Maria Aguirre v. Cdl Last Mile Solutions, LLC

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0591-25 MARIA AGUIRRE, ANDREA PALACIOS and LORENA VARAS, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. CDL LAST MILE SOLUTIONS, LLC, SUBCONTRACTING CONCEPTS, LLC, d/b/a SCI, ANTHONY CURCIO, Defendants-Appellants, and KATTY PONCE, Defendant. _____________________________ Argued September 15, 2026 – Decided October 16, 2026 Before Judges Rose and Natali. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, Docket No. L-1172-23. Theodore Eder argued the cause for appellants CDL Last Mile Solutions, LLC and Anthony Curcio (Weber Gallagher, attorneys; Theodore Eder, on the briefs). Scott Simpson (Menken Simpson & Rozger LLP) of the New York bar, admitted pro hac vice, argued the cause for respondents (A.Y. Strauss LLC, attorneys; Scott Simpson, Raya F. Saksouk, (Menken Simpson & Rozger LLP) of the New York bar, admitted pro hac vice, Daniel J. Cohen and Daniel C. Stark, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM Defendants CDL Last Mile Solutions, LLC (CDL), Subcontracting Concepts, LLC d/b/a SCI (SCI), and Anthony Curcio challenge two orders dated June 4, 2025 and September 25, 2025. The June 4 order granted plaintiffs' application to certify this New Jersey Wage and Hour Law, N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a to -56a38 (NJWHL), and New Jersey Wage Payment Law, N.J.S.A. 34:11-4.1 to -4.14 (NJWPL), dispute as a class action, appointed class representatives and class counsel. On September 25, the court modified its June 4 order by clarifying and expanding the class to include drivers based out of CDL's Moonachie and Carlstadt facilities, while narrowing the class to exclude individuals classified by defendants as employees who oversaw work performed by delivery drivers. A-0591-25 2 Before us, defendants argue the court erred when it certified the class because plaintiffs' counsel initially sued Katty Ponce, one of defendants' former employees, whom they contend fell within the class as originally pled which caused a permanent, disqualifying conflict. According to defendants, that conflict was not remedied by her later dismissal from the case or by the court's exclusion of certain supervisory employees from the class pursuant to the September 25 order. Defendants also contend the: 1) record does not support the court's finding that Ponce fell within the terms of the September 25 order, 2) revised class definition improperly excluded individuals who otherwise belonged in the class, 3) class includes drivers who may be adverse to one another because some drivers allegedly hired or paid other drivers, and 4) certification was premature on an insufficiently developed record. After reviewing the record against the applicable legal principles, we are convinced the court properly exercised its discretion when it determined plaintiffs satisfied Rule 4:32-1, including subsection (a)(4)'s adequacy of representation prong, after the parties consented to the dismissal of Ponce with prejudice before certification and the class was later refined to exclude employees who oversaw work performed by delivery drivers. We further determine the court acted properly when it modified the class definition before A-0591-25 3 final judgment, and the record at the certification stage was sufficient to support that preliminary class-management decision. Finally, we are satisfied the court acted well within its discretion when it determined common questions concerning defendants' classification and compensation practices predominated over any individualized issues, and when it concluded certification was appropriate without additional discovery. I. Defendant CDL is a regional delivery service specializing in logistics and last mile delivery services that operates warehouses in Moonachie, Carlstadt, and Westampton. Defendant SCI, a Delaware LLC, headquartered in New York, "provides third-party administrative support for courier and logistics companies." Defendant Curcio is the owner and operator of CDL. Plaintiffs are New Jersey residents and work as delivery drivers for CDL. They make deliveries exclusively in New Jersey and report to either the Moonachie or Carlstadt warehouses. On March 2, 2023, plaintiffs filed a putative class action complaint seeking damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, attorneys' fees and costs. The complaint alleged the class included at least one hundred "delivery drivers who performed work for [d]efendants in the State of New Jersey from March A-0591-25 4 2017, until [d]efendants cease their unlawful acts." Plaintiffs claimed they were misclassified as independent contractors and denied overtime pay in violation of the NJWHL. Plaintiffs also alleged defendants unlawfully deducted from their wages in violation of the NJWPL. Both CDL and SCI moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule 4:6-2(e), and to compel arbitration. The court denied their motions and stayed the litigation pending appeal. We affirmed, concluding New Jersey law applied, and that the arbitration agreements were unenforceable under Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 219 N.J. 430, 436 (2014). See Aguirre v. CDL Last Mile Solutions, LLC, A-3346-22 (App. Div. Feb. 26, 2024) (slip op. at 3-4). The Supreme Court denied certification. Maria Aguirre, Andrea Palacios and Lorena Varas v. CDL, Anthony Curcio, Katty Ponce, and SCI, 257 N.J. 590 (2024). On remand, plaintiffs moved to certify a class covering all delivery drivers based out of CDL's "New Jersey warehouses" and for the appointment of class representatives and class counsel. Defendants opposed plaintiffs' application and noted the complaint only alleged facts related to CDL's Moonachie facility. At oral argument, defendants raised a conflict of issue argument related to Ponce, a logistics coordinator who was also an owner/operator delivery driver A-0591-25 5 working out of the Moonachie warehouse. Defendants argued that plaintiffs' initial decision to name Ponce as a defendant was a conflict of interest because she was a delivery driver who fell within their proposed class definition. They also asserted that Ponce was neither a manager nor a supervisor. When the court noted that Ponce appeared to be "managing on behalf of the company," defendants' counsel clarified she was only "hired to help coordinate in addition to her duties as an . . . independent contractor." Thus, defendants maintained she fit within the same general contractual and operational framework as other Moonachie drivers—namely, as one of CDL's independent-contractor delivery operators contracting through SCI—and that any coordination responsibilities did not place her outside that group. Stated differently, defendants characterized Ponce as similar to the putative class members in both the nature of her delivery work and their respective contracts. Plaintiffs' counsel disagreed with defendants' characterization of Ponce's role and maintained the proposed class of delivery drivers were "heavily supervised" by Ponce. Addressing the initial decision to name her as a defendant, plaintiffs contended they were unaware of the potential conflict issue and noted that defendants raised it approximately two years into the litigation. To address these issues, the court requested supplemental briefing on the A-0591-25 6 potential conflict and other issues raised at oral argument. Shortly thereafter, the parties agreed to stipulate the dismissal of all claims as to Ponce with prejudice. On June 4, 2025, the court entered an order granting plaintiffs' motion for class certification. Although the form order referred to delivery drivers based out of CDL's "New Jersey warehouse(s)," the court's accompanying written rider made clear the court was, at that time, limiting the certified class to drivers based out of the Moonachie warehouse. The court explained the record before it did not support certification with respect to drivers from the Carlstadt or Westampton facilities. 1 In addition, in its June 4 rider, the court noted that plaintiffs had proposed excluding individuals who were, or had been, classified by defendants as employees who oversaw work performed by delivery drivers. The court did not formally incorporate that exclusion into the class definition until the September 25 order. 1 As discussed below at page ten, the discrepancy between the broader language in the order and the narrower limitation set forth in the rider was later addressed in the September 25 order, which expanded the class to include drivers based out of Moonachie and the Carlstadt predecessor facilities, but not Westampton, and also excluded individuals classified by defendants as employees who oversaw work performed by delivery drivers. A-0591-25 7 The court found that the Moonachie drivers were required to report on site every morning, perform several hours of work, and were under the direction and control of a Ponce, a New Jersey-based supervisor. The court specifically described Ponce as a "CDL dispatcher who was primarily responsible for supervising CDL's New Jersey drivers." Next, the court explained its reasons why plaintiffs satisfied Rule 4:32-1(a)(1) through (a)(4). The court found plaintiffs' proposed class included approximately one hundred and fifty individuals who worked as delivery drivers. The court also determined there existed numerous common questions among plaintiffs and the putative class members. The court specifically found that plaintiffs satisfied Rule 4:32-1(a)(3)'s typicality requirement because plaintiffs sought to represent all CDL delivery drivers who were misclassified as independent contractors and therefore denied overtime pay for hours exceeding forty a week and allegedly suffered unlawful deductions from their wages. Further, the court determined plaintiffs' interest aligned with the proposed class members and plaintiffs ' counsel were experienced litigators specializing in employment-related matters. Next, the court found plaintiffs satisfied Rule 4:31-(b)(3)'s predominance and superiority requirements, as each class member alleged they were misclassified as independent contractors and signed agreements drafted by SCI. A-0591-25 8 The court determined that this misclassification formed the basis of defendants' failure to pay overtime to plaintiffs and the putative class members. The court also found a class action was a superior method of addressing the parties' disputes rather than filing over one hundred separate actions. Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration with respect to the conflict of interest issue and, alternatively, to clarify the geographic scope of the class consistent with the June 4 rider. In support of their opposition, plaintiffs included the deposition of James Carr, a former facilities manager at the Moonachie and Carlstadt warehouses, in which he testified Ponce's job responsibilities included manager-related work. Carr added that he delegated to Ponce the responsibility of distributing driver numbers and login information. Ultimately, the court denied defendant's motion for reconsideration and found the initial decision to sue Ponce was not a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, specifically RPC 1.7, that would preclude class certification. In addition, regardless of Ponce's status, the court concluded she could pursue her claims in or outside the class. On September 25, the court modified the June 4 order by (1) expanding the certified class to include delivery drivers who worked at the Moonachie and Carlstadt facilities, but not the Westampton warehouse, and (2) excluding from A-0591-25 9 the class employees classified by defendants as employees who oversaw work performed by delivery drivers. The court found the inclusion of plaintiffs' proposed carve-out within the certified class definition to be in the interest of justice. The court also found the carve-out consistent with plaintiffs' complaint, and the inclusion adequately protected the interests of both the certified class and any employee who worked in a hybrid role. II. We first address the standard of review that governs our analysis. Defendants argue we should review the certification orders de novo because, in their view, the appeal turns on legal questions concerning conflicts of interest and the interpretation of Rule 4:32-1(a)(4), rather than on discretionary class- management determinations. They further contend the trial court's certification ruling rested on legal error and an insufficient review of the record. We disagree, in part, with defendants' contentions. An order granting or denying class certification is generally reviewed for abuse of discretion. Dugan v. TGI Fridays, Inc., 231 N.J. 24, 50 (2017). When reviewing such an order, we determine whether the trial court followed the standards set forth in Rule 4:32-1, and properly exercised its discretion in applying those standards to the record before it. See Dugan, 231 N.J. at 50 ; Lee A-0591-25 10 v. Carter-Reed Co., LLC, 203 N.J. 496, 506 (2010). That deferential standard governs most of the issues defendants raise, including adequacy, predominance, superiority, and the management or modification of the class definition. We review de novo only pure legal questions, including any interpretation of the RPCs. See Manalapan Realty v. Tp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995); International Union of Operating Engineers Local No. 68 Welfare Fund v. Merck & Co., Inc., 192 N.J. 372, 386 (2007). The trial court's factual findings remain entitled to deference so long as they are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record. See Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974). For mixed questions of law and fact, we give deference to the supported factual findings but review de novo the trial court's application of legal rules to factual findings. State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 416 (2004). With that framework in mind, we address defendants' arguments in the following order. First, we address the adequacy of representation issue. Second, we discuss the principles granting the court's authority to modify the class and to exclude hybrid supervisory employees. Third, we consider defendants' predominance contentions in light of alleged conflicts among drivers, and finally defendants' arguments that plaintiffs' certification application was premature. A-0591-25 11 Class actions are joinder devices in which "[o]ne or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all." R. 4:32-1; Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 191 N.J. 88, 103 (2007). Before a class action can commence, the class must be certified. R. 4:32-2(a). The two primary considerations when certifying a class are whether the class seeking certification meets the general prerequisites and whether the applicant has satisfied the requirements of one of the three alternative types of class actions described in Rule 4:32–1(b). Under the Rule, a party seeking to certify a class must establish numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation, such that "the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." R. 4:32-1(a)(1)-(4). "[A] class action should lie unless it is clearly infeasible." Riley v. New Rapids Carpet Ctr., 61 N.J. 218, 225 (1972). III. We