationship in 2021, and the relationship has been "on and off" since then. Although they were once engaged and lived together for a period, they never married. They have no children together. The events relevant to this appeal began largely in February 2023. L.A. alleged that, during a trip to Iceland, C.A.F. took her cell phone and reviewed her personal photographs and messages. The next incident occurred one evening in May 2023. C.A.F. went to L.A.'s home while she and her four children were asleep. He entered using a key that L.A. had hidden outside the home. L.A. did not realize he was there until she heard someone, turned on her nightlight, and saw C.A.F. "at the bottom of her bed on all fours." C.A.F. told her "he had a really hard day, and he was A-1269-25 2 meeting with one of his friends . . . and [that] he just wanted to come and pray for [her]." L.A. asked him to leave, and he did. The next alleged incident occurred in June. L.A. alleged that, after an argument in her home, C.A.F. became verbally aggressive, grabbed her, caused her to fall onto her bed, and choked her. L.A. did not report the incident to police because she hoped the parties could reconcile through therapy. A few weeks later, L.A. was at Jay's Elbow Room in Maple Shade. She invited C.A.F. to join her and sent him her location. When C.A.F. arrived, he took L.A.'s phone and refused to return it. Both parties had been drinking. Before they left the bar, L.A.'s friend, J.D., punched C.A.F. in the face. The parties then left in separate vehicles, but C.A.F. followed L.A. to her home in Cherry Hill. Once inside, L.A. asked him to return her phone and leave, or she would call the police. C.A.F. followed her upstairs and sat at the foot of her bed, hoping to discuss what had happened at the bar. L.A. did not want to talk. Although she told him to leave, he remained there. The confrontation then became physical. C.A.F. asked whether he could sleep on the couch, and L.A. told him he had to leave. L.A. went downstairs and tried "to push him out of [the] house." She then tried to get her phone so she could call the police, but C.A.F. would not return it, and she could not reach A-1269-25 3 her landline. L.A. went back upstairs to her bedroom, and C.A.F. followed her. According to L.A., C.A.F. put his arm around her neck and released her only after she told him the contact was painful. L.A. further alleged that C.A.F. then put a blanket over her head, making it difficult for her to breathe. She said she was able to remove the blanket after approximately ninety minutes. The altercation ended when L.A. called for her children because she "felt . . . that was the only way that [C.A.F.] would get off of [her]." After she yelled for them, C.A.F. began to leave. He placed her phone on the staircase. Once L.A. regained access to the phone, she called 911. Emergency personnel responded to the home. They photographed injuries to L.A.'s arms and wrists. Although C.A.F. had left, he returned to L.A.'s residence at 8:00 a.m. the next day. L.A. immediately shut the door and called the detective, who arrived "five minutes" later. Criminal charges followed, and the criminal court entered a no-contact order against C.A.F. After that incident, L.A. obtained a TRO against C.A.F. based on criminal restraint, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-2, and harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c). The court held a trial at the end of July. After hearing testimony, the court denied an FRO. The court reasoned that, although L.A. had shown a predicate act, she had not proven that she needed an FRO to protect her from immediate danger or further A-1269-25 4 acts of domestic violence. The court warned C.A.F. that, if another FRO hearing occurred, the underlying facts could be used against him. On August 9, 2025, C.A.F. allegedly showed intimate videos of L.A. to her platonic friend, J.D. The videos depicted L.A. and C.A.F. engaged in sexual relations. J.D. said he had not asked to see them. The next night, L.A. was at the W Hotel in Philadelphia, a place both parties frequently visited. She was there with J.D. when C.A.F. allegedly came within three feet of her. L.A. then spit in C.A.F.'s face and left the hotel in an Uber with J.D. C.A.F. alleged that L.A. also showed him her middle finger. Four days later, the court granted L.A. a second TRO against C.A.F. for harassment based on the sharing of the video and the incident at the W Hotel. On October 31, 2025, the court granted C.A.F. a TRO against L.A. based on the spitting incident at the W Hotel. A trial on the cross-complaints occurred on November 3. Both parties had counsel, and both testified. L.A. also called J.D. as a witness. The court did not enter a sequestration order. After J.D. testified about the W Hotel incident and remained in the courtroom, the court recalled him to testify about C.A.F.'s alleged display of the intimate videos. A-1269-25 5 After hearing the evidence, the court found that the parties had a dating relationship under the PDVA. It then stated: "Clearly, we have some proof here of the parties doing things, offensive touching under 2C:33-4(b). Clearly, there is some proof here." The court then stated that it