turn first to defendants' challenge to adequacy of representation under Rule 4:32-1(a)(4). Defendants argue that, once the class complaint was filed, counsel owed duties to the putative class, including Ponce if she fell within the original class definition, and therefore could not sue her while also seeking to represent the class. In defendants' view, that conflict was irreconcilable and permanent, and was not cured by dismissing Ponce with prejudice or by later A-0591-25 12 redefining the class to exclude employees who oversaw delivery drivers' work. We are not persuaded. In our view, defendants' adequacy argument requires us to determine whether plaintiffs and their counsel could fairly and adequately represent the class as ultimately certified, after Ponce was dismissed and the class definition was narrowed to exclude employees who oversaw work performed by delivery drivers. We are satisfied that Ponce's dismissal and the court's later modification of the class addressed defendants' adequacy concerns. Rule 4:32-1(a)(4) requires that "the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." The adequacy determination is comprised of two key inquiries: whether the named plaintiffs' interests are antagonistic to the absent class members and whether counsel can prosecute the case competently and vigorously. Delgozzo v. Kenny, 266 N.J. Super. 169, 188 (App. Div. 1993); Laufer v. U.S. Life Ins. Co. in City of New York, 385 N.J. Super. 172, 181-82 (App. Div. 2006). When considering this issue, we find significant the timing of the relevant events. Here, the parties stipulated to dismiss Ponce with prejudice on May 5, 2025. The court then entered the initial class-certification order on June 4. As noted, on September 25, the court modified the class definition to exclude A-0591-25 13 individuals classified by defendants as employees who oversaw work performed by delivery drivers. The court did not certify a class while Ponce remained an active defendant. Even accepting defendant's premise that counsel owed some duty to the putative class before certification, we are satisfied the trial court acted within its discretion in certifying the class after Ponce was dismissed. We reject defendants' reliance on RPC 1.7 to support the proposition that any purported conflict was incurable, and that plaintiffs' counsel breached their fiduciary obligations to the putative class when it filed the complaint to include Ponce, assuming she fell within the class as originally pled. We reach this conclusion because class-action procedure does not compel courts to mechanically equate absent putative class members with traditional individual clients of class counsel before certification. New Jersey courts regularly look to federal authority for guidance in construing Rule 4:32. See Delgozzo, 266 N.J. Super. at 188 . Courts addressing the analogous federal rule have recognized that the pre-certification relationship between proposed class counsel and absent putative class members differs from the ordinary attorney-client relationship. See In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litigation, 965 F.Supp.2d 104, 115-16 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing ABA Mod. Rules Prof. 1.7, comment 25). Thus, even assuming counsel owed some A-0591-25 14 pre-certification obligations to the putative class, the court was not obligated to treat plaintiffs' naming Ponce as a defendant as a permanent, automatic bar to adequacy where Ponce was dismissed before the certification order was entered and the class was subsequently narrowed to exclude any employee who oversaw the work of delivery drivers. Defendants rely on In re Cadillac V8-6-4 Class Action, 93 N.J. 412 (1983), May v. Gladstone, 562 F. Supp. 3d 709 (C.D. CA 2021), and unpublished decisions for the proposition that conflict-of-interest concerns can defeat class certification. 2 We find those authorities unpersuasive as they address materially different facts and legal principles. In Cadillac, the conflict arose because the same attorney sought to serve both as class counsel and class representative, creating a direct tension between counsel's own interest and those of the class. 93 N.J. at 439-40 . In May, a class counsel's representation was financed by a third party with its own separate, adverse business objectives, raising the concern that counsel's litigation decisions could be influenced by interests external to the class. 562 F. Supp. 3d at 713-14. 2 Under Rule 1:36-3, an unpublished opinion holds no binding or precedential value. A-0591-25 15 Here, defendants identify no conflict between class counsel and a named plaintiff, or between counsel's own financial or personal interests and those of the class. Instead, they point to a potential conflict between the named plaintiffs' initial decision to sue Ponce and the interests of a putative class member who, defendants contend, shared the same employment status as other hybrid -role workers. Even if such a conflict existed when the case was first pled, for reasons stated, it was not permanently disqualifying under these circumstances as Ponce was dismissed with prejudice before certification and the court later refined the class definition to exclude employees who oversaw work performed by delivery drivers. Further, the court was authorized to address the concern through appropriate case management. See Little v. Kia Motors Am., Inc., 242 N.J. 557 , 590 (2020) (explaining that the trial court has substantial control over management of a class action, including molding the class.) The dismissal of Ponce before certification removed her as an active defendant, and the later refinement of the class removed from the certified class the category of employees whom the court understood to have overseen the work of delivery drivers. On this record, it was reasonable for the court to conclude that any A-0591-25 16 adequacy concern defendants identified had been addressed without requiring wholesale denial of class treatment. We also note that defendants have not cited any controlling New Jersey authority requiring a court to treat the initial decision to name a defendant as a permanent bar to adequacy once that defendant has been dismissed before certification and excluded from the class as certified. We decline to adopt such an inflexible rule in the class-certification context. To the extent defendants advance an argument that plaintiffs' counsel breached his fiduciary duty to the putative class when he filed the complaint naming Ponce, and that decision independently required denial of plaintiffs' motion, we reject that contention as well on this record. Again, if counsel owed some degree of pre-certification duty to absent putative class members, the court was not required to treat the initial pleading decision as an irrevocable bar once Ponce was dismissed prior to certification and the class later modified. We also reject defendants' related suggestion that the September 25 order potentially deprived excluded individuals of their opt-out rights or violated their due process rights. Any individual excluded from the certified class is, by definition, not a class member in this action and therefore not bound by any class judgment. See In re School Asbestos Litigation, 56 F.3d 515, 519 (3d Cir. 1995) A-0591-25 17 (stating "only [class] members can be legally bound by settlements or judgments in the class action"). Further, the September 25 amendment of the class definition did not adjudicate the merits of any such person's individual claims. It only concluded that such claims would not proceed within the class as presently certified. IV. We next address defendants' challenge to the court's September 25 modification of the class definition. Defendants argue the court lacked both a sufficient factual basis and proper legal authority to modify the class to exclude individuals classified by defendants as employees who oversaw work performed by delivery drivers, and they further contend the record did not support treating Ponce as falling within that exclusion. As noted, defendants maintain Ponce was not a supervisory employee but instead had dual roles as a logistics coordinator and a delivery owner-operator and therefore should have remained within the class. Again, we disagree with defendants' arguments. A class certification order may be revised or modified any time before final judgment. R. 4:32-2(a); Baskin, 246 N.J. at 182. Indeed, when a court certifies a class, it is "free to modify [the certification order] in the light of subsequent developments in the litigation." Muise v. GPU, Inc., 371 N.J. Super. A-0591-25 18 13, 33 (App. Div. 2004) (citing General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982)). The court may therefore shape, refine, and, if necessary, narrow the class as new information comes to light. In re Cadillac, 93 N.J. at 437 ; Iliadis, 191 N.J. at 119-20 ; Little, 242 N.J. at 590. Those principles fully support the court's decision. The court was permitted to revisit the class definition as the record developed and to refine it in a manner that preserved class cohesion and addressed issues raised during the certification proceedings. Muise, 371 N.J. Super. at 33; In re Cadillac, 93 N.J. at 437 . The court expressly explained that the modification clarified the intended scope of the class and resolved the uncertainty surrounding the proposed exclusion. That reasoning fits well within the rubric of Rule 4:32-2(a), and the interlocutory nature of certification orders. The record also supported the court's preliminary conclusion, for certification purposes, that Ponce fell within the exclusion. At this stage, the court was not required to, and did not, make a final merits determination as to Ponce's precise legal status. Rather, it was only required to determine whether the record supported excluding employees whom defendants classified as employees and who oversaw work performed by delivery drivers. A-0591-25 19 On that point, the motion record included evidence from which the court could preliminarily find that Ponce communicated reporting times to drivers, monitored their work, directed aspects of their performance, and conveyed discipline-related consequences through