also needed proof "that there is a necessity of one party or the other party that needs the final restraining order." It found L.A. more credible than C.A.F. and reasoned that C.A.F.'s "controlling behavior" established that L.A. needed an FRO. The court entered an FRO against C.A.F. and dismissed the TRO complaint against L.A. C.A.F. presents four issues on appeal: (1) "the trial court erred in finding that defendant committed a 'predicate act' of domestic violence"; (2) "the trial court erred in finding that the 'domestic contretemps' constituted an act of domestic violence"; (3) "the trial court erred by considering prior alleged acts of domestic violence that were previously dismissed by the court after a final restraining order hearing"; and (4) "the trial court erred in permitting plaintiff's witness, J.D., to testify after he had been released as a witness."2 II. Ordinarily, "[w]e accord substantial deference to Family Part judges, who routinely hear domestic violence cases and are 'specially trained to detect the 2 C.A.F. does not challenge the dismissal of his TRO against L.A. A-1269-25 6 difference between domestic violence and more ordinary differences that arise between couples.'" C.C. v. J.A.H., 463 N.J. Super. 419 , 428 (App. Div. 2020) (quoting J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 482 (2011)). "[D]eference is especially appropriate 'when the evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility.'" MacKinnon v. MacKinnon, 191 N.J. 240, 254 (2007) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998)). Generally, "findings by a trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015). We will not disturb a trial court's factual findings unless "they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant[,] and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412 (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). We do not accord such deference to the court's legal conclusions, which we review de novo. Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269, 283 (2016). The entry of a final restraining order under the PDVA requires the trial court to make certain findings pursuant to a two-step analysis. See Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112, 125-27 (App. Div. 2006). Initially, the court "must determine whether the plaintiff has proven, by a preponderance of the credible A-1269-25 7 evidence, that one or more of the predicate acts set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a) has occurred." Id. at 125 (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)). Harassment, as defined by N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4, is one of the predicate acts of domestic violence. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a)(13). Harassment occurs when a person: a. Makes, or causes to be made, one or more communications anonymously or at extremely inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse language, or any other manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm; b. Subjects another to striking, kicking, shoving, or other offensive touching, or threatens to do so; or c. Engages in any other course of alarming conduct or of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy such other person. [N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4.] A finding of harassment requires proof that the defendant acted "with purpose to harass." N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4; see Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 124 . Courts "must consider the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the harassment statute has been violated." H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 175 N.J. 309, 326 (2003) (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 404 ). If the court finds the defendant committed a predicate act of domestic violence, the court must then determine whether it "should enter a restraining A-1269-25 8 order that provides protection for the victim." Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 126 . In those cases where "the risk of harm is so great," J.D., 207 N.J. at 488 , this second inquiry "is most often perfunctory and self-evident." Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 127 . In all cases, "the guiding standard is whether a restraining order is necessary, upon an evaluation of the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1) to -29(a)[7], to protect the victim from an immediate danger or to prevent further abuse." Ibid.; see also D.M.R. v. M.K.G., 467 N.J. Super. 