the group communications plaintiffs submitted, acknowledging that defendants disputed that those activities made her a supervisor. In addition, that record included deposition testimony from James Carr who described Ponce as a coordinator that assisted with driver- related logistics on the warehouse floor. That evidence was sufficient, again at the preliminary certification stage, to support the court's interim determination that logistics coordinators such as Ponce fell within the exclusion. We stress that the court did not, at this stage, make final adjudicatory factual or legal determinations as to Ponce's ultimate employment status, supervisory authority, or the merits of any claim she might assert. Instead, the court determined only that the motion record was sufficient, for interim class - management purposes, to exclude from the certified class those employees whom defendants classified as employees and who oversaw work performed by delivery drivers. Defendants' contrary evidence—that Ponce also performed deliveries and did not possess ultimate hire-fire authority—does not compel a different result. A-0591-25 20 The exclusion adopted by the court was not limited to high-level managers. Instead, it addressed those employees who oversaw work performed by delivery drivers, and it expressly referenced logistics coordinators, like Ponce, as an example. We are satisfied the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Ponce fit within that description for purposes of defining the class. Nor was the court's decision inconsistent in recognizing that Ponce might possess claims of her own while excluding her from the certified class. The court's point was simply that an employee with a hybrid role could pursue any distinct claims outside the certified class. See Iliadis, 191 N.J. at 108 (explaining that individual issues do not decertify a class and "may remain following resolution of common questions"). V. We next consider defendants' argument that the class fails to satisfy Rules 4:32-1(a) and (b)(3) because certain class members may be adverse to one another. Specifically, defendants contend that certain drivers allegedly hired, A-0591-25 21 paid, or subcontracted work to other drivers, creating intra-class conflicts and individualized issues that defeat predominance.3 Predominance under Rule 4:32-1(b)(3) requires a court to determine whether common questions of law or fact predominate over questions affecting only individual members. The inquiry is not merely numerical but rather a qualitative assessment. Lee, 203 N.J. at 519-20 . To maintain a class action based on predominance, the Rule requires the trial court find "that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." R. 4:32-1(b)(3); see also Dugan, 231 N.J. at 49 . A plaintiff need not show the absence of all individual issues. Instead, the question is whether the proposed class seeks to remedy a common legal grievance and whether the common issues are sufficiently significant to warrant collective adjudication. Iliadis, 191 N.J. at 108-09 ; In re Cadillac, 93 N.J. at 431 . 3 We disagree with plaintiffs' arguments that defendants failed to raise the alleged intra-class adversity issue regarding drivers who purportedly subcontracted with or paid other drivers to perform their work and that class certification was premature as additional discovery was necessary. Defendants clearly raised those issues before the court, and we accordingly address them on the merits. A-0591-25 22 Against that standard, we are satisfied the court had a sufficient basis to conclude common issues predominated. The central questions identified by the court concerned defendants' common: (1) classification model; (2) agreements used in the owner-operator arrangement; (3) operational rules imposed on drivers, and (4) compensation and deduction practices challenged under the NJWHL and NJWPL. Those issues are not displaced merely because some drivers may have operated through business entities or may have contracted with other drivers. We are unpersuaded by defendants' reliance on Dewey v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft for the proposition that a "fundamental conflict" may exist when some class members were allegedly harmed by conduct that benefited other class members. 681 F. 3d 170, 184 (3d Cir. 2012). In Dewey, the Third Circuit found a fundamental intra-class conflict bearing on adequacy of representation because a settlement divided a class into two groups that received materially different benefits, giving one group priority access to a limited reimbursement fund, and placed all named representatives within that preferred group. 681 F. 3d at 187-90 . Here, defendants maintain, without sufficient record support, that certain drivers may have hired or subcontracted work to other drivers creating a A-0591-25 23 potential conflict between two distinct classes of drivers who may possess claims against the other. The difference between the two cases is readily apparent. Whereas Dewey involved a demonstrated actual conflict within the proposed class, here at most, defendants identified a potential issue concerning one or a very small number of drivers within a putative class of approximately one hundred and fifty members. At this preliminary stage, the record did not require the trial court to conclude that any such arrangements created a fundamental intra-class conflict defeating predominance. The court was entitled to determine that those asserted differences did not override the larger, more prominent issues into how defendants classified and paid their delivery-drivers. If later discovery reveals that particular driver-to-driver arrangements materially alter the Rule 4:32 analysis, the court retains authority to revisit the class structure. At bottom, we are concerned it would be contrary to well-settled class action principles to deny class treatment to larger groups of allegedly aggrieved drivers based on issues defendants have identified as to only one or a very small number of workers. The issues defendants identified do not outweigh the common questions affecting the broader cohort of drivers, particularly where the court remains free to refine the class or address any genuinely distinct claims A-0591-25 24 through its later case-management power. We reach the same conclusion with respect to individualized damages questions. Variations in hours worked, routes performed, or amounts paid do not alone defeat certification where the core liability issues are common and may be addressed with similar evidence. VI. Finally, we address defendants' argument that certification of the class was premature because plaintiffs filed their application before the record had been sufficiently developed through discovery, including depositions, and because, in defendants' view, the court relied too heavily on the complaint when making its decision. In the alternative, defendants seek a remand for further discovery. It is undisputed that plaintiffs moved for certification within a relatively short period after defendants filed their answer, but a class certification application at such an early stage is not uncommon. Indeed, Rule 4:32-2(a) contemplates that certification will be addressed at an "early practicable time," not only after full merits discovery has been completed. Further, the court did not certify the class based only on the pleadings. In addition to the complaint, the motion record included relevant contracts, certifications from the named plaintiffs and putative class members, warehouse A-0591-25 25 communications, and selected deposition materials developed during the certification proceedings. That record was sufficient for the court to perform the certification analysis required at that stage, particularly because class - certification orders remain interlocutory and subject to later refinement under Rule 4:32-2(a). The court likewise acted within its discretion in concluding that class treatment was the superior method of adjudication. See In re Cadillac, 93 N.J. at 436-47 . The court determined that requiring numerous drivers to file separate wage-and-hour actions would risk duplicative litigation and inconsistent rulings on the same core classification and compensation issues. On this record, defendants have not shown that the trial court acted without a rational basis or outside the bounds of Rule 4:32 in certifying the class when it did. In sum, we are convinced the court did not misapply its considerable discretion when it applied Rule 4:32 and when it concluded based on the record before it, that plaintiffs satisfied the class action requirements including the requirement of adequacy of representation and when it determined common issues concerning defendants' classification and compensation practices predominated over individualized issues. In addition, we are satisfied the court A-0591-25 26 had a sufficient basis to exclude from the class those employees who oversaw work performed by delivery drivers. We stress, however, consistent with the Rule and applicable case law, the September 25 certification order remains interlocutory, and the court retains authority before final judgment to alter or amend them as appropriate, including by narrowing or otherwise refining the class, creating subclasses, or decertifying the class in whole or in part, as appropriate. Nothing in this opinion should be construed as an expression of our view on any final order. In addition, we do not resolve the ultimate merits of Ponce's status, the substantive claims of any excluded employee, or any subcontractor, joint-employment, or related liability issue. We hold only that the record before the motion court supported certification of this class, as later refined by the September 25 order, at this preliminary stage of the proceedings. Accordingly, our disposition reflects only that the record before the motion court supported certification; it does not foreclose any subsequent modification if factual development shows that individual issues, hybrid roles, or intra-class conflicts materially affect the propriety or scope of class treatment. R. 4:32-2(a); In re Cadillac, 93 N.J. at 437 ; Lee, 203 N.J. at 530 . A-0591-25 27 Affirmed. A-0591-25 28