308 , 324 (App. Div. 2021). Those factors are: (1) The previous history of domestic violence between the plaintiff and defendant, including threats, harassment and physical abuse; (2) The existence of immediate danger to person or property; (3) The financial circumstances of the plaintiff and defendant; (4) The best interests of the victim and any child; (5) In determining custody and parenting time the protection of the victim's safety; and (6) The existence of a verifiable order of protection from another jurisdiction; (7) Any pattern of coercive control against a person that in purpose or effect unreasonably interferes with, threatens, or exploits a person's liberty, freedom, bodily integrity, or human rights with the court specifically A-1269-25 9 considering evidence of the need for protection from immediate danger or the prevention of further abuse. If the court finds that one or more factors of coercive control are more or less relevant than others, the court shall make specific written findings of fact and conclusions of law on the reasons why the court reached that conclusion[.] [N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a).] "A history of domestic violence may serve to give content to otherwise ambiguous behavior and support entry of a restraining order." J.D., 207 N.J. at 483 . Because "the Legislature did not intend that the commission of one of the enumerated predicate acts of domestic violence automatically mandates the entry of" an FRO, a trial judge is required to make specific findings as to whether restraints were necessary to "protect the victim from an immediate danger or to prevent further abuse." Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 127 . "That inquiry serves to ensure that the protective purposes of the Act are served, while limiting the possibility that the Act, or the courts, will become inappropriate weapons in domestic warfare." J.D., 207 N.J. at 488 . III. We begin with the trial court's failure to connect its factual findings to the governing law. See R. 1:7-4(a) (requiring the court in non-jury trials "by an A-1269-25 10 opinion or memorandum decision, either written or oral" to "find the facts and state its conclusions of law"); Elrom v. Elrom, 439 N.J. Super. 424, 443 (App. Div. 2015). "[N]aked conclusions" do not satisfy Rule 1:7-4, Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 570 (1980), and the Rule's requirements are "unambiguous." Estate of Doerfler v. Fed. Ins. Co., 454 N.J. Super. 298, 302 (App. Div. 2018). "Rather, the trial court must state clearly its factual findings and correlate them with the relevant legal conclusions." Curtis, 83 N.J. at 570 . Because Rule 1:7-4(a) informs both the parties and this Court of the rationale underlying the court's conclusions, "appellate review can be impeded when Rule 1:7-4 is not complied with and a remand might be necessary." Lakhani v. Patel, 479 N.J. Super. 291 , 298 (App. Div. 2024); Ducey v. Ducey, 424 N.J. Super. 68, 74 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting Esposito v. Esposito, 158 N.J. Super. 285, 291 (App. Div. 1978)); see Shulas v. Estabrook, 385 N.J. Super. 91, 96 (App. Div. 2006). Although the court found "some proof here of the parties doing things, offensive touching under 2C:33-4(b)," it did not identify the elements of harassment or explain how the evidence satisfied them. A finding of "some proof" of "offensive touching" is not enough. Even if the conduct might objectively suggest harassment, the court still had to make specific findings supporting that offense under New Jersey law. See H.E.S., 175 N.J. at 327 . A-1269-25 11 The court also made no finding that C.A.F. acted with the purpose to harass. That finding is required before a court may conclude that a defendant committed harassment. E.M.B. v. R.F.B., 419 N.J. Super. 177, 182 (App. Div. 2011). Nor did the court's statement that C.A.F. lacked credibility fill that gap. See ibid. Although a court may infer a purpose to harass from the evidence, common sense, and experience, the court did not do so. H.E.S., 175 N.J. at 327 . These omissions prevent meaningful review. Because the trial court performed only a cursory evaluation of the evidence and did not make the required findings, we cannot determine whether its decision rests on adequate, substantial, credible evidence. Gnall, 222 N.J. at 428 . The court also declined to address Silver's second prong. Instead, it stated only that C.A.F.'s "controlling behavior" warranted an FRO. The court did not analyze the other statutory factors or discuss the parties' prior history of domestic violence, despite L.A.'s testimony and documentary evidence on that issue. We briefly address C.A.F.'s argument that the court should not have considered incidents from the first FRO trial at the second trial. At the first trial, the court found a predicate act of domestic violence but concluded that L.A. did not need an FRO. On remand, the court may still consider that earlier finding A-1269-25 12 as evidence of prior domestic violence, even though it previously determined that the second Silver prong was not met. In view of the court's credibility assessment, on remand the case should be assigned to another judge. See R. 1:12-1(d); Pressler and Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 4 on R. 1:12-1 (2027) (stating "the appellate court has the authority to direct that a different judge consider other matters on remand and in subsequent proceedings in order to preserve the appearance of a fair and unprejudiced hearing"). In remanding this matter, we express no opinion on the merits of the FRO application. Instead, we direct the new trial judge to fully consider the evidence and issue a decision pursuant to Rule 1:7-4. The FRO is vacated and the TRO against C.A.F. is reinstated. Vacated and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction. A-1269-25 13